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ABSTRACT 
	
IMAGINING BHARAT: ROMANCE, HEROISM, AND HINDU NATIONALISM 
IN THE BENGALI NOVEL, 1880-1920 
Monika R. Bhagat-Kennedy 
Ania Loomba 
Although the Republic of India was founded as a secular democracy, the country has long been 
plagued by sectarian violence between its Hindu majority and Muslim minority. Scholars have 
examined how the 1940s Indian nationalist movement and the 1947 Partition of the subcontinent 
laid the foundation for communal tensions, but the long-standing conception of India as a 
fundamentally Hindu nation has received less attention. This dissertation examines colonial Bengal at 
the turn of the twentieth century in order to trace the longer history behind the widespread belief 
that India is a fundamentally Hindu nation—the animating tenet of contemporary Hindutva 
ideology. Reading works composed in Bengali and English, I demonstrate how the Bengali novel 
played a central role in perpetuating and, at times, contesting this Hindu cultural imagining by 
strategically exploiting elements of indigenous oral and literary traditions alongside key themes of 
British Orientalist discourse. The dissertation argues that turn-of-the-century Bengali writers were 
paramount in politicizing the emerging understanding of India as the mythic Hindu utopia “Bharat,” 
a term lifted from ancient religious texts that, for many Hindus today, represents not just India’s true 
identity but also its only acceptable future. 
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
IMAGINING INDIA AS A HINDU NATION  
 
 In 1884, Sir John Strachey, an esteemed and long-serving official of the British Raj, 
delivered twelve lectures on India at the University of Cambridge. Strachey covered a range 
of topics including the army, tax policy, education, and the administration of justice. Of 
particular interest is Strachey’s introductory address, which begins with a reflection on a 
peculiar quandary that confronted British officials when discussing India with those who 
were unfamiliar with it. Concurring with the observations of his eminent colleague Henry 
Sumner Maine, Strachey stated that there was indeed a certain “ignorance regarding 
India…even among educated men in England,” such that there was a need to establish even 
basic matters of fact.1 To this end, Strachey made no apology for posing two rudimentary 
questions to his audience at the outset of his lecture: “What is India? What does this name 
really signify?”2   
The answer, Strachey declared, was seemingly paradoxical yet true: “There is no such 
country, and this is the first and most essential fact about India that can be learned.”3 Later 
in his address he repeated that indeed the “first and most essential thing to learn about 
India” is that  
…there is not, and never was an India, or even any country of India, possessing, according to 
European ideas, any sort of unity, physical, political, social, or religious; no Indian nation, no 
‘people of India’ of which we hear so much...4 
 
It must not be supposed that [governmental] bonds of union can in any way lead 
towards the growth of a single Indian nationality. However long may be the duration 
of our dominion, however powerful may be the centralizing attraction of our 
Government, or the influence of the common interests which grow up, no such 
                                                
1 John Strachey, India, 1. Henry Sumner Maine (1822-1888) was a renowned British jurist and historian; his 
most well-known work on India was Village-Communities in the East and West (1871).  
2 Ibid., 2. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid., 5. Emphasis added. 
  
2 
issue can follow. It is conceivable that national sympathies may arise in particular 
Indian countries; but that they should ever extend to India generally, that men of the Punjab, 
Bengal, the North-Western Provinces, and Madras, should ever feel that they belong to one great 
Indian nation, is impossible. You might with as much reason and probability look 
forward to a time when a single nation will have taken the place of the various 
nations of Europe.5 
  
In the lecture Strachey posited an extended analogy between India and Europe—like 
Europe, India is “a name which we give to a great region including a multitude of different 
countries,” or, as he states elsewhere, a “continent.”6 The official made his case on the basis 
of what he called the “great,” “extreme,” and “immense” diversity of India and its 
inhabitants.7 While on the one hand India’s disparate “countries” remain isolated from one 
another due to factors such as differing climates and a vast geographic terrain, Indians 
themselves are fragmented along the lines of language, religion, and race.8 As Strachey 
clarified elsewhere in his address, his use of the word “country” was deliberate, a means of 
emphasizing the exceedingly decentralized, isolated nature of India’s constituent parts. Yet 
this analogy between Europe and India only went so far, for while Europe boasted nations, 
the “continent” of India did not: “I have spoken of the different countries of India, but they 
are not countries in the ordinary European sense. A European country is usually a separate 
entity, occupied by a nation more or less socially and politically distinct. But in India…there 
are no nations of the modern European type.”9 In Strachey’s highly qualified schema, India 
was not a “country” but a “continent,” one that itself contained only “countries,” and not 
                                                
5 Ibid., 8. Emphasis added. 
6 Ibid., 2. 
7 Ibid., 3, 7, 8. 
8 Ibid., 2-3. 
9 Ibid., 4. 
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nations: “India is a name which we give to a great region including a multitude of different 
countries. There is no general Indian term that corresponds to it.”10 
Strachey’s many qualified assertions betray his convoluted logic. His deployment of 
the term “country” is striking, used to refer to what were more conventionally known as 
provinces, or, in the case of those areas surrounding the three major British administrative 
strongholds of Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta, “presidencies.”11 Yet Strachey avows that 
even though the term “presidency” was rampant in British parlance, it was actually devoid of 
meaning: “British India is now divided not into the three presidencies of Bengal, Madras, 
and Bombay, but into provinces, eight of which are extensive countries under separate 
Governments.”12  
If the political landscape of India was indeed as fractured as Strachey describes, what 
had been the purpose and role of the Raj? Although the colonial state performed a number 
of centralizing and organizing operations such as “regulat[ing] and harmonis[ing] the 
Governments of the British provinces, control[ling] the Native States and our relations with 
foreign powers…mak[ing] war and peace, and manag[ing] those branches of the 
administration which directly concern the general interests of the empire,” Strachey argues 
that such activities could never produce the conditions necessary for nation-making in 
India.13 Not only does the sheer diversity of peoples and places in the “continent” make 
nationalism an impossibility, there also lay the more fundamental problem that Indians were 
                                                
10 Ibid., 2. 
11 Metcalf and Metcalf, A Concise History of Modern India, 47. 
12 Strachey, 10. 
13 Ibid., 8. 
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unfamiliar with “political citizenship” and related concepts such as fatherland, mother 
country, patriotism, and the like.14   
 Significant cultural developments across India and in Bengal in particular belied 
Strachey’s claims. Less than a decade before his lectures at the University of Cambridge, a 
prominent Bengali man named Nundolal Dey published a series of articles on the supremacy 
of ancient Indian culture in Bengal Magazine under a pseudonym. Encouraged by the 
favorable attention his work had received, Dey republished the articles as a book entitled 
Civilization in Ancient India under his own name in approximately 1902.15 In the preface, Dey 
stated that his purpose was to 
…deal with some of the subjects in which the ancient Hindus attained a high degree 
of excellence and to trace some of the causes of their decline. If this little book can 
excite in the mind of my reader any interest for India, past or present, I shall 
consider it not written in vain. 
 
As foretold by Civilization’s opening claim, “All authorities agree that India is one of the 
earliest civilized countries in the world,” the text was teeming with provocative propositions 
about the excellence of the ancient Hindus in arbitrary cultural categories including the 
“Arts,” “Science,” “Literature,” “Philosophy and Religion,” and “Manners and Customs.”16 
Voicing popular ideas of the moment, Dey asserts that the progenitors of India’s Hindus 
were not aborigines but rather the descendants of mythical Aryans who had migrated from 
Central Asia at some point in the distant past.17 Also referring to this group as the “Aryan 
                                                
14 Here Strachey cites Alfred Lyall’s Asiatic Studies, which he praises highly and urges his audience to read in 
order to “understand what India really is.” In his footnote Strachey notably concedes that he was taking 
liberties with Lyall’s observations: “Sir Alfred Lyall was specially referring to Central in this passage, but it is 
equally true of India generally.” 
15 Dey’s preface is dated October 14, 1902; Civilization in Ancient India was likely published around this time. As 
noted on the title page, Dey had been employed by the Bengal Judicial Service and was a member of the Asiatic 
Society of Bengal. He was also the author of The Geographical Dictionary of Ancient and Medieval India, published in 
Calcutta in 1899. 
16 Dey, Civilization in Ancient India, 1. 
17 Ibid. See also 75.  
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Hindus,” Dey proclaims that the ancient Hindus were a mighty people who boasted a highly 
advanced culture though they lacked historical records documenting their many 
achievements: “There is no systematic history of India before the Mahomedan conquest: the 
facts are meagre and scattered. The Rajatarangini is the annals only of a single province. The 
antiquarian must grope his way through the gloom of ancient India by long and laborious 
researches.”18  
Whether and to what extent Dey had performed such inquiries is questionable given 
that the majority of his claims stand as mere declarations while the remaining are supported 
by reference to either Hindu texts such as the Ramayana and the Manusmriti or the work of 
various British Orientalists and historians on India including William Jones (1746-1794), 
Henry Thomas Colebrooke (1765-1837), and Mountstuart Elphinstone (1779-1859). While 
the historical quotient of nearly all of Dey’s pronouncements is more than dubious, the 
writer’s comments about the present state of Indian historiography are enlightening:  
The knowledge of the ancient history of a country gives an impetus to the intellectual 
movement and accelerates the progress of its nation. The past must teach the present, and 
the present should elucidate the past. India, though poor at present, has an heirloom in its ancient 
glory; her sons have the prestige only of a line of illustrious ancestors. Nothing has now been left to 
them except to chant the praise of the adventurous heroes of the past. Yet when the incubus of 
inactivity shall pass away, this spirit of admiration shall contribute much to the 
regeneration of India…The facts and information which [the antiquarian] would 
glean, should not only serve to unravel the skein of the past history of India, but also to inspire the 
people with noble aspirations when they would think upon the condition of their once glorious 
country: the past should be ransacked not for mere curiosity but for the present.19 
 
Dey’s observations reveal the Bengali elite’s growing concern about the deficit of Indian 
histories and historiography at the turn of the twentieth century. Contrary to Strachey’s 
assertions that India was neither a country nor a nation, for Dey India was very clearly both, 
                                                
18 Ibid., 5-6. See also 138. 
19 Ibid., 5-6. Emphasis added. 
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hence the pressing need for histories that would animate its nationals, who are explicitly and 
righteously Hindu. For Dey, history exists not just for its own sake, that is, to illuminate the 
past or to satisfy curiosity about bygone incidents in a particular place, but also to inspire its 
people in the contemporary moment. Both past and present ought to have a mutually 
sustaining relationship: the past “must teach” the present, which should in turn interpret and 
honor its connection to the past. As Dey indicated in his prefatory remarks, Civilization in 
Ancient India was itself part of this endeavor to recount the glory of Indian antiquity for the 
sake of the present and the future. Such knowledge would not only serve as a balm for 
present wounds but would also help Hindus promote similar kinds of positive affiliations 
and collectivities into the future. 
As Dey’s laudatory treatise about ancient India suggests, Strachey’s arguments that 
India was not a country but a continent, one in which affective bonds could never manifest 
beyond the provincial level, were mistaken. Obvious political agendas aside, how might we 
reconcile both men’s respective views of India? Why does Strachey go to such lengths to 
establish and emphasize the ostensibly “elementary” fact that the only nationality that could 
ever exist in India was within its various “countries”? And if Strachey was right that there 
was no such thing as an Indian “nation” and only “countries,” why does Dey use precisely 
these terms to refer to a Hindu India? If not a sense of “political citizenship,” what was 
motivating Dey to write Civilization in Ancient India, and why were Bengali (Hindu) authors 
more broadly becoming so preoccupied with India’s past just as Britain had consolidated its 
power over this vast dominion? 
 “Imagining Bharat: Romance, Heroism, and Hindu Nationalism in the Bengali 
Novel, 1880-1920” explores such questions, examining how and why Bengali writers from 
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Bankim Chattopadhyay to Rabindranath Tagore both mythologized and critiqued the idea of 
a Hindu India.20 Though India was founded as a secular democracy in 1947, its avowed 
secularism continues to remain insecure as a result of a religiously charged and often violent 
nationalist ideology that has long privileged India’s Hindu majority. This ideology was 
nurtured, sharpened, and occasionally criticized by the Bengali novels explored in this 
dissertation. The divisive politics emerging from this particular cultural imagining has had 
profound effects, contributing to the cataclysmic Partition of the subcontinent and the 
recent ascendance of the Hindu Right in Indian society and government.   
Examining a number of literary works published in Bengal and Britain, and 
composed in both Bengali and English, this dissertation argues that the turn of the twentieth 
century was a foundational moment for contemporary Indian nationhood. It was at this time 
that Hindu intelligentsia across the colonial state—and the British imperial web more 
broadly—increasingly reified the emerging understanding that India was a righteously Hindu 
nation. 21 Such ideas were put forth in a variety of highly intergeneric novels and narratives 
that incorporated features of histories, epics, and romances from both the Indian and British 
traditions. “Imagining Bharat” argues that Bengali authors were central to the politicization 
of the burgeoning pan-regional imagining of India as a mythic Hindu space known as 
“Bharat,” a term appropriated from ancient Hindu religious texts that, ironically, was later 
                                                
20 Following the Bengali convention as well as the practice within literary scholarship on the author, I will refer 
to Bankim by his first name in subsequent references. The other Bengali writers I examine, e.g., Sarath Kumar 
Ghosh, Siddha Mohana Mitra, and Rabindranath Tagore, are more commonly referenced by their last names in 
scholarship and I will refer to them accordingly. 
21 Here I borrow Arnold Toynbee’s definition of intelligentsia, which arises “in any community that is 
attempting to solve the problem of adapting its life to the rhythm of an exotic civilization to which it has been 
forcibly annexed or freely converted.” In order to preserve their culture, the intelligentsia acts as “a class of 
liaison officers who have learnt the tricks of an intrusive civilization’s trade.” See David Kopf, British Orientalism 
and the Bengal Renaissance, 2.  
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proclaimed in the Indian Constitution to be the genuine name of the ostensibly secular 
republic (see Figure 1).22  
 “Imagining Bharat” argues that the emerging genre of the Bengali novel played a 
central role in perpetuating, and, at times, contesting, the evolving idea of India as Bharat. 
Late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century Bengal was a region obsessed with history. 
English-educated Bengali (Hindu) elites were indispensable to the mythologization of Bharat 
through a variety of cultural and literary works that celebrated India’s supposed grand Hindu 
past. It was during this period that Bengali writers penned fictional and non-fictional 
histories, romances, epics, and other such works in a concerted effort to refute dominant 
visions of a degenerate Indian/Hindu era put forth by British Orientalists and reified by the 
colonial state.  As a seemingly fixed past transformed into a fluid and underdetermined 
space, Bengali writers projected strategic anachronisms onto it, such as a unified Hindu 
polity or virile Hindu men who would serve as exemplars for the present.  
Within these highly intricate and often unwieldy literary works Bengali writers 
portrayed the wondrous feats, and at times failures, of Hindu heroes and heroines in order 
to rally the Hindu community in particular ways. Portrayals of Hindu/Indian agency and 
bravery alongside the clear message that alternative outcomes were, in fact, quite close to 
materializing helped assuage present humiliations. In addition to exploring how turn-of-the-
century Bengali (Hindu) authors incorporated elements of indigenous oral and literary 
traditions in their fictions, I highlight their strategic appropriation of particular ideas of 
British Orientalist discourse advanced by figures such as William Jones and James Mill. 
                                                
22 See Part I, Section I, Point I of the Constitution of the Republic of India: “India, that is Bharat, shall be a 
Union of States.” As the first Indian region to come under Britain’s sway, Bengal had long held a prominent 
place in the British occupation of India beginning in the mid-eighteenth century and through approximately 
1910, when the British shifted the capital of the colonial government from Calcutta to New Delhi. 
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Paralleling Dey’s Civilization in Ancient India, the majority of the narratives examined here 
proffered rousing visions of India as a righteously Hindu space; whether this majestic stature 
existed in the distant past or lay dormant in the present, this literature promised that in time 
and under the right circumstances, Bharat could be readily revived and reclaimed. While 
Bengali-language novels by Bankim and Tagore primarily addressed Bengali and non-Bengali 
Hindus, English-language works by migrant authors Sarath Kumar Ghosh and Siddha 
Mohana Mitra were directed to British readers in the metropole. Despite such differences, 
these works evinced the same overall message to their respective audiences. Hindus were 
encouraged to celebrate India’s authentic identity as Bharat and to understand British rule as 
a period of temporary tutelage, one that was far superior to the tyranny of the previous 
Mughal (Muslim) regime, and Britons were admonished to appreciate India as a prized 
colonial possession deserving of respect. 
Reading these works together gives us a nuanced understanding of the different 
possibilities for Indian nationhood that existed long before the idea of, and the push for, 
India as a sovereign nation-state was a foregone conclusion. Though they were growing 
increasingly troubled by the detrimental effects of India’s colonization, the majority of the 
authors I examine were not straightforwardly anticolonial rather than they were hopeful for 
certain kinds of solidarities between Indians (Hindus) and Britons. Despite the freedom of 
historical romances and novels to imagine and project alternate pasts, presents, and futures, 
none of the works examined here portray a British departure or ejection from India or the 
establishment of an independent Indian nation. Even as the idea of Bharat was steadily 
becoming concretized among Hindu elites, conceptions of India, Indian belonging, and the 
colonial relationship on the whole remained fluid during this period. It is only by resisting a 
  
10 
prevailing tendency within contemporary scholarship to fetishize nations and nation-states 
that we can begin to perceive the truly dynamic and complex ideas surrounding nationhood, 
group belonging, and cross-cultural affiliation flourishing at this time. 
“Imagining Bharat” intervenes in South Asian literary and historical studies by 
questioning the widespread understanding that the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth 
centuries constituted the so-called “moderate” phase of Indian politics, and by troubling the 
category of “anticolonial nationalism” more broadly. As Sudipta Kaviraj, Sanjay Seth, 
Mrinalini Sinha, and other scholars have argued, the ideological agenda of Indian elites at 
this time has for too long been understood through the prism of the Indian nationalist 
movement of the 1930s and 1940s and its culmination in Independence and Partition.23 
Rather than dismissing or reducing this period as a necessarily “moderate” phase in what 
eventually became a widespread campaign for a fully independent nation-state, literature 
from this period registers the ambivalences evinced by Bengali (Hindu) elites, who were far 
more patriotic towards particular imaginings of a Hindu Bharat than they were desirous of 
establishing either an autonomous India (i.e., having Dominion status within the British 
Empire and the right to Home Rule) or a sovereign Indian nation-state.24 It was precisely at 
this generative moment at the turn of the twentieth century that elite Hindus across the 
                                                
23 Kaviraj, The Unhappy Consciousness: Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay and the Formation of Nationalist Discourse in India 
(1995); Seth, “Rewriting Histories of Nationalism: The Politics of ‘Moderate Nationalism’ in India, 1870-1905” 
(1999); Sinha, “The Strange Death of an Imperial Ideal: The Case of Civis Britannicus” (2011).  
24 Here it is important to stress Kaviraj’s caveat that, particularly in the context of mid-to-late nineteenth-
century Bengal, anticolonialism must be distinguished from nationalism and that the two concepts must not be 
conflated or confused. As Kaviraj explains, Bankim and other Bengali intellectual elites manifested an 
anticolonial consciousness before they chose their nation: “Nationalist ideas are directed against a foreign 
occupying power, but in order to be fully nationalist they must also have a more positive directedness towards a 
conception of what the nation is. Would it not be strange to characterize ‘nationalist’ a form of consciousness 
which has yet to decide what it is to be its nation? The worship of a nation, its semi-religious ardour, cannot be 
produced by an entirely negative critique of imperialism’s political economy.” See Kaviraj, The Imaginary 
Institution of India, 106. Emphasis in original. See also 148-149 and 176-177. 
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colonial state and the British imperial web more broadly could evince an ardent patriotic love 
for a Hindu India while professing faith in the Raj and its pledges of benevolent governance. 
Though the imagining of India as Bharat would become increasingly axiomatic and divisive 
as the twentieth century progressed—especially in the hands of nationalist leader M.K. 
Gandhi who often heralded independent India as a glorious “Ram Rajya” [Reign of Ram]—
the literature examined in “Imagining Bharat” reveals the fluidity of ideas about nationhood 
at this time, inviting us to speculate on how India’s trajectory from colonial state to nation-
state may well have materialized quite differently or, perhaps, not at all.25 
*       *       * 
The first chapter, “British Orientalism and Hindu India,” provides the historical and 
theoretical background to my argument by examining how British Orientalist discourse 
contributed to the emerging understanding of Bharat as the authentic identity of India 
among Hindu elites. British Orientalist ideology enabled, issued, and sustained numerous 
positivist essentialisms about the Indian past and its people that informed both British and 
Bengali (Hindu) thought during the colonial period. Foremost among these was a highly 
reductive chronology that divided Indian history into three fundamental epochs: Hindu, 
Muslim, and British. Consonant with Hindu religious thought about the role of dharma 
[righteous action] and the cyclical nature of time, British Orientalists advanced a teleological 
view of Indian history: India had been an exclusively Hindu space in antiquity, the Mughal 
Empire was the rule of tyrannical, marauding Muslims, and enlightened British governance 
was the key to India’s future progress. Building on the arguments of South Asian historians, 
I suggest that the evolving understanding that the Hindu Puranic concept “Bharat” was 
                                                
25 Ayesha Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia, 207. 
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coterminous with the British colonial state demonstrates the attempt of many English-
educated Hindu elites across India to exploit, and often subvert, crucial animating ideas of 
British Orientalist doctrine. In so doing, these particular cadre of intellectuals, who may be 
termed Macaulay’s Children, helped provide a coveted yet contrived history of a cohesive 
Hindu samaj [community] that would prove useful in the face of colonial domination.26  
The second chapter, “Bankim Chattopadhyay’s Challenge to British Historiography 
in Anandamath,” examines the most potent and enduring novelistic depiction of Bharat to 
date. Written during the height of British power in the region, Anandamath (1882) 
strategically turns to a sketchy moment in late eighteenth-century Bengali history to portray a 
militant ascetic Hindu brotherhood that attempts to liberate the homeland—
anthropomorphized and gendered as an enslaved “Mother”—from the local Mughal ruler. I 
depart from the usual critical focus on Bankim’s vilification of Muslims to show that 
Anandamath’s generic form as a historical novel, one in which fact and fiction are virtually 
indistinguishable from one another, was indispensable to conveying its message that India 
was a righteously Hindu nation. In so doing, I extend contemporary understandings of the 
rise of Bengali historiography in the early nineteenth century, arguing that Anandamath has a 
crucial place within this potent body of historical writing.27 By recasting India’s colonization 
as a strategic and willful decision on the part of Hindus in the recent past to obtain valuable 
material knowledge from the British, Bankim encouraged his Hindu readers to champion a 
                                                
26 This cadre of Indian elites was in large part the outcome of Thomas Macaulay’s famous 1835 Minute on 
Indian Education, which successfully advocated English-medium schools in India’s urban areas. As Macaulay 
had envisioned, this class would serve as “interpreters” between the British rulers and Indian commoners. 
Beginning in the mid-to-late nineteenth century, this group’s privilege and education enabled them to pursue 
opportunities with the colonial state or in the law, politics, arts, among other fields. 
27 See for example Ranajit Guha, Dominance without Hegemony: History and Power in Colonial India (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1997) and Partha Chatterjee, “History and the Nationalization of Hinduism,” in 
Representing Hinduism: The Construction of Religious Traditions and National Identity, eds. Vasudha Dalmia and 
Heinrich von Stietenchron (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1995).  
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specific vision of India for the future, one in which they could readily challenge the British 
and recover their country’s prior majesty as Bharat. 
Gender was critical to British Orientalism and emerging Hindu nationalism, partly 
because of the colonial construction of Hindus as an inherently effete people who had been 
historically incapable of warding off foreign domination, an insult leveled against Bengali 
men in particular. My third chapter, “Hindu Heroism in Indian Nights’ Entertainment: The Trials 
of Narayan Lal” demonstrates how itinerant Bengali author Sarath Kumar Ghosh’s portrayal 
of a valiant Hindu hero questing for love challenged the widespread stereotype that Bengali 
men were fundamentally effeminate. Published in Pearson’s Magazine in 1902 to a diverse, 
transnational readership, Indian Nights’ Entertainment, I suggest, responded to prevailing 
British perceptions of the inherent effeminacy of Hindu men that helped justify colonialism. 
In my readings of the original serialization and two subsequent book-length expansions, I 
argue that the work is most fittingly characterized as a contemporary romantic epic. Not only 
did it address the needs of Ghosh’s native Bengali milieu by portraying the stirring exploits 
of Hindu heroes and heroines against the backdrop of Bharat, it catered to Western 
audiences’ fascination with the Oriental exotic by providing a story styled after Arabian 
Nights romances.   
The fourth chapter, “‘A Grand Asiatic Empire’: The Expanse of Bharat in Hindupore: 
A Peep Behind the Indian Unrest: An Anglo-Indian Romance and The Prince of Destiny: The New 
Krishna,” examines how these two novels set in the colonial present negotiated the complex 
politics of the contemporary swadeshi movement. In these English-language novels published 
in London in 1909, Sarath Kumar Ghosh and S.M. Mitra evince a guarded, ambiguous 
posture towards Britain, one that advocates increased amity between colonizer and colonized 
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yet warns of violent retaliation should India continue to suffer under British rule. Engaging 
Jacques Derrida’s theories on hospitality and cosmopolitanism, I show how Ghosh and 
Mitra’s portrayals of idealized, cross-cultural encounters between travelling Hindu heroes 
and their foreign hosts exemplify the benevolence with which the British ought to regard 
both India and Hinduism. While critics have examined how both novels function as 
“informative romances” that attempt to counter British prejudice, less attention has been 
paid to a highly overdetermined conception of Hinduism that emerges as both the perceived 
cause of India’s mistreatment as well as its remedy. Both Ghosh and Mitra lay claim to the 
recent “Eastern” triumph in the Russo-Japanese War by advancing a common religious 
heritage with Japan such that Hinduism and Buddhism have been rendered tantamount to 
each other. I argue that both writers ultimately moderate their depictions of increased 
Indian-British amity by concluding their novels with a profound warning: Britain’s 
domination of Bharat is tenuous and the latter’s rise as a major world power alongside Japan 
is inevitable.   
My conclusion, “Containing Bharat: Tagore’s Warning,” examines Rabindranath 
Tagore’s prescient views on the dangers latent within the evolving understanding of India as 
Bharat, a cautionary stance reflecting his overall suspicion of any kind of national attachment 
or idealization of nationhood more broadly. Though a proponent of more conservative ideas 
in his youth, Tagore eventually came to condemn Hindu-infused nationalist rhetoric and 
embraced instead more cosmopolitan notions of belonging that eschewed the inevitable 
exclusions and violence intrinsic to nation-making. Here I briefly explore Tagore’s 
condemnation of the political expediency of a religiously-charged nationalism that 
increasingly favored Hindus and marginalized Muslims and other minorities. Considering the 
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figure of the tragic Hindu hero in Gora (1910), I argue that this novel evidences Tagore’s 
resistance to any one projection of India or Indian belonging, particularly the limited (and 
limiting) conception of Bharat.  
The overall aim of “Imagining Bharat” is to historicize a complex and 
overdetermined category, one that resists any easy conceptualization because it is at once too 
narrow and too diffuse. Today popular imaginings of Bharat are vibrant throughout India 
and its diaspora, uniting and dividing communities across religious, gender, class, caste, and 
other social markers. In recent years Hindu nationalists have capitalized upon and reworked 
this myth for their own ends; for many Indian politicians and government officials today, 
Bharat exists not only as a mythic Hindu utopia that preceded the tyrannical Mughal 
“Muslim” era and the oppressive British Raj, but also as an aspirational status for India to 
reclaim for the future, one in which the nation will assume its rightful place among world 
powers. This privileging of India’s Hindu majority continues to undermine the republic’s 
avowed commitment to secularism and democracy, endangering the civil liberties of 
Muslims, Dalits, and other minorities. “Imagining Bharat” endeavors to elucidate such 
phenomena by tracing their longer histories and the central role of the Bengali novel in this 
mythologization. 
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CHAPTER 1 
BRITISH ORIENTALISM AND HINDU INDIA  
 
 
“To give itself a history is the most fundamental act of self-identification of a community.” 
–Sudipta Kaviraj, The Imaginary Institution of India1 
 
 
In March of 1866, Henry Sumner Maine, the vice-chancellor of the University of 
Calcutta, addressed the University Senate with a matter of growing concern. As he made the 
case for a more positivist education for the “Native mind,” Maine admitted that if he had 
“any complaint to make of the most highly educated class of Natives—the class…which has 
received the highest European education,” it would be neither the mode of the acquisition of 
that knowledge, its quality, nor even “any evil effects it may have on their character, or 
manners, or habits.” Rather, he wanted  
…to express disappointment at the use to which they sometimes put it. It seems to me 
that not seldom they employ it for what I can best describe as irrationally reactionary 
purposes. It is not to be concealed, and I see plainly that educated Natives do not conceal 
from themselves, that they have, by the fact of their education, broken for ever with much in their 
history, much in their customs, much in their creed. Yet I constantly read, and sometimes hear, 
elaborate attempts on their part to persuade themselves and others, that there is a sense 
in which these rejected portions of Native history, and usage and belief, are perfectly in harmony with 
the modern knowledge which the educated class has acquired, and with the modern civilization to which it 
aspires… 
 
But unquestionably the tendency has its chief root in this—that the Natives of India 
have caught from us Europeans our modern trick of constructing, by means of works of fiction, an 
imaginary Past out of the Present, taking from the Past its externals, its outward furniture, but building 
in the sympathies, the susceptibilities, and even (for it sometimes comes to that), the knowledge of the 
present time. Now this is all very well for us Europeans [...] But, here, the effect of such fictions, and of 
theories built from such fictions, is unmixedly deleterious. On the educated Native of India, the Past 
presses with too awful and terrible a power for it to be safe for him to play or palter with it…2  
 
Though elsewhere in his address Maine sympathized with the urge to write such fictions—
“It is very difficult for any people to feel self-respect, if they have no pride in their own 
                                                
1 Sudipta Kaviraj, The Imaginary Institution of India, 183. 
2 Henry Sumner Maine, “Address to University of Calcutta, III,” 288-291. Emphasis added. 
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annals”—he adduced a sharp difference between Europeans and Indians engaging in this 
practice.3 According to Maine, the state of contemporary Europe was such that its 
inhabitants had no psychological need to distract themselves with ancient exploits. Moreover, 
Europeans had no incentive to do so, for they understood that their present was certainly a 
great improvement over their past: “There is no one in this room to whom the life of a 
hundred years since would not be acute suffering, if it could be lived over again.”4 But for 
Indian elites, pride in their country’s past had been pushed to such an “extravagant length” 
that it had become a “destructive mistake” and “unmixedly deleterious” for them to 
continue to produce such writing. 
How are we to understand the expression of such anxiety in a period in which the 
British had consolidated their power in India?5 How could a colonial official become so 
unnerved by the rise of Indian historical fiction or the practice of “constructing, by means of 
works of fiction, an imaginary Past out of the Present [along with] the sympathies, the 
susceptibilities, and even…the knowledge of the present time”? Maine’s edgy rhetoric in this 
address stands out among the three published speeches he delivered to the University Senate 
during this period.6 His unease can be traced to the widespread success of Bankimchandra 
Chattopadhyay’s first historical novel Durgeshnandini, which had been published a year earlier, 
as well as the growing preoccupation of Bengalis with questions of history and 
historiography.7 What Maine found most disconcerting was the implicit message of these 
works. They were dangerous precisely because they portrayed the pre-colonial era so 
                                                
3 Ibid., 289. 
4 Ibid., 290. 
5 Metcalf and Metcalf, A Concise History of Modern India, 123. The historians point out that “The decades that 
spanned the turn of the twentieth century marked the apogee of the British imperial system, whose institutional 
framework had been set after 1857.” 
6 Alex Padamsee, “A ‘Well-Traveled’ Theory,” 208. 
7 Ibid., 208-211. 
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positively that they compromised the most fundamental assumption of the Raj—that the 
British were executing an honorable “civilizing mission” to uplift India from a degenerate 
and corrupt past to which it was still shackled.8 Through government, education, and the 
import of Western technologies, the British imperial project in India had been able to 
rationalize itself, in the words of John Stuart Mill, as a “parental despotism” or “[a] 
government of leading-strings…required to carry such a people the most rapidly through the 
next necessary step in social progress.”9 Through their depictions of a glorious pre-colonial 
period, both fictional and nonfictional histories enabled Indian elites to belie the telos of 
improvement inherent in British rule and insinuate that a future without them would be 
desirable. No wonder Maine balked at the escalating phenomenon: “The Past cannot be 
coloured by [the educated native] in this way, without his misreading the Present and 
endangering the Future.”10 
Maine’s address to the Senate of the University of Calcutta was significant not just 
for its concern about natives using historical fiction for subversive purposes, but also 
because he identified two fundamentally incompatible views of India’s pre-colonial past. 
While for Britons the Raj was naturally superior to any previous political regime in India, 
Maine was puzzled by the existence of “educated native gentlemen” who  
seem to have persuaded themselves, that there was once a time in India in which 
learning was more honored and respected, and when the career of a learned man was 
more brilliant, than in British India and under British rule. They seem to believe, or they 
try to believe, that it was better to be a Brahmin or a scribe attached to the Court of some half 
                                                
8 Carey A. Watt, “The Relevance and Complexity of Civilizing Missions,” 1. Watt explains that “For the British 
Raj in India the civilizing mission meant many things, including bringing the benefits of British culture to the 
subcontinent in the form of free of free trade and capitalism as well as law, order and good government. British 
rule was supposed to end a supposed condition of chronic warfare, violence, disorder and despotic rule in India, 
and it would institute peace and order in the form of Pax Britannica. At its core, the civilizing mission was 
about morally and materially ‘uplifting’, ‘improving’ and later ‘developing’ the supposedly ‘backward’ or ‘rude’ 
people of India to make them more civilized and more modern.” 
9 John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, 49-50. 
10 Maine, “Address to University of Calcutta, III,” 291. 
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mythical Hindu king, than to follow one of the prosaic learned professions which the English have 
created…  
 
It is impossible even to imagine the condition of an educated Native, with some of 
the knowledge and many of the susceptibilities of the nineteenth century—indeed, 
perhaps, with too many of them—if he could recross the immense gulf which 
separates him from the India of Hindu poetry, if indeed it ever existed. The only India, in fact, 
to which he could hope to return—and that retrogression is not beyond the range of conceivable 
possibilities—is the India of Mahratta robbery and Mahomedan rule.11  
 
Here Maine describes a troubling situation in which English-educated Indian elites have 
taken to romanticizing the past in ways that belie their Western liberal education. Contrary to 
prevailing British thought that the Raj was necessarily a progressive stage for India, this 
particular class held that their country’s past as a glorious Hindu nation was both superior 
and preferable to the colonial regime. For Maine such thinking was profoundly delusional—
no prior condition of India could ever be worth celebrating. Far from any wondrous Hindu 
utopia (an “India of Hindu poetry”), the polity had always been dark and degenerate, marked 
not by Hindu splendor but Muslim tyranny. 
These two conflicting perspectives on Indian antiquity are crucial to understanding 
the growing preoccupation of turn-of-the-century Bengali writers with questions of history 
and historiography. While Britons maintained a teleological view of Indian history in which 
colonial rule was a necessarily progressive turn of events, beginning in the mid-nineteenth 
century increasing numbers of Indian elites began to challenge this bedrock assumption of 
the Raj. This clash in narrative generated a whole host of questions regarding India’s past, 
present, and future. What did India really look like in pre-colonial times? What truth, if any, 
was there behind the prevalent British ideology that India had always been in a 
fundamentally degenerate state, and how might this view have accorded or collided with the 
existing beliefs of Hindus and Muslims? How did this conflict over India’s past emerge, and 
                                                
11 Maine, “Address to University of Calcutta, III,” 289-290. Emphasis added. 
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what were the respective roles of the British and the Indians in their development? Were 
these two disparate interpretations of ancient Indian history necessarily mutually exclusive of 
one another? Was it indeed the case, as Maine had argued, that those “rejected portions of 
Native history, usage, and belief” were fundamentally incompatible with English-educated 
elites’ newly acquired “modern knowledge” and desire for “modern civilization”?  
To begin to understand these questions, it is necessary to examine the historical and 
theoretical foundations of British Orientalism, an ideology that animated not just Britain’s 
occupation of India, but also the indigenous elite’s developing ideas about the colonial 
relationship and the future of the country.12 Edward Said’s seminal argument in Orientalism 
about the mutual imbrication of knowledge and power in both defining and subordinating 
the Other identifies how British Orientalism enabled, issued, and sustained numerous 
positivist essentialisms about India—such as its supposed lack of history and fundamental 
religiosity—that informed both British and Indian thought at this time.13 In the Indian 
context, David Ludden has observed how “…political discourse on both sides of the 
colonial encounter entailed the other. The colonial divide evolved as each side defined itself 
in relation to its ‘other’….”14 In other words, British Orientalism not only justified the 
colonization of India, but also crucially informed ensuing anticolonial and nationalist 
                                                
12 It is well established that imperialism was significantly enabled and sustained by particular epistemologies in 
addition to the use of brute force, violence, and economic exploitation. As Antonio Gramsci observes, “…the 
supremacy of a social group manifests itself in two ways, as ‘domination’ and as ‘intellectual and moral 
leadership’. A social group can, and indeed must, already exercise ‘leadership’ before winning governmental 
power (this indeed is one of the principal conditions for the winning of such power); it subsequently becomes 
dominant when it exercises power, but even if it holds it firmly in its grasp, it must continue to ‘lead” as well.” 
See Gramsci, “The Problem of Political Leadership,” 57-58.  
13 Building upon the arguments of Michel Foucault and Antonio Gramsci, Said asserts that, among other things, 
Orientalism is “a discourse that is by no means in direct, corresponding relationship with political power in the 
raw, but rather is produced and exists in an uneven exchange with various kinds of power, shaped to a degree 
by the exchange with power political (as with a colonial or imperial establishment), power intellectual (as with 
reigning sciences like comparative linguistics….), power cultural (as with orthodoxies and canons of taste, texts, 
values), power moral (as with ideas about what ‘we’ do and what ‘they’ cannot do or understand as ‘we’ do).” 
See Edward Said, Orientalism, 12.  
14 David Ludden, “Orientalist Empiricism,” 269. 
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movements. As Uma Chakravarti, Lata Mani, and others have well established, British 
Orientalism and its attendant colonial policies consolidated amorphous “Hindu” practices 
and beliefs in conservative ways, devaluing local departures and emphasizing a textual 
tradition.15  Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, a newly constructed artificial Hindu 
majority was instrumental in reifying select ideas of British Orientalism that were consonant 
with Hindu ideology, in particular the belief that India has once enjoyed a culturally 
ascendant Golden Age in antiquity. 
In this chapter I argue that the emerging perception that the mythic location indexed 
by the Hindu Puranic category “Bharat” was coterminous with the British colonial state 
evidences the attempt on the part of many Hindu elites across India to exploit, and often 
subvert, crucial animating ideas of British Orientalist doctrine. The growing identification of 
India as Bharat is crucial to understanding the so-called “moderate” phase of Indian politics 
at the turn of the twentieth century, a moment in which native elites expressed varying levels 
of dissatisfaction with the British regime but continued to believe in its overall beneficence 
and pledges of goodwill towards India. While the moderate period has been characterized by 
the apparently modest goals of the newly formed Indian National Congress and the rather 
measured way in which they were expressed and pursued, it was at precisely this moment 
that potent ideas of India as a fundamentally Hindu nation were being circulated within 
fictional and non-fictional writing across the country. 
From Bankim to Tagore, turn-of-the-century Bengali writers played a foundational 
role in this endeavor as they strategically appropriated British Orientalism’s essentialisms 
about the Indian past and people, which they then reworked and recuperated to their own 
ends in literature. The burgeoning genre of late nineteenth-century Bengali historical novels 
                                                
15 See Uma Chakravarti, “Whatever Happened to the Vedic Dasi?” and Lata Mani, “Contentious Traditions.” 
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and romances, I suggest, was part and parcel of this larger endeavor to offer uplifting 
narratives about a glorious Hindu homeland that would undermine demeaning British 
accounts and galvanize Hindus across the colonial state. Through their deployment of the 
“modern trick,” these authors not only defended and united the Hindu community, they also 
combatted discursive underpinnings of colonial rule as a “civilizing mission” as well as the 
perceived iniquities of “Muslim” Mughal rule.  But this project of samajik [societal] 
rejuvenation came at a cost. By appropriating the British Orientalist idiom that privileged 
religious belonging as a core facet of personal identity, such efforts at cultural regeneration 
furthered the ongoing politicization of religion in India. 
 
The British Pursuit of Colonial Knowledge 
British Orientalism was enabled by institutional apparatuses of emergent colonial 
power. While many scholars cite William Jones as the first British Orientalist, his work 
would not have been possible were it not for the first governor-general of India, Warren 
Hastings, who believed that India and its inhabitants could be readily managed and 
controlled. Beginning in the late eighteenth century, the new governing responsibilities of the 
East India Company at the Bengal Presidency spurred a strong desire for what David 
Ludden has called colonial knowledge—the information necessary to sustain technologies of 
rule.16 Though Hastings’s tenure was marked by instability and culminated in a lengthy 
                                                
16 Ludden, “Orientalist Empiricism,” 253. In the seventeenth century the East India Company had established 
three main centers for their activity at Madras, Bombay, and Calcutta that were termed “presidencies.” The 
fertile province of Bengal made it rich in natural resources and conducive to the production of material goods. 
By the middle of the eighteenth century, the Company’s trade at Bengal had become highly profitable and 
accounted for 75 percent of the Company’s Indian goods. Bengal was the first region of India that the East 
India Company subdued after its victories at the Battle of Plassey in 1757 and the Battle of Buxar in 1764. 
Calcutta subsequently became the capital of the East India Company’s operations on the subcontinent, and, 
after 1858, the colonial government, until the early twentieth century. See Metcalf and Metcalf, A Concise History 
of Modern India, 47-56. 
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impeachment trial on charges of corruption, he made a number of decisions that profoundly 
transformed Indian society as he pursued this knowledge. Among the most significant of 
these was his 1773 commission of the production of separate law texts for Hindus and 
Muslims to which British judges could refer in their adjudication over civil matters: “the 
Laws of the Koran with respect to Mahomedans, and those of the Shaster with respect to 
the Gentoos [Hindus] shall be invariably adhered to.”17 Brahmin pundits were called upon to 
assist in this endeavor as they were considered the natural ecclesiastical leaders of the Hindu 
religion; their newfound status as native informants helped them solidify their authority and 
continue their ongoing practice of privileging various non-brahmanical practices as 
legitimate.18 As Richard King explains, “Brahmanization—the process whereby the 
Sanskritic, ‘high’ culture of the Brahmins absorbed non-brahmanical…. religious forms—
was an effective means of assimilating diverse cultural strands within one’s own locality, and 
of maintaining social and political authority.”19 It also inevitably resulted in slippages of 
meaning as texts were haphazardly chosen and at times repeatedly translated from one 
language to another. Nathaniel Halhed’s A Code of Gentoo Laws (1776) was an early example 
of this arbitrary and highly mediated practice, as its source material was first chosen and 
translated from Sanskrit into Persian by a panel of selected Brahmins, and then from Persian 
into English by Halhed himself.20 
Hastings’s promulgation of separate written legal codes for Hindus and Muslims was 
problematic on several counts. Not only was the underlying process rather indiscriminate, it 
ossified what were relatively fluid customs and traditions particular to certain groups and 
                                                
17 Qtd. in Metcalf and Metcalf, A Concise History of Modern India, 58. 
18 Richard King, Orientalism and Religion, 103-104. 
19 Ibid., 103. Elsewhere King defines Brahmanization as “the general process whereby non-brahmanical forms 
of Indian religion are colonized and transformed by hegemonic brahmanical discourses” (233, fn. 23). 
20 Metcalf and Metcalf, A Concise History of Modern India, 58. See also van der Veer, Imperial Encounters, 113. 
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contexts. For example, while the British considered the Dharmasastras classical “ur-texts” of 
religious law applicable to all Hindus, they were in fact representative of only Brahmins. 
These texts contained no notion of a unified Hindu community and even acknowledged the 
many varied contexts in which different rules or customs could apply.21 This pursuit of 
native regulatory texts demonstrated a Eurocentric belief that Western conceptual 
frameworks were universal, or if they were not, they could be readily imposed. In this case, 
the British applied a Judeo-Christian notion that all religions necessarily have some kind of 
written “scripture.”22 Such conceptual paradigms did not attend to the importance of orality 
within Hindu praxis, namely, the belief that certain texts attained their sacrality through the 
dual activities of speaking and listening.23 Moreover, Hastings’s arbitrary determination of 
two primary religions—Hinduism and Islam—totalized numerous other religions, sects, and 
communities such as Jains, Sikhs, Parsis, and tribal peoples.24 The colonial government 
considered all these groups Hindu, resulting in the gross reduction of disparate religious 
traditions into one amorphous category and the construction of a false majority.25 The 
identification of a single “Hindu” religion also entailed the awkward assemblage of smaller 
religious sects including Vaishnavas (worshippers of Vishnu), Shaivas (worshippers of the 
deity Shiva) and Shaktas (worshippers of the deity Shakti).26 The modern conception of 
                                                
21 King, Orientalism and Religion, 102. See also Romila Thapar, “Imagined Religious Communities?” 220. In 
addition, see Rosane Rocher, “British Orientalism in the Eighteenth Century,” 242-243.  
22 King, Orientalism and Religion, 101. 
23 van der Veer, Imperial Encounters, 120. 
24 Rocher, “British Orientalism in the Eighteenth Century,” 221-222. 
25 The monolithic conception of Hinduism persists to this day as Article 25 of the Constitution of the Republic 
of India includes Jains, Buddhists, and Sikhs within its definition of term “Hindu.” Such a rendering gives 
primacy to those Indians whose religions claim an origin within the country and thus excludes Muslims, 
Christians, Parsees, and Jews. See Dalmia and von Stietencron, “Introduction,” 20, fn.1. Certain groups, such 
as the Sikhs, have a long history of resisting such problematic interpellations.  
26 The term “Hindu” does not have religious origins. Among its first uses was to describe the inhabitants of the 
land across the Indus or Sindu River, or the Indian subcontinent. As Thapar explains, “It was only gradually 
and over time that it was used not only for those who were inhabitants of India but also for those who 
professed a religion other than Islam or Christianity” (1989, 222). During the eighteenth century, the term 
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Hinduism as a monolithic religion only came into existence in the nineteenth century as a 
result of such arbitrary yoking of these and other communities into one broad, artificial 
category. Over time these small constituent groups internalized this construction as they 
recognized the advantages in mobilizing a sizeable “Hindu” majority to secure economic 
resources and political representation.27  
In 1784, Hastings formalized the pursuit of colonial knowledge—information that 
was both acceptable to British epistemologies and enabled its governance—with the 
founding of the Asiatic Society of Bengal under William Jones. A Supreme Court judge, 
Jones had learned Sanskrit and went on to translate a number of Indian legal, religious, and 
cosmological texts into English.28 Jones’s endeavors were not guided purely by 
intellectualism or fascination with Indian antiquity as is sometimes believed. Rather, he 
translated these works himself because he did not wish to rely on Brahmins or other native 
experts for information.29 Jones specifically sought ancient Hindu ur-texts, which he believed 
would provide the most authoritative and authentic guidance.30 In this pursuit for pure 
origins, Jones compared Sanskrit, Greek, and Latin and issued a groundbreaking theory in a 
lecture he delivered at the Asiatic Society on February 2, 1786: 
…how degenerate and abased so ever the Hindus may now appear, that in some early age they were 
splendid in arts and arms, happy in government, wise in legislation, and eminent in various 
knowledge…  
 
The Sanscrit language, whatever be its antiquity, is of a wonderful structure; more 
perfect than the Greek, more copious than the Latin, and more exquisitely refined 
than either, yet bearing to both of them a stronger affinity, both in the roots of verbs 
and the forms of grammar, than could possibly have been produced by accident; so strong indeed, 
                                                                                                                                            
continued to function negatively as it eventually replaced the category of “heathens,” or those who were not 
Christian, Jewish, or Muslim; see King, Orientalism and Religion, 99-100. 
27 Thapar, “Imagined Religious Communities?” 229. See also Dalmia and von Stietencron, “Introduction,” 20. 
28 Metcalf and Metcalf, A Concise History of Modern India, 62. King, Orientalism and Religion, 102. 
29 van der Veer, Imperial Encounters, 114. 
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that no philologer could examine them all three, without believing them to have sprung from some 
common source, which, perhaps, no longer exists….31 
 
Jones’s postulation of a common root language between European and Indian languages—
what eventually came to known as Proto-Indo-European—was momentous. Based on his 
conjecture of “some common source” of Sanskrit, Latin, and Greek, Jones concluded that 
India had once boasted a glorious classical civilization comparable to that of the ancient 
Romans and Greeks. In other words, India had enjoyed a magnificent “Golden Age” in 
antiquity from which it had declined.  Critical assumptions of this theory were that Hindus 
were the original inhabitants of India and that the deterioration of their ascendant culture 
had been caused by the advent of the Mughal Empire, ideas that would later foment 
educated Hindu elites and ideologues (and, eventually, the Hindu Right) in critical ways. 
Research journals such as the Asiatik Researches (1788), the Quarterly Journal (1821), and the 
Journal of the Asiatic Society (1832) disseminated these views throughout Europe, spurring great 
discussion and debate.32 
Early British Orientalists operated on the critical presumption that they were the 
righteous interpreters and custodians of Hindu India’s ancient treasures. In 1800, Lord 
Wellesley founded Fort William College as a site for training British officers in Indian 
languages, an endeavor that required the translation and publication of numerous indigenous 
texts.33 In addition to the Asiatic Society, the College was a key site where Jones and other 
British Orientalists understood their mission to be, in the words of Uma Chakravarti, the 
recovery and “reintroduct[ion] [of] the Hindu elite to the ‘impenetrable mystery’ of its 
                                                
31 William Jones, “On the Hindus,” 94. Emphasis added. 
32 Gyan Prakash, “Writing Post-Orientalist Histories of the Third World,” 385. See also Rocher, “British 
Orientalism in the Eighteenth Century,” 216.  
33 King, Orientalism and Religion, 130. 
  
28 
ancient lore.”34 A lithograph that adorned British cartographer James Rennell’s 1782 
compendium Map of Hindoostan captures this dynamic (see Figure 2).35 As David Ludden 
observes, the image is remarkable for the ambiguity as to whether Britannia is accepting a 
book labeled “Shastas” from the Brahmins or returning it to them.36 Yet the overall message 
was inescapable—the British were the righteous keepers of Hindu India’s ancient knowledge. 
The idea that India had boasted a resplendent culture in antiquity received additional support 
through various archaeological discoveries in the first decades of the nineteenth century as 
well as from the German Indologist Max Müller, who in 1847 famously advanced that light-
skinned “Aryan” peoples were the original speakers of the “common [linguistic] source” that 
Jones had postulated.37  
British Orientalism transformed at the turn of the nineteenth century as Britain 
required a new narrative to justify its ongoing entanglement with India. Eschewing early 
Orientalists’ animating premise that India had once enjoyed a culturally ascendant Golden 
Age, British political leaders and intellectuals increasingly subscribed to the idea that the 
polity had been degenerate from its very origins and, as such, required the civilizing hand of 
the British. Warren Hastings’s impeachment trial forced Britons to confront their country’s 
role in what Nicholas Dirks has termed the “scandal” of empire. These included the immoral 
activities of the Company in India as well as the unscrupulous behavior of those who had 
returned to Britain wealthy and corrupt from their exploits abroad and came to be called 
                                                
34 Chakravarti, “Whatever Happened to the Vedic Dasi?” 31.  
35 James Rennell (1742-1830) was the first British geographer and cartographer to survey India. See Kapil Raj, 
“Circulation and the Emergence of Modern Mapping,” 38.  
36 Ludden, “Orientalist Empiricism,” 254.  
37 Metcalf and Metcalf, A Concise History of Modern India, 63; Chakravarti, “Whatever Happened to the Vedic 
Dasi?” 39-40; van der Veer, Imperial Encounters, 140-141. Müller’s ideas contributed significantly to emerging 
racial discourse by suggesting that both Europeans and Indians were the common descendants of the ancient 
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“nabobs.”38 Dirks argues that the iniquity that came to light from Hastings’s trial contributed 
to a fundamental recasting of British activity in India as the disgrace of the Company was 
transferred to the native Indian population.39 The recent loss of the American colonies—as 
well as the riches that poured into Britain as a result of the Company’s unethical yet 
profitable dealings—further heightened the need for a new rationale for the British presence 
in India. Since Britain could no longer turn a blind eye towards the Company, the 
convenient idea of a “civilizing mission” arose.40 The newfound reformist bent is evident in 
the Charter Act of 1813, which renewed the East India Company’s charter for twenty years 
and officially opened the country to missionary activity.41 Hindus in particular were deemed 
to be in dire need of British intervention, as noted in William Wilberforce’s remarks before 
Parliament in June 1813: “The Hindu divinities were absolute monsters of lust, injustice, 
wickedness, and cruelty. In short, their religious system is one grand abomination.”42 Such 
comments signal the reorientation of British Orientalism in the early nineteenth century. As 
Britons increasingly repudiated late eighteenth-century suggestions of a glorious 
Indian/Hindu Golden Age put forth by Jones and his colleagues, they grew all the more 
convinced of their inherent superiority over Indians on all fronts. 
 
 
 
                                                
38 This term is a corruption of the term “nawab,” the title of Mughal rulers. See Nicholas Dirks, The Scandal of 
Empire, 9. 
39 Dirks, The Scandal of Empire, 125-131, 207, 311. 
40 Though anti-slavery and abolition movements were also important factors in the development of the British 
civilizing mission, such influences are beyond the scope of this chapter. 
41 Gauri Viswanathan, Masks of Conquest, 23-38. As Viswanathan points out, a section of the Charter Act also 
empowered the Governor-General-in-Council to direct funds to the “revival and improvement of literature, 
and the encouragement of the learned natives of India” (38). See also van der Veer, Imperial Encounters, 6. 
42 Qtd. in Kopf, British Orientalism and the Bengal Renaissance, 142. 
  
30 
James Mill’s Authorizing History 
The landmark publication of James Mill’s voluminous The History of British India in 
1817 provided the emergent colonial state with substantial ideological support for its 
imperialist agenda.43 Mill found Jones in particular to be anathema because the latter’s theory 
of a common Indo-European linguistic origin and ancient Golden Age destabilized British 
notions of their inherent difference from Indians.44 Jones’s theory was considered 
demeaning to the classical heritage of Greece and Rome to which Britons had strategically 
laid claim. In order to keep India separate from Europe, the former had to be cast as 
fundamentally different and inferior, a task that Mill accomplishes with great rhetorical 
flourish. Mill’s prodigious treatise was based entirely on the secondary information produced 
by earlier British Orientalists—even those, like Jones, whom he despised. Mill, in fact, had 
never been to India himself and knew none of its languages.45 In his preface Mill 
preemptively addresses his lack of firsthand knowledge by explaining that such information 
was in fact not necessary: “Whatever is worth seeing or hearing in India, can be expressed in 
writing. As soon as every thing of importance is expressed in writing, a man who is duly 
qualified may attain more knowledge of India, in one year, in his closet in England, than he 
could obtain during the course of the longest life, by the use of his eyes and his ears in 
India.”46 Insinuating a British claim to Greco-Roman culture, Mill rationalizes his method by 
citing Roman historian Tacitus’s De Origine et situ Germanorum [Germania] which had been 
composed in a similar fashion: “Tacitus, though he never was in Germany, and was certainly 
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not acquainted with the language of our uncultivated ancestors, wrote the exquisite account of 
the manners of the Germans.”47 
The secondary sources on which Mill relied proved highly generative, as the 1817 
edition of History spanned three massive volumes. Certainly the most significant feature of 
History was its overdetermined periodization of Indian history based on its ostensible 
governing authority: “Of the Hindus”, “The Mahomedans”, and “one exclusive company” 
(see Figure 3). The importance of the Millian chronology cannot be overstated as it provided 
generations of Britons and Indians with a simple yet highly distorted perspective of India’s 
past.48 The understanding that Indian history as such only truly began with the advent of 
British colonialism is evident in Mill’s analyses of three successive Hindu, Muslim, and 
British epochs. While the discussions of the Hindu and Muslim eras reside neatly within the 
first volume, the second and third volumes together are dedicated to less than one hundred 
years of East India Company activity from 1708-1805. The chapter headings of Volume I 
further demonstrate Mill’s teleological view of Indian history as they become lengthier and 
more detailed as control of the polity transfers from the Hindus to the Muslims and finally 
to the British. Reflecting Mill’s belief that Hindus were devoid of an authentic history, the 
initial chapters contain merely descriptive information about the community: “Laws,” 
“Religion,” “Manners,” “The Arts,” “Literature,” and so on.  
Though Muslims are accorded greater historicity than Hindus, the intervening 
epoch—“The Mahomedans”—is also addressed summarily. In a volume that is over six 
hundred pages long, Mill covers several centuries of medieval Indian history in about one 
hundred and fifty pages. The chapter heading in which “The Mahomedans” first appear as 
                                                
47 Ibid., xiii. Emphasis added. Mill’s reference to the Germans as “our uncultivated ancestors” is consistent with 
his teleological view of history. 
48 Thapar, “Interpretations of Ancient Indian History,” 320. 
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major players in India reified prevalent views about inherent Hindu effeteness and Muslim 
tyranny: “From the first Invasion of India by the Nations in the North, till the Expulsion of 
the Gaznevide Dynasty.” 49 As Mill states on the opening page of the chapter, “It appears 
that the people of Hindustan have at all times been subject to incursions and conquest, by 
the nations contiguous to them on the north-west…” Yet in Mill’s account, such invasions 
nevertheless proved beneficial for India: “…human nature in India gained, and gained very 
considerably, by passing from a Hindu to a Mahomedan government…The defects of 
Mahomedan rule, enormous as they justly deserve to be held, can by no means be regarded 
as equal to those which universally distinguish the government of Hindus.”50 In this 
teleological account, Hindus were necessarily inferior to Muslims, whose rule then naturally 
gave way to the superior British. By portraying both Hindus and Muslims in such a simple 
and cursory manner, Mill primes his readers to view the Raj as a warranted force of progress.  
Alongside a teleological view of history with “Homo Euro-Americanus” as its 
necessary culmination, Mill evaluated Indian culture and society using emerging liberal ideas 
on rationality and utility.51 Among the many things that Mill criticized were Hindu religious 
belief and practice, the people’s supposed lack of historical consciousness, and their apparent 
political disorganization:  
To the monstrous period of years, which the legends of the Hindus involve, they ascribe events the most 
extravagant and unnatural. Even these are not connected in chronological series; but are a number of 
independent and incredible fictions. This people, indeed, are perfectly destitute of historical records. 
Their ancient literature affords not a single production to which the historical 
character belongs. The works in which the miraculous transactions of former times are 
described, are poems. Most of them are books of a religious character, in which the 
exploits of the gods, and their commands to mortals, are repeated or revealed. In all, 
the actions of men and those of deities are mixed together in a set of legends more 
absurd and extravagant, more transcending the bounds of nature and of reason, less 
                                                
49 Mill, The History of British India, vol. 1, bk. 3, 481. 
50 Ibid., 628. 
51 Inden, “Orientalist Constructions of India,” 416. 
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grateful to the imagination and taste of a cultivated and rational people, than those 
which the fabulous history of any other nation presents to us. The Brahmens [sic] are 
the most audacious, and perhaps the most unskillful fabricators, with whom the annals 
of fable have yet made us acquainted.52 
 
Of all the results of civilization, that of forming a combination of different states, and directing their 
powers to one common object, seems to be one of the least consistent with the mental habits and 
attainments of the Hindus. It is the want of this power of combination which has rendered India so 
easy a conquest to all invaders; and enables us to retain, so easily, that dominion over it which we have 
acquired. Where is there any vestige in India of that deliberative assembly of princes, 
which in Germany was known by the name of the Diet? Where is there any memorial 
of that curious constitution by which the union of the German princes was preserved; 
or of those elections by which they chose whom among themselves should be placed 
at their head. That nominal homage which the Mahratta chiefs at present pay to the 
throne of Sevagee, is a temporary circumstance, entirely of a different nature. These 
chiefs are not subordinate princes, but revolted subjects, in a dismembered empire. 
There is among them no confederacy.53  
 
Ronald Inden’s theorization of three separate aspects of Indological accounts—the 
“descriptive,” “commentative,” and “explanatory”—are useful when examining Mill’s 
assessments.54 A self-appointed representative of Western civilization, Mill considers 
European superiority a universal axiom and, with this yardstick in hand, he ascertains 
numerous Indian deficiencies. As foretold by the overdetermined chapter titles of the 
“Hindu” section, Mill’s remarks are mostly descriptive and commentative, and very rarely 
explanatory. For example, in the first excerpt Mill refers to Brahmanical notions of time 
[yugs] and dismisses them on two counts. These narratives do not constitute a proper history 
for they describe events “most extravagant and unnatural” and are not arranged in 
chronological order. They contain no historical value whatsoever because of absurd content 
that “transcend[s] the bounds of nature and of reason.” In his concluding remarks to the 
volume Mill again avers that when it comes to history, “of this most important branch of 
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literature the Hindus were totally destitute.”55 Since they do not accord with his Eurocentric 
views, he dismisses Hindu narratives without considering whether they may have been both 
historical and religious, which was indeed the case for Puranic chronicles.56 For Mill, History 
and Religion necessarily require separate discussions, leading to the summary dismissal of 
works such as the Ramayana and the Mahabharata.57 
In the second excerpt, Mill cites India’s conquerability as an essential quality, a 
function of Hindus’ irrationality and deficient “mental habits and attainments.” Mill cites the 
German Diet as an example of European political unity against which he contrasts Indians’ 
fragmentation.58 For Mill, Indians are especially backward because they do not have a 
representative or unified institutional body to reach consensus. He naturally does not pause 
to consider whether aspects of the Mughal Empire might have fulfilled this arbitrary marker 
of civilization. Assuming a unitary view of truth, Mill also does not reflect on whether the 
Company’s presence may have caused or exacerbated the fragmentation of Maratha princes 
that he cites as indicative of Indians’ fundamental disorder. Likewise, he dismisses any 
evidence that would undermine his argument, such as Maratha reverence of their expired 
leader Shivaji. As C.H. Philips observes, “Once committed to [the] view that Indian society 
was barbarous, Mill was highly selective in his use of evidence.”59  
                                                
55 Mill, The History of British India, vol. 1, bk. 3, 648. 
56 Partha Chatterjee, “History and the Nationalization of Hinduism,” 104. 
57 Mill goes on to compare Hindu epic literature with that of the Persians: “Compare the Mahabharat, the great 
narrative poem of the Hindus, with the Shah Namah, the great narrative poem of the Persians; the departure 
from nature and probability is less wild and extravagant; the incidents are less foolish; the fictions are more 
ingenious; all to a great degree, in the work of the Mahomedan author, than in that of the Hindu” (vol. 1, bk. 3, 
648). 
58 Here Mill is likely referring to the Perpetual Diet of Regensburg, a representative body of German states 
confederated under the Holy Roman Empire that had a long history of meeting regularly to discuss and reach 
consensus on matters of concern. Beginning in 1594 the Diet met exclusively in Regensburg; its last significant 
act was the 1803 resolution to reorganize and secularize the Empire. The Diet dissolved alongside the Holy 
Roman Empire in 1806, and it was only in 1847 that a central representative Diet of German states was formed.  
59 C.H. Philips, “James Mill, Mountstuart Elphinstone, and the History of India,” 221. Philips notes further that 
Mill “commonly attached the greatest weight to the writers who [were] least entitled to confidence.” These 
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Despite Mill’s admission that any worthy history of India must necessarily be a 
“critical” or “judging” account—or precisely because of such assertions—History became an 
overwhelmingly influential (inter)text on India by providing an authoritative basis for 
Britons’ ever-increasing hostility and condescension towards the colony and its inhabitants.60 
Hailed as the first comprehensive account on India, History became required reading for the 
Company’s civil servants and was reissued in several subsequent editions in 1820, 1826, and 
1840, the last of which was posthumous.61 In 1848, Horace Hayman Wilson (1786-1860), 
Professor of Sanskrit at Oxford, published an abridged version of Mill’s History in which he 
added critical notes and advanced its account from 1805 to the 1834.62 Wilson’s stature as a 
respected Indologist legitimized History and ensured that it would remain dominant for much 
time to come. Yet Wilson was actually quite critical of Mill’s account as noted in the 
following statements he made in 1844: 
In the effects which Mill’s History is likely to exercise upon the connection between 
the people of England and the people of India ... its tendency is evil: it is calculated 
to destroy all sympathy between the ruler and the ruled; to preoccupy the minds of 
those who issue annually from Great Britain to monopolise the posts of honour and 
power in Hindustan, with an unfounded aversion towards those over whom they 
exercise that power. . . . There is reason to fear that these consequences are not 
imaginary, and that a harsh and illiberal spirit has of late years prevailed in the 
conduct and councils of the rising service in India which owes its origin to 
impressions imbibed in early life from the History of Mr. Mill.63 
                                                                                                                                            
were individuals prejudiced against Indians or who perceived India from limited, biased, or superficial 
perspectives. Likewise, Mill overlooked instances in which these and other accounts may have been favorable 
to Indians. 
60 Mill, “Preface,” The History of British India, vol. 1, x. As Inden notes, a hegemonic text in the Gramscian sense 
is “a text [that] is not concerned with narrow and internalist issues of the discipline itself but with the broader 
questions of India’s place in the world and in history, issues in which those outside of the discipline, the active 
subjects of the world—business and government leaders—and the more passive subjects of the world’s history, 
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A hegemonic text is also totalizing—it provides an account of every aspect of Indian life. It accounts for all the 
elements that the relevant knowing public wants to know about” (417). 
61 Inden, “Orientalist Constructions of India,” 418. See also Philips, “James Mill, Mountstuart Elphinstone, and 
the History of India,” 226. 
62 Philips, “James Mill, Mountstuart Elphinstone, and the History of India,” 221.  
63 Qtd. in ibid., 225-226. 
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Considering these views, it is indeed surprising that Wilson chose to publish an abridged 
edition of Mill’s text and not to have issued a historical account of his own. Although Wilson 
provided extensive corrective footnotes to Mill’s text, his edition nevertheless certified the 
latter as a significant work on India.64 Wilson’s acknowledgement that Mill’s tome was “the 
most valuable work upon the subject which has yet been published” may explain why he 
chose to provide critical commentary, for its status as the first comprehensive “historical” 
treatise of India rendered it an ur-text that demanded attention and analysis.65  
British historian Mountstuart Elphinstone (1779-1859) furthered Mill’s influence 
within nineteenth-century British historiography on India with The History of India, published 
in 1841. Ironically, Elphinstone had intended to offer a more sympathetic account of India 
than his predecessor and was certainly in a better position to do so given his background as 
Governor of Bombay from 1819-1827. Lamenting Mill’s caustic denigrations, Elphinstone 
desired to produce a history that would prove to be “more full in facts and free from 
disputes and dissertations.”66 However laudable his intention may have been, the following 
excerpt from The History of India demonstrates Elphinstone’s overall failure to escape Mill’s 
influence: 
What we do see we judge by our own standard. We conclude that a man who cries 
like a child on slight occasions, must always be incapable of acting or suffering with 
dignity; and that one who allows himself to be called a liar would not be ashamed of 
any baseness. Our writers also confound the distinctions of time and place; they 
combine in one character the Maratta and the Bengalese; and tax the present 
generation with the crimes of the heroes of the “Maha Bharat.” It might be argued, 
in opposition to many unfavourable testimonies, that those who have known the 
Indians longest have always the best opinion of them; but this is rather a compliment 
to human nature than to them, since it is true of every other people. It is more in 
point, that all persons who have retired from India think better of the people they 
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have left after comparing them with others even of the most justly admired nations. 
These considerations should make us distrust our own impressions, when unfavorable, but cannot 
blind us to the fact that the Hindus have, in reality, some great defects of character.67 
 
Though he is not named directly, Mill is foremost among those “writers [who] confound the 
distinctions of time and place” and engage in other such objectionable totalizations and 
comparisons of Indians. In his oblique critique, Elphinstone indicts Mill’s lack of distinction 
and glaring omission of context when making his grandiose claims. Likely shielding himself 
from allegations of bias, Elphinstone argues that one should not accept the laudatory 
opinions of those who have firsthand experience with Indians because it is within “human 
nature” to be partial to those with whom one is familiar. For Elphinstone, British readers 
should instead consider that those who have left India continue to praise its people even 
after comparing them with those of “the most justly admired nations.”  
But Elphinstone’s final observation eviscerates such arguments. Though the 
historian criticizes the Millian tendency to issue totalizing opinions and urges readers to 
“distrust our own impressions when unfavorable,” he does precisely this. No matter how 
open-minded Britons may try to be, they cannot escape the “fact that the Hindus have, in 
reality, some great defects of character.” Elphinstone further perpetuates the understanding 
that Indian history was composed of successive Hindu, Muslim, and British epochs. Though 
he discusses only the first two eras and does not include an analysis of the East India 
Company—hence the title The History of India—the British succession of the Mughal Empire 
is obvious. Like his predecessor, Elphinstone also uses simple descriptions that suggest 
Hindus’ relative lack of historicity, e.g., “Division and Employment of Classes,” 
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“Geography,” and “Chronology.” 68 The title of the final book in the Hindu unit is 
particularly telling: “History of the Hindus up to the Mahometan Invasion.”69 Notions of 
Muslims as marauding conquerors are further reinforced in the title of the subsequent book, 
“From the Commencement of the Arab Conquests to the Establishment of a Mahometan 
Government in India.” Here Elphinstone begins his discussion with an analysis of Arabs, 
Islam, and the aggressive ideology of “Mahomet” [Muhammad]: “…the Hindus might have 
long remained undisturbed by foreign intrusion, if a new spirit had not been kindled in a 
nation till now as sequestered as their own.”70 That Elphinstone begins the story of the 
“Muslim” epoch outside of India further reinforced the prevalent belief that Muslims were 
alien to the polity, yet another idea that would go on to galvanize educated Hindus across 
India. 
Though Elphinstone’s History of India was relatively richer in historical depth and 
informed by firsthand knowledge, it failed to compete with Mill’s treatise because, as C.H. 
Philips puts it, “Elphinstone was too diffident, too cautious; his criticism of Mill was implied, 
never open, his attack always oblique.”71 As noted in the above excerpt, by issuing a 
totalizing criticism about Hindus himself Elphinstone strangely undermines his own 
argument in favor of a historical methodology attentive to local specificities. Presumably, 
Elphinstone took this approach in order to establish his credibility with British readers by 
affirming popular notions about India that Mill had advanced earlier. Elphinstone’s History 
was adopted as a textbook at Haileybury College where East India Civil Service cadets were 
                                                
68 For example, Books 1 and 2 are respectively entitled “State of the Hindus at the Time of Menu’s Code” and 
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of the Vedas.” 
69 Volume 1 of Elphinstone’s History is divided into two units “Hindus” and “Mahometans,” which are 
subdivided into books.  
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trained, but it was soon overshadowed by Wilson’s 1848 edition of Mill’s tome.72 British 
bewilderment over the cataclysmic rebellion of 1857 further cemented the authority of Mill’s 
sensational account over Elphinstone’s more restrained treatise.73 Nevertheless, 
Elphinstone’s monograph enjoyed circulated through the early twentieth century. New 
editions of History of India were published in 1905 and 1911, intended for Indian university 
students who understandably preferred it to Mill’s volumes.74 
Irishman Vincent Smith advanced the Millian historical legacy still further into the 
twentieth century. Like Elphinstone, Smith had a lengthy career with the Indian Civil Service, 
from 1869-1900, before turning to historical writing after retirement.75 In 1904, he published 
The Early History of India: From 600 B.C. to the Muhammadan Conquest including the Invasion of 
Alexander the Great, the title of which evidences his naturalization of the Millian chronology.76 
Smith’s text differed from those of his predecessors due to its consideration of newly 
discovered archaeological and cultural materials. In the manner of the late eighteenth-century 
British Orientalists, Smith described these findings as marking “immense progress in the 
recovery of the lost history of India.”77 While on the whole Smith granted far greater historicity to 
Hindus that did Mill and Elphinstone, he still reified the overarching presumption of 
successive Hindu, Muslim, and British epochs:   
The history of [India over] this long period is, on the whole, a melancholy record of degradation and 
decadence in government, literature, religion, and art, with the exception of temple architecture. The 
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“Nationalist Historians,” 419. 
75 A.L. Basham, “Modern Historians of Ancient India,” 266. See also Philips, “James Mill, Mountstuart 
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three following chapters, which attempt to give an outline of the salient features in 
the bewildering annals of Indian petty states when left to their own devices for 
several centuries, may perhaps serve to give the reader a notion of what India always 
has been when released from the control of a supreme authority, and what she would be 
again, if the hand of benevolent despotism which now holds her in its iron grasp should be 
withdrawn.78  
 
[This] volume deals with the political history of Hindu India, the land of the Brahmans, which 
is the real India—a land the fascination of which is largely due to the unique character of its 
civilization. That quality of strangeness makes the history of Hindu India less 
attractive to the European or American general reader than the more easily 
intelligible story of the Muslim and British conquerors, but anybody who desires to 
understand modern India must be content to spend some labour on the study of 
ancient India during the long ages of autonomy.79 
 
In the first excerpt, Smith references an approximate five-hundred-year period—from 528 
A.D. to the beginning of the eleventh century—when India was, in his words, “free to work 
out her destiny in her own fashion.”80 In a passage reminiscent of Mill’s History, Smith argues 
that the “degradation and decadence” of this period evidence India’s natural proclivity 
towards chaos and a fundamental inability to maintain its sovereignty. And echoing the 
younger Mill’s observations about the need for more advanced countries to exert a “parental 
despotism” over others, Smith argues that the “benevolent despotism” and “iron grasp” of 
Britain over India must be maintained lest the latter’s stability be lost. The second passage, 
taken from Smith’s 1914 edition, similarly establishes a Millian chronology through its 
matter-of-fact declaration that “Hindu India, the land of the Brahmans…is the real India.” 
Muslims are necessarily outsiders, or as Smith states, “conquerors.” For Smith, any 
knowledge of “the real India” necessarily requires an understanding of its long lost Hindu 
past.  
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That Mill’s History of British India—a text that relied exclusively on secondary sources 
and whose author had never been to the country about which he wrote—exerted such 
influence in British historiography deserves pause. Rather than providing any substantive 
information about India and its people, the treatise only further entrenched notions of 
British superiority and a right to occupation. History shaped the thinking of not only Britons 
but also prominent continental philosophers such as Georg Hegel, Karl Marx, and Max 
Weber. Prejudiced by Mill’s account, these European thinkers also perceived India as an 
inert object without a proper history, civilization, or religion to speak of.81 Mill’s History 
reified notions of Europe as the dominant agent and mover of a universal history by 
periodizing the Indian past as comprised of increasingly progressive Hindu, Muslim, and 
British epochs.82 That Mill does not identify the British as “Christian” rulers indexes his 
thinking that religious belonging was the primary determinant of personal identity in India 
and that its inhabitants had not developed any other worthwhile categories of group 
designation.83 Yet despite all his aspersions, Mill deemed Indians capable enough to benefit 
from British rule. Believing the mind to be a tabula rasa, Mill held that reformist legislation 
and English education would be able to yield desired changes. As David Ludden remarks, 
“…[Mill’s] work marshaled what he believed to be all necessary facts to show the necessity 
of British rule as a remedy for Indian’s traditional tyranny and chaos…”84 
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Policy  
Supported by Mill’s History, the British were increasingly empowered to enact a 
number of policies intended to reform the perceived degeneracy of Indian culture with a 
particular focus on Hindu belief and praxis. Such measures reflected a growing sense of a 
British “civilizing mission,” a myth that attempted to obscure the harsher ideas and realities 
behind their domination of the country. Ideas about gender in particular played a major role 
in this endeavor because the treatment of Hindu women by Hindu men was considered 
irrefutable evidence of the fundamental depravity of the latter, substantiating the British 
right to rule.85  
The abolition of sati in 1829 is a crucial case in point, the rite being categorically 
denounced in the official legislation as “[a] practice…revolting to the feelings of human 
nature.”86 The Widow Remarriage Act of 1856, which permitted the remarriage of Hindu 
widows, was another instance of the emergent colonial state attempting to regulate Hindu 
practices according to what were regarded as universal liberal ideals.87 Yet another example 
of British legislation targeting Hindus was the 1891 passage of the Age of Consent Act, 
which raised the age at which girls could legally have sexual intercourse, usually in the 
confines of marriage, from ten to twelve years.88 This last issue had long been a matter of 
controversy, with Hindu opinion split over the right of the British to legislate on this 
intimate matter.89 While some supported the measure, others objected to British interference 
within the domestic sphere as well as the derogatory insinuations about Hindu masculinity.90 
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Although the Act was never implemented, it actually helped strengthen Hindu patriarchal 
control on such practices due to a desire to maintain a sphere exempt from unwanted 
intervention by the colonial state.91 These examples demonstrate how feminist concerns 
were often abstracted into symbolic points of contention in which Hindu and British men 
sought to establish their respective authority. Thus instead of helping the women at the 
center of these issues, such debates often strengthened the patriarchal shackles that bound 
them and relegated their concerns even further to the periphery.  
 Alongside reformist legislation that both prohibited and permitted certain activities, 
the emerging colonial government sought to mold Indian behavior by example. The most 
significant of such measures was the institution of English education and literary studies in 
India. In 1835, Thomas Macaulay issued his famous “Minute on Indian Education” in which 
James Mill’s influence is unmistakable:  
I have no knowledge of either Sanscrit or Arabic. But I have done what I could to 
form a correct estimate of their value. I have read translations of the most celebrated 
Arabic and Sanscrit works. I have conversed, both here and at home, with men 
distinguished by their proficiency in the Eastern tongues. I am quite ready to take the 
Oriental learning at the valuation of the orientalists themselves. I have never found one 
among them who could deny that a single shelf of a good European library was worth the whole 
native literature of India and Arabia. The intrinsic superiority of the western literature is indeed 
fully admitted by those Members of the Committee who support the Oriental plan of education…92  
 
We must at present do our best to form a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions 
whom we govern—a class of persons Indian in blood and colour, but English in tastes, in opinions, 
in morals, and in intellect. To that class we may leave it to refine the vernacular dialects of this 
Country, to enrich those dialects with terms of science borrowed from the western nomenclature, and 
to render them by degrees fit vehicles for conveying knowledge to the great mass of the population.93 
 
Like Mill, Macaulay distanced himself from the views of the eighteenth-century British 
Orientalists and advanced reductive essentialisms about India based on second-hand 
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information. Nevertheless, Macaulay’s Minute became the basis for official British policy, 
formalizing and expanding a practice that had already been in effect in Calcutta for several 
decades.94 As Gauri Viswanathan has pointed out, Macaulay’s advocacy led to the swift 
passage of the 1835 English Education Act and the establishment of numerous English-
medium government schools in India’s urban areas.95 Swayed by both Mill and Macaulay, 
Governor-General William Bentinck—who had only recently promulgated legislation to 
abolish sati in 1829—ceased patronage of the Asiatic Society, Fort William College, and 
related institutions, many of which were based in Bengal. Revealing Mill’s tremendous 
influence, before leaving for India Bentinck reportedly told him, “I am going to British India, 
but I shall not be Governor-General. It is you that will be Governor-General.”96  
Yet by this point, late eighteenth-century British Orientalist ideas about a Hindu 
Golden Age had already taken on a life of their own. This was particularly the case among 
the Bengali bhadralok, a term that was used to refer to the new middle and upper classes of 
Bengalis, usually high-caste Hindus, who had flourished under the British regime; their elite 
status and education had enabled them to become teachers, merchants, clerks, rentiers, and 
government employees.97 Dubbed the “Father of Modern India,” Ram Mohan Roy (1772-
1833) is perhaps the most well-known of these figures. A highly educated and wealthy 
Bengali Brahmin, Roy was learned in Sanskrit, Arabic, Persian, and English and had worked 
for the Company at the turn of the nineteenth century. He was a vocal advocate of William 
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Bentinck’s reformist policies, such as the abolition of sati and an English academic 
curriculum that Roy had described as “a more liberal and enlightened system of instruction, 
embracing mathematics, natural philosophy, chemistry and anatomy, with other useful 
sciences…”98 Demonstrating the dialectical nature of British Orientalism, Macaulay had in 
fact adopted some of Roy’s arguments in his own push for an English-based, Westernized 
educational program in India.99 
A precursor of Macaulay’s Children, Roy was among the first English-educated 
Indian elites to take up the religious episteme for the purpose of reforming Hinduism.100 
Like the British Orientalists of the late eighteenth century, he had translated a number of 
ancient Hindu texts such as the Upanishads and the Vedas into English and Bengali in the 
effort to craft from them a coherent vision of a rational, monotheistic Hinduism.101 
Appropriating the idiom of a long-lost Hindu Golden Age, Roy believed that Hinduism as it 
existed in the present was a corruption of a previously ennobled form and he eschewed idol 
worship and sati as illegitimate practices. In the following excerpt, Roy describes how he 
came to appreciate British rule as a way of improving the Hindu community and India at 
large:  
When about the age of sixteen, I composed a manuscript, calling in question the validity of the 
idolatrous system of the Hindus. This, together with my known sentiments on the subject, 
having produced a coolness between me and my immediate kindred, I proceeded on 
my travels, and passed through different countries, chiefly within, but some beyond 
the bounds of Hindustan, with a feeling of great aversion to the establishment of the 
British power in India. When I had reached the age of twenty, my father recalled me 
and restored me to his favour; after which, I first saw, and began to associate with 
Europeans, and soon after made myself tolerably acquainted with their laws and 
form of government. Finding them generally more intelligent, more steady and moderate in their 
conduct, I gave up my prejudice against them and became inclined in their favour, feeling persuaded 
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that their rule, through a foreign yoke, would lead more speedily and surely to the amelioration of the 
native inhabitants…102 
 
Here Roy presents himself as having come to accept colonial rule through the British 
demonstration of what Antonio Gramsci calls “intellectual and moral leadership”—because 
he believed it would “speedily and surely [lead] to the amelioration of the native 
inhabitants.”103 In 1828, Roy institutionalized his reformist ideas on Hinduism and founded 
the Brahmo Samaj, among the earliest indigenous organizations that encouraged reflection 
about existing religious practices and group belonging.104 Alongside a rich oral tradition, a 
burgeoning print culture played a key role in disseminating new ideas about religion among 
the middle and upper classes in Bengal and other regions.105  
 
Rebellion and the Raj 
  Following the publication of Mill’s History of British India, the event that exerted the 
most impact on British Orientalist discourse was the rebellion of 1857-1858, an uprising of 
Indian soldiers employed by the East India Company against their British commanders that 
led to the colonial state temporarily losing control over large swathes of northeast and 
central India. The rebellion was critical because the mass violence and widespread chaos that 
it unleashed concretized for the British their perceptions of a fundamentally degenerate 
Hindu India, leading to the formalization of Crown Rule in 1858.   
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The question of what to call this event has been contentious from the start and has 
varied widely depending on one’s perspective. The British have commonly referred to the 
episode as the “Sepoy Mutiny” in an attempt to localize its origin and minimize its impact, 
while Indian patriots and nationalists, most famously V.D. Savarkar, hailed it the first 
“Indian War of Independence.”106 Neither of these labels is accurate. Though the uprising 
originated in the army, labeling the episode a “mutiny” is far too reductive and does not 
adequately account for the disparate motives of the many actors involved, its appeal to those 
outside of the army, or its considerable geographic scope.107 Reasons to participate in the 
rebellion were variable, thus challenging Indian perceptions that this was a conflict driven by 
a clear ideology or platform. While feelings of regional patriotism and discontent with British 
rule were certainly—but not exclusively—at play, there was no coherent plan or strategy to 
eject the British from India.108 Though these varying interpretations persist, modern 
historians have largely settled on the terms “rebellion” or “revolt” to describe the episode.109  
The rebellion was markedly different from previous military and civilian uprisings 
due its expanded scope, increased intensity, and convergence of both long- and short-term 
grievances against the colonial regime.110 Growing dissatisfaction among native soldiers 
against their British commanders reached a breaking point when it was rumored that the 
cartridges of the new Enfield rifle were greased with the fat of cows and pigs—offensive to 
the religious sensibilities of Hindus and Muslims respectively—as a part of a nefarious 
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scheme to force their conversion to Christianity.111 In the spring of 1857, many soldiers 
across northeastern India refused to load the rifles and were imprisoned for insubordination 
or expelled. The actual revolt began in May 1857 when soldiers in the Meerut regiment 
liberated their imprisoned peers and attacked the British officials who tried to stop them. As 
the sepoys proceeded southwest towards Delhi, they urged others to join them with the 
rallying cry “Chalo Delhi!” [“Let’s go to Delhi!”]. There they united behind the titular Mughal 
emperor Bahadur Shah Zafar in a symbolic act of defiance against the British. News of the 
rebellion incited other Indians to join for a variety of reasons; the cities of Delhi, Lucknow, 
and Kanpur in particular witnessed horrific violence on both sides. While the British had lost 
control over large parts of north and central India, other regions such as Bengal and the 
newly annexed Punjab remained passive.  
The rebellion led to a complete reappraisal of the British presence in India. The 
British were wholly taken aback by the revolt and in many locations it took them up to a year 
to reestablish their authority.112 The rebellion resulted in the formal dissolution of the East 
India Company and the transfer of governing authority to the British Crown per the 
Government of India Act of 1858. Queen Victoria’s Proclamation in November 1858 
suggests that the uprising had resulted primarily from an affront to Indians’ religious beliefs: 
Firmly relying Ourselves on the truth of Christianity, and acknowledging with 
gratitude the solace of Religion, We disclaim alike the Right and the Desire to impose our 
Convictions on any of Our Subjects. We declare it to be Our Royal Will and Pleasure that none be 
in any wise favored, none molested or disquieted, by reason of their Religious Faith or Observances; 
but that all shall alike enjoy the equal and impartial protection of the Law: and We do strictly 
charge and enjoin all those who may be in authority under Us, that they abstain from all interference 
with the Religious Belief or Worship of any of Our Subjects, on pain of Our highest Displeasure.  
 
And it is Our further Will that, so far as may be, Our Subjects, of whatever Race or 
Creed, be freely and impartially admitted to Offices in Our Service, the Duties of 
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which they may be qualified, by their education, ability, and integrity, duly to 
discharge… 
 
We deeply lament the evils and misery which have been brought upon India by the acts of ambitious 
Men, who have deceived their Countrymen, by false reports, and led them into open Rebellion. Our 
Power has been shewn by the Suppression of that Rebellion in the field; We desire to 
shew Our Mercy, by pardoning the Offenses of those who have been thus misled, 
but who desire to return to the path of Duty….113 
 
While it was certainly true that the alleged coating of the new Enfield rifle cartridges formed 
the express cause of the rebellion, several long-standing secular grievances were also 
factors.114 These included dissatisfaction with pay and new recruitment policies, the recent 
annexation of the princely state of Awadh, and exorbitant land revenue assessments.115 Once 
the rebellion was underway, the decision to join or not was also often guided by material 
concerns or that which seemed most advantageous at the time.116 Though some sepoys 
revolted out of confusion or pressure from peers, others remained passive due to hostility 
towards their comrades.117 In other cases, the British issued bribes to individuals or groups 
not to revolt: “I will give Mubarak Shah four hundred Horse [sic]…If he is not on our side, 
he will be against us.”118 The Bengali bhadralok and many princely rulers remained passive; 
such “loyalty” is best understood as a calculated decision to protect beneficial ties with the 
British regime.119 As these cases suggest, ostensible acts of allegiance or disaffection during 
the rebellion often arose from a variety of factors and must not be taken at face value.     
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The heavy-handed response to the rebellion belied the complexity of the episode and 
its underlying causes. Queen Victoria’s patronizing declaration itself stands as a significant 
node within nineteenth-century British Orientalist discourse by furthering the idea that 
religious belonging was the overriding determinant of Indians’ identity and behavior. Not 
surprisingly, British officials in India did not readily consider their own hand in the rebellion 
or how secular motivations may have been at play. Rather, the event was attributed to 
natives’ volatile religious sensibilities that could be easily stoked by “…ambitious Men…who 
have deceived their Countrymen [with] false reports.” For Queen Victoria the British were 
faultless as “ambitious” Indian soldiers had wrongly roused their peers to revolt on the basis 
of misinformation about the Enfield rifle. Her assurances that the British had no “Right [or] 
Desire to impose [their] Convictions” on Indians and that the former were to “abstain from 
all interference with the Religious Belief or Worship of any of Our Subjects” further reified 
the sense that Indians were exceedingly sensitive about religious matters. Critical for the 
“moderate” phase of turn-of-the-century Indian politics, the Proclamation concluded with 
the affirmation that Britain desired the wellbeing of India and its people and made numerous 
promises of benevolent governance: “…it is Our earnest Desire to stimulate the peaceful 
Industry of India, to promote Works of Public Utility and Improvement, and to administer 
its Government for the benefit of all Our Subjects resident therein. In their Prosperity will 
be Our Strength; in their Contentment Our Security; and in their Gratitude Our best 
Reward…”120 
Yet such lofty rhetoric and pledges proved hollow. In what was termed the British 
“reconquest” of India, Britons reestablished their authority with a forceful hand.121 The 
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rebellion was put down with a great amount of violence—what Queen Victoria obliquely 
calls “Power” in her Proclamation.122 In addition to ushering in Crown Rule, the rebellion 
hardened British prejudice and racism towards Indians.123 While the British had always been 
attentive to positivist explanations of Indians’ essential difference from Europeans, they had 
nevertheless made claims to an enlightened agenda dedicated to the uplift of the native 
population.124 Even James Mill, despite his hostile views about nearly everything associated 
with India and especially Hindus, had suggested that Indians could (be compelled to) change 
given appropriate legislative action and the introduction of Western education.125  
The rebellion was momentous precisely because it ruptured the British narrative of 
positive change and progress and instead concretized their perceptions of indelible racial 
difference between themselves and Indians.126 The Utilitarian and Anglicist pretense that 
present reforms would one day “qualify” or enable India to be freed of its (J.S.) Millian 
“leading-strings” had been eviscerated with the perceived evidence that Indians were 
fundamentally depraved. With Britain now firmly convinced of the righteous necessity of 
their rule, the rationale of a progressive civilizing mission abandoned its liberal bent and 
became increasingly racist in character. The coeval rise of Social Darwinism—ideology that 
attempted to apply Charles Darwin’s ideas of natural selection to the apparent “progress” of 
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human societies—further substantiated such thinking.127 Rather than maintain the pretext 
that colonial rule promoted India’s advancement, Britons now believed all the more strongly 
that their occupation could very well endure indefinitely as Indians’ patent inferiority and 
backwardness necessitated their guiding hand.   
Once the British regained full control in 1858, they implemented blatantly 
authoritarian and racist policies in order to secure their authority. Like the British 
Orientalists of the late eighteenth century, positivist colonial knowledge was aggressively 
pursued but this time with a greater emphasis on ostensibly “scientific” reasoning and 
methodology reflective of the current moment. The goals were not just to better understand 
or constellate native groups into particular categories for the ease of ruling, but also to help 
predict native behavior to avoid potential unrest. Within the army, the proportion of British 
officers to Indian soldiers was increased and those Indians deemed inherently loyal or 
belonging to the “martial races”—such as Punjabis—were targeted for recruitment.128 The 
understanding of caste as another concrete marker of Indian identity drove the publication 
of an encyclopedic, eight-volume series called The Peoples of India issued by the Government 
of India in 1868.129 These books contained ethnographical descriptions of the chief 
characteristics and traits of various Indian castes and communities, followed by images of 
“representative” members of that group. For example, the “Rajpoots of Bareilly” were said 
to “usually affect martial habits and professions only, especially when they leave home. Our 
regular native army, and the police, contain large proportions of them…Almost as a rule, 
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they despise high class education, and, for the most part, are apparently more indifferent to 
intellectual aims and exertion than other Aryan Hindoos…”130  
Yet another way in which the colonial government increasingly began to read and 
enforce various kinds of distinctions among the native population was the long overdue 
enactment of the separate law codes for Hindus and Muslims that were developed under 
Warren Hastings.131 Other initiatives included the Census of India, first taken in 1872, and 
then on a decennial basis beginning in 1881.132 The colonial state also began to require the 
registration of journals and newspapers; printed materials such as books and pamphlets were 
increasingly scrutinized.133 Such policies evidence the desperation of the colonial government 
to “fix” what was naturally changeable and fluid in the attempt to harness greater control 
over Indian bodies and minds. 
 
Social Reform and the Idea of Bharat 
Colonial subjugation instantiated a rupture with familiar ways of being in the world, 
requiring new categories of thought—or new understandings of extant ones—in order to 
grapple with such transformations.134 In an article entitled “A Conceptual History of the 
Social: Some Reflections out of Colonial Bengal,” Rochona Majumdar analyzes the way in 
which the Bengali intellectual elite sought to rehabilitate their community and rethink their 
engagement with the colonial state in an ever-changing sociopolitical milieu. Though this 
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introspective turn had already been underway to a certain extent under the leadership of 
Ram Mohan Roy and others, Majumdar suggests that a shift occurred after 1857. In the 
wake of the rebellion and the formal advent of Crown Rule, the glaringly illiberal policies 
and practices of the British regime caused the Bengali elite to become increasingly wary of 
the mass social changes wrought by colonialism. While they remained irreversibly affected by 
their Western education, Bengali intellectuals began to rework their understanding of 
European ideas and ideals as they theorized the essential character of native society, or that 
which “would establish India’s history of difference with Europe.” 135 
The concepts samaj and samajik—loosely translated as “society” and “the social” 
respectively— were integral in this regard as they steadily came to index the essence or 
“organic unity” of India.136 Substantially different from a nation-state or civil society, samaj 
was understood to be that which “made up the being of India.”137 As Majumdar argues, “It 
was through the development of concepts such as samaj and other related categories over the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that ideas about nationalism, modernity, and a 
variety of new futures came to be imagined.”138 In marked contrast to European notions of 
society, which, as theorized by Charles Taylor and Keith Baker, were profoundly secular and 
evidenced a radical break with the past, Majumdar argues that 
…Indian ideas about the social were about resurrecting, or indeed crafting, a new 
history out of the past. The social was the ground on which Indians could distinguish 
themselves from the colonizer by establishing their long lineage in the past. The 
present was degenerate and this was a crisis brought upon by colonial conditions of 
life—political servitude, exposure to a new set of values, economic crisis, new 
professional structures, the pressures and lures of urban life, and new codes of 
familial behavior. The writers under consideration here sought to resolve these crises 
by looking to the past (real or imagined), upon which they posited the ideal of an 
                                                
135 Ibid., 169. 
136 Ibid. 
137 Ibid., 184. 
138 Ibid., 165. 
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Indian civilization. To think about the concept of the social in India meant first to 
write a history of samaj out of this civilizational heritage. The next step was to seek 
ways of remodeling the present through an active dialogue with the past as part of an 
anti-colonial political ethics.139  
 
Here Majumdar suggests that for Bengali writers such as Bankim Chattopadhyay, Bhudev 
Mukhopadhyay, and Rabindranath Tagore, the present condition of society was undesirable 
and reform was badly needed. Though the present was degenerate, one could “remodel” it 
such that the glory of the past could be recaptured. Integral to this pursuit of cultural 
regeneration was the celebration of what was unique about native society, for which the past 
provided an inviting blank canvass for “posit[ing] the ideal of an Indian civilization” and 
writing histories of samaj. It is thus not surprising that in this period the terms samaj and 
samajik began to appear in a variety of Bengali texts such as newspaper articles, histories, 
essays, and fiction as the Bengali elite increasingly scrutinized their relationship to the 
colonial state.140 Necessarily capacious and overdetermined, the categories samaj and samajik 
varied in meaning in the corpus of these writers but shared a fundamentally Hindu core: 
“…samaj, as it was theorized in late colonial India, remained distinctly Hindu.”141 
Though helpful in elucidating colonial Bengali intellectuals’ reflection on the social 
and the pressing need for samajik reformation, these arguments suffer from certain 
limitations. The critical point that these elites conceived of samaj as necessarily Hindu 
remains at best a subtext throughout the analysis and warrants, I argue, further elaboration 
and emphasis. As is often the case with scholarship on colonial Bengal, there is also a 
persistent slippage between the regional and the extra-regional or national. The growing 
understanding that the essence of India’s social fabric was necessarily Hindu was not limited 
                                                
139 Ibid., 169-170. Majumdar specifically draws upon Keith Baker’s essay, “Enlightenment and the Institution 
of Society: Notes for a Conceptual History” (2001). 
140 Ibid., 166. 
141 Ibid., 184.  
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to Bengali intellectuals; commentary along these lines would have better supported the 
conflation of “Bengali” and “Indian” notions of samaj. The utility of religious belonging in 
particular in enabling a conceptual leap from what may have otherwise been exclusively 
Bengali notions of samaj and samajik (undergirded by language, for instance) to broader 
extra-regional notions is of crucial importance, warranting additional explanation. 
I further suggest caution in labeling the collective endeavor of Bankim, Bhudev, 
Tagore, and other turn-of-the-century Bengali intellectuals as necessarily evincing an “anti-
colonial political ethics,” a loaded description that does not attend to the complexities of the 
“moderate” period of Indian political thought.142 Though the impetus to reflect upon the 
Bengali/Indian samaj may have been prompted by increasing doubt about the beneficence of 
British domination, characterizing this effort as necessarily arising from an “anti-colonial 
political ethics” problematically overlooks the growing belief among many Hindu elites that 
their samaj urgently required reform before either an anticolonial or a nationalist agenda could 
be readily debated, assumed, or espoused. Though the colonial relationship was increasingly 
scrutinized at this time, they continued to regard British rule as an overall positive 
development for the country, a “divine dispensation” that would ideally enable India and its 
people to flourish. Attention to the highly nuanced politics of this period reveals that even 
though these elites were becoming increasingly dismayed by colonial domination, they 
maintained that the internal improvement and revitalization of the Hindu samaj could only 
meaningfully occur within and under the auspices of the British Raj.143    
                                                
142 See Seth, “Rewriting Histories of Nationalism: The Politics of ‘Moderate Nationalism’ in India, 1870-1905,” 
on the misleading historiographical tendency to label the period from 1870-1905 of Indian politics as 
“moderate,” or in other words to approach it from the standpoint of a “built-in teleology in which all roads 
lead inexorably to the climax of 1947” (98). Moderate nationalism is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Four. 
143 Following Sudipta Kaviraj and other scholars, I urge the importance of nuancing the rather unwieldy 
concept of “anticolonial nationalism.” See Kaviraj’s essay, “The Imaginary Institution of India,” in which he 
theorizes the existence of “a form of consciousness/discourse which is genetically related to mature 
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Manu Goswami’s observations about the emergence of the cultural imagining of 
India as the specifically Hindu space “Bharat” help broaden Majumdar’s more recent 
arguments. In her monograph Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National Space, 
Goswami traces how the cultural imagining of India came to be mapped onto the colonial 
state, and as a part of this endeavor explains the increasingly common association of the 
Puranic term “Bharat” as the authentic identity of the polity.144 She explains that the 
conception of Bharat as a distinct national space that existed prior to the British colonial 
state—and yet was coterminous with it—emerged in north India in the 1860s and 
proliferated in numerous cultural works including popular histories and geographies, 
pedagogical texts, newspapers, pamphlets, literature, and songs.145 By the turn of the century, 
such understanding had attained a “self-evident givenness” among upper-caste, middle-class 
Hindus in north India, Bengal, and other areas.146 Goswami’s theorization of Bharat as a 
Bakhtinian “chronotope” elucidates its highly overdetermined nature: 
The category chronotope—which literally means time-space—refers to the dialectical 
co-constitution of spatial and temporal categories. Chronotopes are historically 
constituted and socially embedded space-time categories that have an exemplary, 
normative status. The doubled character of chronotopes as both social and 
                                                                                                                                            
nationalism, but is distinctly different from it…though not nationalist in a strict sense, this consciousness is 
anti-colonial because there is hardly any doubt about its dark and anguished opposition to colonial domination, 
and the destiny it had imposed on Indian society” (178). My use of the term “anticolonial” accords with this 
sense of broad dissatisfaction and disenchantment with colonial rule.  
144 As Goswami explains, Bharat or Bharatvarsha were common Puranic terms, “deriv[ing] either from the 
mythical King Bharata, who was descendant of the first Manu (the androgynous first being of Puranic myths), 
or from the ‘tribe’ of Bharata, which figures centrally in Vedic and epic traditions” (156). The Puranas 
themselves were ancient Hindu texts consisting of “various Brahminical schemas about the origins of the world, 
its topographical ordering, sacred geography, and genealogies of gods, sages, and kings” (155). See Producing 
India: From Colonial Economy to National Space (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004). 
145 In her sixth chapter, “India as Bharat: A Territorial Nativist Vision of Nationhood, 1860-1880,” Goswami 
examines numerous cultural works from the last third of the nineteenth century, including popular histories, 
geography texts, newspaper accounts, pedagogical works, native historiography, songs, and other cultural 
artifacts, that propagated the idea of India as Bharat. She locates the emergence of this potent cultural 
imagining specifically within the North-Western Provinces and Awadh, which were later designated as the 
United Provinces in 1935 and roughly correspond to the present-day Indian states of Uttar Pradesh and 
Uttarkhand (165-166). She also observes the coeval imagining of “Bharat Mata” arising in these areas as well as 
in Bengal. 
146 Ibid., 166.  
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normative and their representational importance for ‘materializing time in space’ 
provide a useful optic for understanding the emergent conception of India as Bharat. 
The notion of Bharat was at once a historically specific formation and the locus of a 
normatively saturated emergent nationalist discourse. It was discursively forged by 
the self-conscious appropriation and transposition of at once British-colonial 
historical, geographical, and ethnological discourse as well as received Puranic 
chronotopes.147  
 
The explanation of Bharat as a chronotope reveals how it simultaneously indexed idealized 
perceptions of the past in both time (the Vedic era) and space (the geographic borders of the 
colonial state).148 Using a popular Hindi history textbook first published in 1864 as a case-in-
point, Goswami notes that the seemingly organic identification of India as Bharat resulted 
from a highly contrived process as Hindu writers appropriated the Puranic term in order to 
subvert dominant British historiography and vivify a subjugated people. While the sequence 
of Hindu, Muslim, and British epochs intrinsic to British Orientalist historiography was kept 
intact, the postulation of Bharat as a utopic, originary national space enabled, to borrow 
Goswami’s words, “the inversion of the enlightenment theme of progress into a narrative of 
decline from the pure wonders of an ancient space-time to the degradation and 
fragmentation constitutive of the present.”149 Crucial to this reversal were the attribution of 
Bharat’s deterioration to the regrettable “invasion” of malevolent Muslim rulers as well as 
the suggestion that the polity remained unjustly subjugated under the British. Much as Henry 
Maine had feared, the insinuation that India’s originary condition as Bharat was in fact 
superior to—and more desirable than—both the intervening “Muslim” period and extant 
British rule in particular contested the progressive ethos intrinsic to the Raj’s trumpeted 
                                                
147 Ibid., 171-172.  
148 See also R.C. Majumdar’s essay, “Nationalist Historians,” regarding the emphasis that English-educated 
Hindus placed on the Vedas and the Vedic period (420-422). 
149 Goswami, Producing India, 182. 
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civilizing mission.150 As Goswami observes, “Bharat came to represent at once a 
geohistorically delimited national entity, a utopia realized in the ancient past, the exemplar 
for present political and social projects, and the object of national desire…The very capacity 
of the notion of Bharat to shuttle between a utopian and sociohistorical register endowed it 
with a robust and troubling endurance.”151  
Both Majumdar and Goswami observe parallel processes by which extant cultural 
terms assumed new meanings for the purpose of rejuvenating a people that increasingly 
privileged religious belonging as the key determinant of personal identity.152 Goswami’s 
theorization about the rise of Bharat helpfully extends Majumdar’s arguments on the 
evolution of samaj in the Bengali sociocultural milieu by illustrating that the overall 
contemplative turn taken by the Bengali intellectual elite during the last third of the 
nineteenth century was not unique. Rather, Bengali elites’ quest for the quintessence of 
India’s social fabric—and the majoritarian determination that it was fundamentally Hindu—
was part and parcel of a widespread phenomenon occurring throughout colonial India.153 
Goswami’s observations sharpen our understanding of Bengali notions of a transcendent 
Hindu samaj by identifying it by name, as “Bharat” and the coeval deification of the goddess 
                                                
150 Ibid., 186-187.  
151 Ibid., 187-188. 
152 As Romila Thapar and others have explained, Indian elites’ growing emphasis on religious belonging 
paralleled that of the colonial state, evincing the internalization of British Orientalist beliefs such as Indian 
history consisting of successive Hindu, Muslim, and British epochs. For Hindus, the formation of communities 
on these grounds would prove advantageous for lobbying the colonial government in terms it readily 
understood as well as for mobilizing a (false and inflated) majority of the population for particular political 
goals. See Thapar, “Imagined Religious Communities?” 229. 
153 Goswami remarks that there was indeed a “remarkable convergence and robustness of emergent discourse 
on history, territory, and nation” across India (166). In addition to her close reading of Raja Shiva Prasad’s 
1846 Itihas Timirnasak [A History of India], published in the United Provinces, Goswami examines geography 
texts, plays, songs, and other cultural works—many of which were produced in Bengal—that similarly evince 
the understanding that the various regions of India were part and parcel of the more transcendent entity of 
Bharat (190-193). 
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“Bharat Mata” [Mother India].154 The lost “ideal of Indian civilization” that Majumdar 
identifies the Bengali literati projecting onto the past was, precisely, the utopia of a Hindu 
“Bharat” mapped onto the present-day contours of the British colonial state. The imagining 
of India as Bharat in different regions during this period, as Goswami shows, indexes a 
pervasive understanding among Hindus far and wide that the essence of the Indian social—
its samaj—was inalienably Hindu in nature.  This samaj urgently required rejuvenation in the 
present moment; such reform would occur not only through the Hindu community’s 
reflection about its past, present, and future, but also by means of positive reforms and 
developments promised by the colonial state.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the key figures, events, and ideas of British Orientalism 
from approximately the late eighteenth to the early twentieth centuries in order to elucidate 
why questions of history and historiography became crucial to English-educated Indian elites 
at the turn of the twentieth century. The ideology was enabled and sustained by a number of 
interlinked Eurocentric assumptions about positivist knowledge, European superiority, and a 
teleological view of history. Over time, British Orientalism had produced two very different 
pictures of the Indian past that informed the rise of the cultural imagining of Bharat starting 
in the mid-nineteenth century. The late eighteenth-century vision of Jones and his colleagues 
contended that India had once boasted a glorious Golden Age from which it had declined 
into a state of degeneracy; in the mid-nineteenth century German Indologist Max Müller 
affirmed that a mythic Aryan race was the progenitor of Europeans and Indians alike. In 
contrast, Mill, Macaulay, and Bentinck held that India was degenerate from its very origins; 
                                                
154 Ibid., 198-203. 
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Mill’s History of British India (1817) was critical in substantiating the British narrative that their 
occupation of India was dedicated to the improvement of the country and its people, with a 
special focus on the depraved Hindus. Most importantly, Mill introduced an influential 
chronology of Indian history as comprised of successive Hindu, Muslim, and British epochs 
that furthered the totalization of Hindu and Muslim communities and reified the British 
perception that their rule was necessary for India’s development. 
The rebellion of 1857 was pivotal node in British Orientalist discourse because it 
challenged the theoretical possibility that the British civilizing mission would one day 
conclude and India’s “leading-strings” could be cut. Instead, the rebellion indurated both 
latent and overt racist beliefs among the British towards Indians. Blind to their own 
culpability and the complex material factors that contributed to the uprising, Britons became 
all the more certain of their superiority and right to rule indefinitely. In order to do so it was 
paramount to discern and emphasize difference (i.e., racial, religious, cultural) not only 
among the various Indian communities but also between themselves and their subjects. 
Crown Rule had established the institutional framework of the British imperial system in 
India, which by the turn of century had reached its apogee.155  
It was just as British Orientalism ossified in this manner that the Indian intelligentsia 
realized its generative possibilities.  While Mill and Macaulay had sought to eviscerate the 
romantic notions of the early British Orientalists, such ideas endured within precisely those 
Indian elites whom they had been envisioned as Anglophilic “interpreters between us and 
the millions whom we govern; a class of persons, Indian in blood and color, but English in 
taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect.” And now these interpreters increasingly began 
to appropriate select ideas for their own purposes—Ram Mohan Roy’s praise of a Hindu 
                                                
155 Metcalf and Metcalf, A Concise History of Modern India, 123. 
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Golden Age to motivate religious reform stands as an early example of English-educated 
Bengali writers taking up their pens for political and ideologically-driven endeavors. As I will 
show in subsequent chapters, beginning in the mid-nineteenth century nonfictional histories 
and historical romances became increasingly popular vehicles for the advancement of 
patriotic and proto-nationalist ideas centered on the emerging understanding of India as an 
originary Hindu space. Henry Maine’s alarm about the rise of such writing in 1866 was 
indeed quite perceptive, as he had discerned very early on the palpable challenge to British 
rule being put forth.  
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Figure 2: 
Lithograph that accompanied James Rennell’s Map of Hindoostan (1782) 
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CHAPTER 2 
BANKIM CHATTOPADHYAY’S CHALLENGE TO BRITISH HISTORIOGRAPHY 
IN ANANDAMATH 
 
 
In the early 1880s, the writer Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay issued a clarion call to 
his fellow Bengalis. Much like Henry Maine’s address to the University of Calcutta Senate in 
1866, Bankim described a dire situation that required immediate redress:  
A history of Bengal is needed, otherwise Bengalees would not become complete beings. A person who 
keeps thinking that his ancestors have not achieved anything of value will not achieve anything 
himself. He thinks that this defect in his blood has been inherited…Don’t you think that there 
must be some true substance in the history of Bengal? 
 
But from where can we get the true substance? Is there any history of Bengal? The 
British wrote plenty of books on the history of Bengal—Mr. Stewart’s book is so 
voluminous and heavy that a strong, young man might be killed if it is thrown at 
him! Marshman and Lothbridge even earned a lot of money by writing the history of 
Bengal in a ‘gossipy’ style. But do these books contain any historical facts about 
Bengal? In our opinion, none of these books written by British authors contain a 
true history of Bengal. These books contain only the history of those Muslims who 
gave themselves worthless titles such as ‘Bengali Badshah’, ‘Subedar of Bengal’, 
etc.…But this is not the true history of Bengal—it is not even a partial history of 
Bengal…A Bengalee who accepts this account as being Bengal’s history is not a true Bengalee. A 
Bengalee who is ready to accept without question the validity of facts laid down by Muslims, who are 
not only blinded by self-pride, but are also liars and full of hatred for the Hindus, is himself not a 
Bengalee. […] 
 
There is no history of Bengal. What goes by the name of it—that is no history. It is fiction—partly 
the account of the lives of a few worthless oppressors who were foreigners and belonged to a different 
religion. We need a history of Bengal otherwise there is no hope for Bengal. But who will write it? 
You will write it, I will write it, everyone will write this history. Whosoever is a 
Bengalee will write it. When the mother dies, there is so much joy in reminiscing 
about her! And this Bengal—the mother of all, the land of our birth—don’t we find 
pleasure in talking about her? 
 
Come, let us search for the history of Bengal. Whatever little is possible, let every 
individual do it…This is not to be done by one individual—it has to be done 
through collective effort… 
 
How long has Europe been civilized? 400 years back in the fifteenth century Europe was even more 
uncivilised than us…The Mughals after conquering Bengal tightened their rule, but how 
far was their rule extended? They expanded their kingdom, but how far did they 
come? […] When did the half of the indigenous population become Muslims? Why did they leave 
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their religion? Why did they convert to Islam? Which castes converted to Islam? This is the most 
important information in the history of Bengal. 1  
 
This essay, “A Few Words about the History of Bengal,” was among several tracts that 
Bankim published in his journal Bangadarshan [“Glimpses of Bengal”] in which he expressed 
an urgent need for histories of Bengal authored by Bengalis that would contravene biased 
British accounts.2 While Bankim subscribes to the Millian chronology of successive Hindu, 
Muslim, and British epochs, he rejects the notion that the Muslim and British eras were 
necessarily more enlightened and advanced than the earlier Hindu ones. Advancing the 
position that had so alarmed Henry Maine over a decade earlier, Bankim suggests the 
existence of a once-resplendent Bengal—now a frail and vulnerable “mother”—whose story 
has been neglected or otherwise distorted. For Bankim, what is now regarded as the history 
of Bengal is nothing more than a malevolent fiction that has done a profound disservice to 
its people; it is thus imperative that Bengalis join together to narrate the full and righteous 
story of their motherland. Bankim’s appeal is laden with pathos as he claims that their 
community stands to lose a great deal if they do not take up this project—their very identity 
and self-worth as a people hang in the balance. It is only by proudly claiming Bengali 
heritage and writing empowering stories about the “true substance” of Bengal, “the mother 
of all, the land of our birth,” that Bengalis will achieve true personhood and “become 
complete beings.”   
Bankim’s plea is neither inclusive nor democratic. While at first glance he seems to 
suggest that all Bengalis are obliged to undertake this project, he subtly distinguishes those 
                                                
1 Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay, “A Few Words about the History of Bengal (1882-3),” 142-143. Emphasis 
added. Ranajit Guha gives 1880 as the year of publication; see Dominance without Hegemony, 153. 
2 Bankim’s other essays about history published in Bangadarshan include “Bharat-kalamka” [“India Slandered”], 
“Bangalar Itihas” [“Bengal’s History”], “Bangalar Itihaser Bhagnangsha” [“A History of Bengal in Parts”], and 
“Bangalar Kalamka” [“Bengal Slandered”].  These essays were published in 1874, 1876, 1882, and 1884 
respectively.  
  
68 
who are actually qualified and worthy of doing so. For Bankim, “true Bengalee[s]” are 
Hindus, a community that has been gravely injured by the derisive histories now in 
circulation. Such texts included Charles Stewart’s The History of Bengal from the First 
Mohammedan Invasion until the Virtual Conquest of that Country by the English A.D. 1757 (1813) 
and John Clark Marshman’s Outline of the History of Bengal Compiled for the Use of Youths in India 
(1839). Yet Bankim does not denounce these British authors and instead directs his vitriol at 
the Mughal chroniclers whom, he claims, provided the basis for their false accounts. He 
further indicts not only the Muslims who “conquered” Bengal, but also those Hindus who 
converted to Islam and became likely collaborators with the Mughal regime. The author’s 
insistent questions about their conversion reflect his view that Bengal was an inherently 
Hindu space. For Bankim, an understanding of how the arrival of Muslims led to the 
deterioration of Hindu Bengal and why half of the indigenous population left the Hindu fold 
are among the key concerns that ought to drive this new historiography. 
Bankim’s entreaty for histories of the “true substance” of Bengal reflects the steady 
alienation Bengali Hindus felt towards the British and their simultaneous scapegoating of 
Muslims as the root cause of India’s lamentable condition. While the Bengali bhadralok had 
historically supported the British regime, in recent decades they had become increasingly 
aggrieved by the racism directed against them as well as the overall exploitation of India.3 In 
                                                
3 Bengalis’ reevaluation of their loyalty to the colonial regime is especially interesting considering that Bengal, 
and Calcutta in particular, had long been centers for British-Indian interaction. Bengal had remained passive 
during the rebellion, an ostensible demonstration of loyalty, but one that was also guided by a great degree of 
self-interest. Having internalized British Orientalism’s tenet of the degenerate nature of India, many Bengalis in 
the vein of Ram Mohan Roy believed that, on the whole, colonial rule was beneficial for Bengal. Well before 
Macaulay’s Minute of 1835 recommended English-medium schools in India’s urban areas, a contingent of elite 
Bengalis had helped establish Hindu College in 1817, the first English-language institution of higher learning in 
India. In addition, by the mid-nineteenth century, many zamindars [landholders] had profited considerably from 
the organizational schema established by the Bengal Permanent Settlement of 1793, which had endowed this 
group with the right to collect taxes on land that they now owned. See van der Veer, Imperial Encounters, 83, and 
Kopf, British Orientalism and the Bengal Renaissance, 4. 
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addition to the ongoing British encroachment into the sacrosanct domestic space through 
legislation on women, Queen Victoria’s pledge to her Indian subjects in her 1858 
Proclamation that they would be “freely and impartially admitted to Offices in Our Service” 
had not been kept.4 Desirable jobs were scarce and difficult to attain. A famous example 
involved the brilliant Bengali Brahmin Surendranath Banerjea, who qualified for a coveted 
position with the Indian Civil Service (ICS) in the 1870s. Banerjea encountered several 
obstacles to assuming the post he had fairly earned, and ultimately served only three years in 
the ICS before being dismissed for a negligible infraction. Perceiving the true reason behind 
his discharge, Banerjea made the following observation: “I had suffered because I was an 
Indian. The personal wrong done to me was an illustration of the helpless impotency of our 
people.”5 British racism manifested on a wider scale in 1883 as a result of bitter controversy 
surrounding the Ilbert Bill, a proposed legislative measure that would have enabled Indian 
judges to preside over cases with British defendants.6 Colonial officials protested this 
proposal vehemently because, as described by one of them, “it [was] intensely distasteful and 
humiliating to all Europeans.”7 A modified version of the bill that catered to the racist 
objections was ultimately passed in 1884, a striking blow to the bhadralok as well as Indian 
elites outside of the province. The furor over the Ilbert Bill was an important catalyst for the 
formation of the Indian National Congress two years later.8 
Having risen to prominence in the early 1870s, Bankim played a central role in 
rehabilitating the Bengali sense of self in this tense environment. The son of a civil servant, 
Bankim was from a respectable Brahmin family and had enjoyed a top-notch education, 
                                                
4 Queen Victoria, “Proclamation by the Queen in Council to the Princes, Chiefs, and People of India,” 2. 
5 Qtd. in Wolpert, A New History of India, 251-252.  
6 Ibid., 257. 
7 Qtd. in Metcalf and Metcalf, A Concise History of Modern India, 120. 
8 Ibid., 136. 
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having graduated from Presidency College and the newly established University of Calcutta.9 
He was familiar with several schools of Western philosophy such as Comtean Positivism, 
French Socialism, and Benthamite Utilitarianism and regarded John Stuart Mill’s writings on 
liberalism very highly.10 Bankim served the colonial government for over thirty years as a 
deputy collector and deputy magistrate, positions that provided him with first-hand 
experience with British mistreatment of Indians. In his early work he often satirized the 
Bengali “Babu,” the sycophantic civil servant who unflinchingly accepted his supposed 
inferiority and tried to curry favor with his British superiors at every turn. In sharp contrast, 
Bankim was quite proud, even arrogant, and readily protested British abuse and prejudice. A 
particularly well-known incident occurred in 1873 when a British official, Lt. Colonel Duffin, 
assaulted Bankim because the writer had inadvertently interrupted his cricket game.11 Bankim 
brought a civil suit against Duffin and won the case. 
Though he readily protested objectionable British behavior, Bankim tolerated 
colonial rule because he was convinced of a net benefit to India, a view that he expressed 
throughout his oeuvre. Critics have argued that Bankim’s literary career may be divided into 
two main periods due to an ideological shift the writer experienced in the early 1880s. In the 
early phase he championed British views about the underdeveloped state of India and the 
need for reform. He supported colonial intervention on the condition of Hindu women and 
the poor, and even supported certain draconian measures such as the all-India Vernacular 
Press Act of 1878.12 Bankim also wrote a number of domestic novels about the travails of 
                                                
9 Sarkar, Hindu Wife, Hindu Nation, 137. 
10 Notably, J.S. Mill had called his father’s History of British India “one of the most instructive histories ever 
written.” Qtd. in C.H. Philips, “James Mill, Mountstuart Elphinstone, and the History of India,” 219. For Mill’s 
own views on India and the necessity for Britain’s “leading-strings,” see his Considerations of Representative 
Government (1861). 
11 Lipner, “Introduction,” 26. 
12 Sarkar, Hindu Wife, Hindu Nation, 157. 
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Bengali Hindu women who endured loveless marriages, philandering husbands, and other 
problems within their natal and marital homes. In his well-known 1879 essay “Samya” 
[Equality], the author addressed several long-standing, systemic inequalities within Bengali 
(Hindu) society. Influenced by J.S. Mill’s Subjection of Women (1869), Bankim indicted 
patriarchal Hindu thinking for the lifelong suffering of women, supporting their right to an 
education, inheritance, and just treatment in marriage.13 He additionally criticized Brahmins 
for abusing their position of authority within the Hindu fold. In what becomes a repeated 
theme in his work, he denounced the mistreatment of the poor and peasants by rapacious 
landlords stemming from the Bengal Permanent Settlement of 1793. An early example of 
Thomas Macaulay’s envisioned cohort of elite Indian “interpreters,” Bankim maintained that 
the Raj was both essential and justified as the introduction of certain technologies and 
political infrastructure could help in alleviating many sociocultural problems.  
In the early 1880s, however, Bankim began to pursue his reformist goals in another 
manner. As suggested by his fervent appeal for authentic Bengali histories, Bankim 
increasingly began to stress the importance of reforming the Bengali (Hindu) community 
from within. Bankim’s ideological shift is usually traced to the year 1882, when he became 
embroiled in a contentious debate with a British clergyman, William Hastie, about the merits 
of Hinduism. Hastie had written an intensely vitriolic tract against the religion and Bankim 
prepared an equally incisive defense, what Tapan Raychaudhuri describes as the author’s 
“first uncompromising avowal of faith in Hinduism.”14 What might have been otherwise 
dismissed as yet another instance of British prejudice affected Bankim greatly.15 At this time 
                                                
13 Majumdar, “A Conceptual History of the Social,” 173. 
14 Raychaudhuri, Europe Reconsidered, 146. 
15 Ibid., 145. As Raychaudhuri remarks, “The year 1882 marks a climacteric in Bankim’s literary career. 
Everything he wrote then on had a strong didactic overtone. His chosen task in this phase was to construct a 
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the writer repudiated “Samya” and distanced himself from the social concerns therein: 
“‘Samya’ was all wrong and I will not re-publish it.”16 This disaffection may be attributed to 
Bankim’s realization of the utility of religion as a powerful tool with which to unify and 
rehabilitate the Bengali Hindu community. Tanika Sarkar explains this shift as follows:  
As class, caste, and gender issues abruptly disappear from [Bankim’s] work, their 
relative absence is filled up in the eighties by a new and coherent problematic: What 
constitutes authentic Hinduism? What possibilities exist within the Hinduism of the 
past, and in the reauthenticated Hinduism of the future, for nation building? What 
precisely is the culpability of the Muslim in Indian history, and how and why had 
Hindu power capitulated to it? It is not that these problems were not reflected on in 
his earlier prose, but there they had locked horns with an equally powerful set of 
social concerns. Their centrality now becomes absolute and uncontested.17 
 
As suggested by “A Few Words about the History of Bengal,” a new historiography about 
Bengal—one written by Bengali Hindus that would serve as a corrective to British 
accounts—was critical to this endeavor of strengthening the Hindu fold. 
Although the goal of reforming the Bengali community through religion compelled 
Bankim to moderate his support for the colonial regime and its liberal reforms, it is 
important to note that he did not abandon these views entirely.18 Rather, from this point 
forward Bankim refracted his Westernized beliefs about the benefits of colonial rule through 
the prism of a reformed Hinduism to which he would contribute substantially. In this more 
solemn period of his career, in both his fiction and nonfiction, Bankim urged solidarity 
among Bengali Hindus, reifying the growing emphasis on religious affiliation as the primary 
determinant of personal identity and group belonging. Alongside other Bengali intellectuals 
who were increasingly reflecting on the nature, purpose, and future of the Hindu samaj at this 
                                                                                                                                            
philosophy of life, a system of discipline which could be the basis of national regeneration. He projected this 
new ideology as essential Hinduism, the ultimate in man’s religious experience.”  
16 Qtd. in Majumdar, “A Conceptual History of the Social,” 173. 
17 Sarkar, Hindu Wife, Hindu Nation, 172.  
18 Ibid., 139. See also Majumdar, “A Conceptual History of the Social,” 174.  
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moment, Bankim believed that the primary way in which the Hindu community of late 
nineteenth-century Bengal could be mobilized was through a shared understanding of an 
inspiring past, one in which Hindus contributed significantly to the development of major 
political events. To this end, Bankim used the emerging genre of the historical novel as his 
instrument of choice to mythologize and propagate ideas of past Hindu grandeur. Of the 
fourteen novels he produced over his career, half can be considered historical novels, most 
of which were situated in the somewhat-familiar-yet-no-so-recent past of the mid-to-late 
eighteenth century when the authority of the Mughal Empire was waning and the British 
East India Company was assuming matters of state.19 During Bankim’s lifetime his 
association with the historical novel was so strong that he was even hailed the “Scott of 
Bengal.”20 
Anandamath [The Abbey of Bliss] was Bankim’s most famous historical novel and a 
powerful contribution to his call for rousing historical narratives about Bengal. The text 
appeared serially from 1881-1882 in his journal Bangadarshan and was met with instant 
popular acclaim and commercial success. But for Bankim the novel was by no means final—
he continued to revise it over the next decade and published it in book form a total of five 
times.21 Turning to the mid-to-late eighteenth century, Bankim fictionalizes the British 
assumption of power in Bengal in a way that allows him to portray Hindu heroes and 
                                                
19 T.W. Clark, “Bengali Prose Fiction Up to Bankimcandra,” 66. 
20 Priya Joshi, In Another Country, 147. 
21 I rely on Julius Lipner’s 2005 translation of the fifth edition of Anandamath, which is considered the standard 
edition. This version was published in November 1892, about fifteen months before Bankim died in April 1894. 
Lipner has done a tremendous service to scholarship on Anandamath by providing an extremely thorough and 
insightful Introduction and Critical Apparatus alongside his translation. He admirably undertook the 
painstaking task of determining the various changes that Bankim made to the novel from 1882-1892, and 
mentions the important variants of the novel in the Critical Apparatus. There were a total of six versions of 
Anandamath released during Bankim’s lifetime: the initial serial version published in Bangadarshan from 1881-
1882; the first edition (December 1882); the second edition (July 1883); the third edition (April 1886); the 
fourth edition (December 1886); and the fifth and final edition (November 1892). By the beginning of the 
twentieth century, Anandamath had been translated into the major Indian languages; see Meenakshi Mukherjee, 
“Anandamath: A Political Myth,” 903. 
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heroines having agency in the formal launch of British rule in the province. In Bankim’s 
account, the East India Company did not assume authority over Bengal after the battles of 
Plassey and Buxar but rather functioned as a mere tool of a corrupt Mughal regime. The plot 
focuses on the efforts of an underground brotherhood of Hindu ascetics who engage in 
banditry and violence in the service of a “Mother” goddess that symbolizes Bengal. They 
direct their aggression against the local Mughal nawab whom they hold responsible for the 
enslavement of the Mother and the concomitant misery of Bengal, a microcosm of the 
Hindu nation at large.  
Although the brotherhood ultimately succeeds in routing the local Mughal power, a 
mysterious divine sage instructs them to sanction the establishment of temporary British rule. 
Doing so, the sage prophesizes, will enable Hindus to learn the worldly skills that they lack 
and rehabilitate their religion, which has become degenerate. In time, the godlike figure 
promises, Hindus will become qualified to assume their own governance. By portraying the 
British rise to power as a contingent event that occurred with the consent of Hindus, 
Bankim achieves two paramount goals. One, he empowers his readers to perceive British 
rule strategically, as a regime that ought to be both amicable and beneficial to India. Two, 
Bankim subtly cautions the British to heed their promises and pretenses of benevolent 
governance lest Hindus decide to withdraw their willful “acceptance” of foreign rule and rise 
to contest their authority. 
Critics have identified Anandamath’s vilification of Muslims of all ranks, the portrayal 
of valiant Hindu men and women who contest Mughal rule, and the anthem “Bande 
Mataram” as significant contributions to the emergent discourses of Indian anticolonialism 
and nationalism. Likewise, they have explored the political import of the ascetics’ begrudging 
acceptance of temporary British rule that marks the story’s anticlimactic ending. However, 
  
75 
less attention has been paid to Anandamath as a historical novel and the way in which genre 
contributed to its efficacy as a foundational text of Indian patriotism and communalism. 
According to Georg Lukács, who attended exclusively to European historical novels, the 
genre should portray ordinary characters as authentically as possible in order for the reader 
to better understand ostensibly stable events of the past and their impact upon the present 
without unnecessary bias.22 In stark contrast, Bankim’s Anandamath demonstrates the 
capacity of the historical novel to turn to the past as a blank and inviting canvas, an 
underdetermined space in which heroes could be created and key incidents reconfigured. 
With such a potent tool in hand, Bankim not only undermined the supposedly providential 
nature of British colonialism, he also galvanized Bengali Hindus to work towards a specific 
vision of the future, one in which their homeland would reclaim its past majesty as Bharat.  
 
The Rise of Bengali Historiography 
The evolution of Bengali historical discourse over the nineteenth century elucidates 
the popularity of historical novels and romances for writers such as Bankim and the 
effectiveness of this kind of writing in propagating the concept of Bharat. The first three 
works of high-quality narrative prose in Bengali were histories commissioned by Fort 
William College for the training of Company officials.23 Partha Chatterjee has made the 
                                                
22 See Georg Lukács, The Historical Novel, 40. 
23 Scholars of Bengali literature have explained that while the language boasted a considerable tradition in verse, 
the same was not true for prose. At the end of the eighteenth century, Bengali was actually only one of seven 
languages spoken in Calcutta; the other six were Arabic, English, Hindustani, Portuguese, Persian, and Sanskrit; 
see Clark, “Bengali Prose Fiction,” 23. While Bengali was the mother tongue of the majority of Calcutta’s 
inhabitants, it was not spoken widely outside of the domestic setting. Government, commerce, and the law 
required knowledge of Persian and English; religious matters were conducted in Sanskrit and Arabic. In the late 
eighteenth century, a number of institutes had been established in Calcutta for teaching English, the knowledge 
of which promised prestige, social advancement, and desirable employment. It would not be until the middle of 
nineteenth century that Bengali was readily recognized as a language apt for literary expression in prose. By this 
point, the Bengali vocabulary had expanded considerably, its form and spelling were standardized, and 
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crucial point that while the Brahmins who authored these texts were employees of the 
Company and their work helped expand colonial knowledge, their “historiographical 
allegiances [were] entirely pre-colonial.”24 These histories were composed in the Puranic 
mode, which focused on the activities of gods and kings and posited that a ruler’s adherence 
to dharma [righteous thought and action] determined his success or failure. If a ruler was 
dharmic, he (most rulers discussed in the Puranic mode were men) would be rewarded with a 
long reign, and if he was not, the god(s) would ensure his removal from power.25 It was 
precisely the Puranic mode’s inclusion of what Ranajit Guha identifies as “mythic 
genealogies, sacred geographies, and…divine intervention[s]” that James Mill had so 
intensely derided, prompting his summary dismissal of India as a polity without history, both 
in the sense of a lack of records as well as incidents worth documenting.26 
 Mrityunjay Vidyalankar’s Rajabali (1808) is the most well-known of these early 
Puranic histories.27 Rajabali begins with chronological and geographical descriptions of the 
ancient past according to Hindu mythology. Vidyalankar comments that the present period 
is that of the Kaliyuga, loosely defined as the era of bad times or vice, and proceeds to tell the 
history of Bharatvarsa, located on a continent-like island called Jambudvipa. He juxtaposes 
mythical figures such as King Yudhisthira from the epic Mahabharata alongside actual historic 
personages such as “Sekander Shah” [Alexander the Great] and the Mughal Emperor 
                                                                                                                                            
punctuation introduced; see Clark, “Bengali Prose Fiction,” 60. A burgeoning public sphere with numerous 
presses, newspapers, and periodicals further aided in the development of Bengali prose literature by providing a 
forum for up-and-coming writers to test their abilities and talents and find receptive audiences for their work. 
Bankim’s literary journal Bangadarshan, founded in 1872, was a particularly important vehicle for the 
development of Bengali prose; see Clark, “The Role of Bankimcandra in the Development of Nationalism,” 
429-430. 
24 Partha Chatterjee, “History and the Nationalization of Hinduism,” 107. 
25 Ibid., 106.  
26 Guha, Dominance without Hegemony, 181.  
27 The other two histories were Ramram Basu’s Raja Pratapaditya Charitra (1801) and Rajiblochan 
Mukhopadhyay’s Maharaj Krishnachandra Rayasya Charitram (1805). See Guha, Dominance without Hegemony, 177.  
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Akbar.28 Vidyalankar even tells his readers the names of future rulers, the duration of their 
reigns, and where they will reside. As Partha Chatterjee observes, “Myth, history and the 
contemporary—all become part of the same chronological sequence; one is not 
distinguished from another; the passage from one to another, consequently, is entirely 
unproblematical.”29 In this grand schema, political reigns begin and conclude depending on a 
particular ruler’s adherence to dharma. Brahmins were responsible for helping guide kings 
towards dharmic action and their absence or failure to perform this duty bore great 
consequences. According to Vidyalankar, the advent of the Mughal Empire came about due 
to the lack of such advisors in India: “Now there were no more such [dharmic] Brahmans 
and, bereft of their advice, the kings of this country lost divine grace and were all defeated by 
the Yavanas.”30 Although Vidyasagar perceives the Mughal Empire as foreign [“Yavanas”], 
and occasionally refers to its rulers as “Musalmans,” the Mughals have not yet been rendered 
into the overdetermined category of evil, invasive “Muslims.”  
If the Mughal Empire advanced because of Hindu rulers’ failures, British rule comes 
about due to the iniquity of the last Mughal emperor, Aurangzeb. Here Rajabali is particularly 
striking because such thinking intersected with the extant British perception that its 
occupation of India was a matter-of-fact, desirable, and even providential event. As Richard 
King and Peter van der Veer have pointed out, during the turn of the century, British 
rhetoric about the previous glory of India and the need for contemporary reform did in fact 
reconcile with the Brahmanical belief that the present era was that of the Kaliyuga.31 Likewise, 
though Vidyalankar relays the history of Bharatvarsa, the term has not yet been mapped 
                                                
28 Chatterjee, “History and the Nationalization of Hinduism,” 106, 109.  
29 Ibid., 107. 
30 Qtd. in Chatterjee, “History and the Nationalization of Hinduism,” 108. “Yavanas” can be loosely defined as 
“foreigners.” 
31 van der Veer, Imperial Encounters, 7. See also King, Orientalism and Religion, 101-103.  
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onto the colonial state or imbued with patriotic fervor. As Chatterjee explains, “Rajabali is 
not a national history because its protagonists are gods and kings, not peoples. The bonds of 
‘nation-ness’ which would justify the identification of the historian with the consciousness of 
a solidarity that is supposed to act itself out in history have not yet been imagined.”32  
While Bengali histories written in the early nineteenth century largely reconciled with 
the British assumption that India’s historical advance was necessarily teleological and 
ameliorative, there was a marked shift in the post-rebellion era when the new Indian literati 
increasingly began to challenge the supposedly providential introduction of British rule.33 
Eschewing Puranic histories’ sacral temporal framework, Indian writers began to adopt the 
modern rational historiographical method and plotted events in desacralized “homogenous 
empty time.”34 But despite demonstrating such features, these histories continued to 
editorialize and attend to contingencies and the conditions of possibility for certain pivotal 
events. Not surprisingly, the circumstances surrounding the East India Company’s gradual 
political takeover in the late eighteenth century was of particular concern because it 
                                                
32 Chatterjee, “History and the Nationalization of Hinduism,” 110. While Chatterjee’s point is well-taken from 
the standpoint of Vidyalankar’s position as a Brahmin scholar employed by East India Company officials to 
write a history of India, the Hindu epics Ramayana and Mahabharata occupy a similar national-mythical realm.   
33 Other examples of the Bengali literati presenting British rule as pre-ordained include essays written by Hindu 
College students in 1828 in response to the question, “Has Europe or Asia benefited most by the discovery of 
the passage round the Cape of Good Hope to India?” One such essay claimed that “…the Natives suffered the 
most mortifying proofs of [Mohammdedan tyrants’] cruelties, until Providence, to avert the evil, brought them 
under the illustrious sway of the English, who not only freed this country from their hands, but have adopted 
all possible measures for its amelioration, introducing arts, sciences, schools, academies and colleges for the 
dissemination of knowledge.” Qtd. in Guha, Dominance without Hegemony, 170. In addition, an 1859 Bengali 
translation of a British history on India includes a eulogy to Providence for arrival of the East India Company 
and its cessation of extant anarchy and corruption; see Chatterjee, “History and the Nationalization of 
Hinduism,” 111. 
34 Drawing on Walter Benjamin, Benedict Anderson characterizes homogenous, empty time as having a new 
emphasis on simultaneity which is “transverse, cross-time, marked not by prefiguring and fulfillment, but by 
temporal coincidence, and measured by clock and calendar.” Homogenous empty time is critical for nation-
making due to its placement of all individuals along a uniform temporal axis that is linear and forward-moving. 
Though many individuals will never meet or interact, the knowledge that others are collectively and 
simultaneously experiencing both time and space in the same manner helps equalize and bind disparate 
individuals as one collectivity. See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, 24-25. 
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eventually led to Crown Rule.35 Later Bengali historians exploited the relatively 
underdetermined nature of this episode by equivocating on those responsible for this event, 
at times faulting solely the Mughal Empire or the Company, and sometimes both. For 
example, a history published in 1869 states outright that if Mir Jafar had not deceived the 
Nawab of Bengal, Colonel Robert Clive would not have won the battle of Plassey so easily.36 
A text published three years later similarly asserted, “If this battle had continued for some 
time, then Clive would surely have lost. But fortune favoured the English, and weakened by 
the betrayal of Mir Jafar, the Nawab was defeated and Clive was victorious.”37 Similarly, a 
popular textbook written by Krishnachandra Ray highlighted the federal nature of the 
Mughal Empire, whose imperial center in Delhi had become too feeble to defend its borders 
properly:  
Most people criticise Clive for these heinous acts, but according to him there is 
nothing wrong in committing villainy when dealing with villains… 
 
‘The land belongs to him who has force on his side.’ It is from this time that the 
Company stopped being a revenue collector and really became the ruler. If the 
                                                
35 A quick sketch of how the East India Company assumed power in Bengal will help one appreciate the 
innovative departures of these Bengali histories. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the 
Company was one of several European entities that conducted commercial activity in India under the auspices 
of the Mughal authorities. The Company enjoyed considerable profits by creating markets in Britain for Indian 
goods such as spices, saltpeter, and especially textiles. Trade in Bengal was particularly lucrative and by 1750, 75 
percent of the Company’s stores came from the region. After the death of the last effective Mughal emperor 
Aurangzeb in 1707, the Company began to expand its trading privileges and amassed power through calculated 
dealings with local Indian rulers. As the battle at Plassey in 1757, Colonel Robert Clive defeated the Nawab of 
Bengal, Siraj-ud-daula, and installed the puppet ruler Mir Jafar who had defected from the Mughal regime. 
Three years later, the British replaced Mir Jafar with his son-in-law Mir Kasim, who soon sought to revive the 
authority of the Nawab over the Company. At the battle of Buxar, Clive defeated an alliance comprised of Mir 
Kasim, the Nawab of Awadh, and the Mughal Emperor himself. The British victory at Buxar in 1764 was 
decisive because the Company was empowered to demand the “diwani,” or tax-collecting rights, for the 
provinces of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa in 1765. The Company’s increase in available capital resulting from the 
diwani was such that it no longer needed to import bullion from Britain for trade. In the late eighteenth century, 
Hastings formalized the importance of Bengal when he established Calcutta as the capital of the Company. As 
it continued to annex Indian princely states until the mid-nineteenth century, the Company maintained the 
pretense of acting in the name of the defunct Mughal Emperor. In 1858 Queen Victoria initiated Crown Rule, 
formalizing British authority over the polity in the wake of the cataclysmic Rebellion of 1857. See Metcalf and 
Metcalf, A Concise History of Modern India, 47-56 and Colley, Captives, 246-249. 
36 Chatterjee, “History and the Nationalization of Hinduism,” 111. 
37 Ibid. 
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Emperor [in Delhi] had been strong, there would have been a huge incident over this. But there 
was nothing left [to the Empire]. Whatever Hastings decided, happened…  
 
If this country had been under the dominion of one powerful ruler, or if the different rulers had been 
united and friendly towards one another, then the English would never have become so powerful here 
and this country would have remained under the Musalman kings. Perhaps no one in this 
country would have ever heard of the English.38 
 
Ray’s history, published in 1870 but written shortly after the rebellion, mentions several 
conditions that made the Company’s seizure of power possible in the eighteenth century: the 
British transgressed their rights as traders; the Mughal center was weak; and local rulers 
lacked solidarity. Ray urges his readers to speculate that if perhaps just one of these 
circumstances had not been at play, the current political landscape might have been vastly 
different. Not coincidentally, Ray’s history is entitled Bharatbarser Itihas [A History of India], 
one of the earliest Bengali works to advance the idea of India as the righteously Hindu space 
Bharat. But despite its national title and accusation that the Company achieved power 
illegitimately, Bharatbarser Itihas concludes by acknowledging the benefits of British rule: “In 
any case, whatever the means by which the English have come to acquire this sprawling 
kingdom, it must be admitted that infinite benefits have been effected by them to this 
country.”39 Thus while Ray’s history sought to inculcate patriotism and pride in India as 
Bharat, his text was not nationalist in the sense of promoting either the ejection of the British 
or the establishment of indigenous governance. 
Bharatbarser Itihas was among several nonfictional works during this period that 
advanced seemingly irreconcilable ideas: the portrayal of India as Bharat, the illegitimacy of 
the British, and the need to embrace colonial rule. These scenarios could only coexist if the 
Mughal Empire became an overdetermined social category, that of invading “Muslims,” such 
                                                
38 Qtd. in Chatterjee, “History and the Nationalization of Hinduism,” 111-112. Emphasis added. 
39 Ibid., 112. 
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that it would become possible to compare them with the British. During this period the 
burgeoning conception of India as Bharat and ongoing dialogue about reforming Hinduism 
led to the convenient scapegoating of Muslims as the culprit of India’s decline from its 
previously ascendant state. The present condition of Hindu women was primary in indexing 
this descent. Rather than restrictive patriarchal beliefs endemic to the community, it was 
suggested that the need to protect Hindu women from the noxious influence of Islam had 
caused their gradual retreat into domestic spaces from roles of greater influence and prestige 
outside. For example, in his influential history, also entitled Bharatbarser Itihas [The History of 
India] (1858), Bengali historian Tarinicharan Chattopadhyay asserted that, “Today we find 
Hindu women treated like slaves, enclosed like prisoners and as ignorant as beasts. But if we 
look a millennium and a quarter earlier, we will find that women were respected, educated 
and largely unconstrained. Where was child marriage then? No one married before the age of 
twenty-four.”40 
Tarinicharan’s discussion demonstrates the ongoing abstraction of women as 
symbols of Hindu cultural identity during this period. Like many other Hindu literati at this 
moment, he insinuates that Muslims are ultimately responsible for objectionable Hindu 
practices concerning women.41 Tarinicharan encourages his readers to compare the 
depravities that resulted from the arrival of the “Muslims” with those of the British, who are 
then instantly rendered the lesser of two evils. The present humiliation experienced under 
                                                
40 Qtd. in Chatterjee, “History and the Nationalization of Hinduism,” 118. 
41 For another example of a Hindu scapegoating Muslims for Hindu traditions concerning women, see Raja 
Shiva Prasad’s history Itihas Timirnasak [A History of India], which was originally composed in Hindi and 
published in Allahabad in 1864. Prasad states the following: “The expansion of the Muslim religion and rule did 
not just inaugurate an unprecedented era of massacres, robberies, the razing of temples and new forms of 
slavery [gulami], but led to a profound transformation of the customs and way of life of Hindus. The cruelty, 
coercive force, and decadence of Muslims drowned us. It marked the beginning of such practices as female 
infanticide, the imprisonment of young girls within their homes, and the use of purdah [veil] among women.” 
Qtd. in Goswami, Producing India, 183. 
  
82 
the British thus becomes a small price to pay for the supposed cessation of the depravity that 
would have persisted had the Mughals remained in power. Some Bengalis even lavished 
effusive praise on the British for ending tyrannical “Muslim” rule and providing a path for 
Bharat to develop as a modern nation and reclaim its latent ascendancy.42   
 Late nineteenth-century Bengali historians’ emphasis upon the particular 
contingencies and circumstances surrounding pivotal events betrays an evolving 
understanding of historiography as a profoundly political act, one that was as biased as it was 
empowering. The ability to turn to crucial events of the past and stress the factors that led to 
certain outcomes allowed them to moderate—and at times contest—the many essentialisms 
that justified India’s colonization such as the innate depravity of Hindus and the inevitability 
of British rule. The burgeoning genre of late nineteenth-century Bengali historical novels and 
romances, I suggest, was part and parcel of this larger endeavor to offer uplifting narratives 
about a glorious Hindu homeland that would undermine demeaning British accounts and 
unite Hindus across the colonial state. As a seemingly fixed past transformed into a fluid and 
underdetermined space, Bengali writers were emboldened to project strategic anachronisms 
onto it, such as a unified Hindu polity or strong and virile Hindu men, that would serve as 
exemplars for the present. Portrayals of Indian agency and bravery alongside the clear 
                                                
42 In 1876 Bholanath Chakravarti delivered a lecture at the Brahmo Samaj in which he held Muslims fully 
responsible for India’s deplorable state and praised the British for ending their rule: “The misfortunes and 
decline of this country began on the day the Yavana flag entered the territory of Bengal. The cruelty of the 
Yavana rule turned this land to waste…The resumption of good fortune was initiated on the day the British 
flag was first planted on this land. Tell me, if Yavana rule had continued, what would the condition of this 
country have been today? It must be loudly declared that it is to bless us that Isvara [God] has brought the 
English to this country. British rule has ended the atrocities of the Yavanas…There can be no comparison 
between Yavana rule and British rule: the difference seems greater than that between darkness and light or 
between misery and bliss.” Like Tarinicharan, Bholanath finds Muslims responsible for the repression of Hindu 
women: “In order to protect women from the attacks of Yavanas, they were locked up inside their homes.” 
Qtd. in Chatterjee, “History and the Nationalization of Hinduism,” 114.   
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message that alternative outcomes were, in fact, quite close to materializing helped assuage 
present humiliations.  
 
Anandamath’s Alternate History  
In the ensuing analysis of Anandamath I build upon Ranajit Guha’s claim that the 
process of “historicization” in colonial Bengal was analogous to the process of 
“novelization” in the European context. In Dominance without Hegemony, Guha draws on 
Mikhail Bakhtin’s theorization of the differences between the epic and the novel and the 
tendency of the novel, when it becomes preeminent, to “novelize” other genres. For Bakhtin, 
“novelization” entails the present as the narrative point of departure; a new focus on 
individuals as those with complex subjectivities; and the introduction of “an indeterminacy, a 
certain semantic openendedness, a living contact with unfinished, still-evolving 
contemporary reality (the openended present).”43 Developing Bakhtin’s ideas, Guha argues:  
In our culture the demolition of the absolute past of the Purāna began with 
historicization rather than with novelization (although the two were soon to join 
forces and deliver a coup de grace). The first three historical works in Bangla are all 
witness to that beginning. Although interlarded with Puranic elements, they all have 
the present as their point of departure.44  
 
While Guha is correct that historicization in colonial Bengal corresponds to novelization in 
Europe, it would be premature to date the inception of historicization to the three histories 
commissioned by Fort William College.45 Using Vidyalankar’s Rajabali as a representative 
                                                
43 Mikhail Bakhtin, “Epic and Novel: Toward a Methodology for the Study of the Novel,” 7. 
44 Guha, Dominance without Hegemony, 182.  
45 Relevant to the development of the Bengali novel, there is a bit of ambiguity regarding whether these three 
works, which were indeed the first three works of history in the Bengali language, were also the first works of 
narrative prose in the language. Ranajit Guha quotes William Carey, professor Bengali and Sanskrit at Fort 
William College, who claims the following: “When [my] appointment was made, I saw that I had a very 
important charge committed to me, and no books or helps of any kind to assist me. I therefore set about 
compiling a grammar, which is not half printed. I got Ram Boshu to compose a history of one of their kings, 
the first prose book ever written in the Bengali language; which we are also printing.” See Guha, Dominance without 
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case, Guha, I suggest, overemphasizes the presumption of the present in these works. Far 
more than being merely “interlarded” with Puranic elements, the historiographical 
allegiances of these early histories are wholly Puranic in nature. Resonant with Bakhtin’s 
theorization on the epic, these Puranic histories focus on the “absolute past”—the present 
moment is neither germane nor apparent. Manu Goswami similarly observes that Rajabali 
demonstrates Puranic conceptions of space as “absolute, concentric, and open” and that of 
time as “divinely ordained and fundamentally qualitative.”46 A more accurate marker of the 
beginning of historicization in colonial Bengal, I suggest, was the emerging understanding of 
India as Bharat in the post-1857 period because such texts necessarily approached the past 
from the standpoint of the present as a moment of rupture.  
Though he does not elaborate on this point, Guha is correct that in colonial Bengal 
historicization and novelization united to deliver a coup de grace to the Puranic mode. I detect 
this partnership emerging, again, within post-1857 Bengali histories, which posited India as a 
righteously Hindu space and stressed the circumstances surrounding particular events. By 
doing so these texts addressed the need to reject the “absolute past” of the Puranic mode 
and focus on the present as a moment of crisis.47 As can be expected, Bengali historical 
novels and romances were especially successful in this endeavor due to fiction’s ability to 
defy fact or that which has been presented as Truth. These emerging genres readily 
                                                                                                                                            
Hegemony, 182. Emphasis added. T.W. Clark’s observation that these three texts were the first works of fluid, 
high-quality prose seems more accurate: “What they wrote was prose, the first prose with literary promise ever 
written in Bengali; and as such what they did is historically important, as all first things are important.” See 
Clark, “Bengali Prose Fiction,” 26. 
46 Goswami, Producing India, 161. 
47 Bakhtin observes that the fictive worlds of epics, contrary to novels, occurred in the “epic past” or “absolute 
past”: “The epic past is called the ‘absolute past’ for good reason: it is both monochronic and valorized 
(hierarchical); it lacks any relativity, that is, any gradual, purely temporal progressions that might connect it with 
the present. It is walled off absolutely from all subsequent times, and above all from those times in which the 
singer and his listeners are located. This boundary, consequently, is immanent in the form of the epic itself and 
is felt and heard in its every word.” See Bakhtin, “Epic and Novel,” 15-16.  
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incorporated elements of Puranic histories, Hindu epics, contemporary British histories, and 
other literary forms for strategic political purposes. The result was a highly intergeneric, 
hybrid fictional text that contested the Millian historiographical chronology and persuasively 
forged the collective imagining of India as Bharat.    
 The most famous historical novel of colonial Bengal, Bankim’s Anandamath is the 
premier example of this trend. The portrayal of a band of militant Hindu ascetics fighting for 
an enslaved Mother not only offered a seductive vision of Bharat, it provided inspiring 
Hindu heroes and heroines for Bankim’s readers to admire and emulate. The writer’s success 
in conveying these messages was a function of his shrewd use of the historical romance as a 
fluid and adaptable medium for conveying compelling visions of the past that spoke to the 
crises of the present. Bankim skillfully expresses the need for a robust Hinduism—in which 
patriotism is rendered a key tenet—by situating exemplars of this creed in the past. By being 
thus “weighted” by time, the ascetics’ service to the Mother elicits great reverence and 
becomes a parable for Bengali Hindus to heed in the current moment. Though they 
reluctantly “permit” British rule for the time being, their brief taste of victory over the inept 
Mughal regime inspires Bankim’s readers to similarly protect the Hindu samaj from peril. 
Perhaps most important, the novel empowers Bengali Hindus to regard British rule 
strategically. Since their forebears consented to British governance, Bengali Hindus may 
determine when their rule is no longer beneficial and withdraw their blessings accordingly. 
 Bankim wastes no time in conveying his brand of Hindu religiosity imbued with 
patriotism. Both the extradiegetic Dedication and Prologue stress the necessity of devotion 
and perseverance, the first of several conflations of the religious and political in Anandamath. 
The Dedication includes a passage from the Bhagavad Gita in which Krishna speaks to his 
disciple Arjun about the deliverance that an individual realizes when he or she becomes fully 
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transfixed upon him: “I soon become their Deliverer, Partha—those whose minds abide in 
Me—From the ocean of repeated death.”48 Krishna’s instruction to “Fix your senses only on 
Me, set your mind on Me” foreshadows the intense dedication with which the ascetics 
pursue the Mother’s cause, particularly their willingness to renounce their roles as husbands 
and fathers in order to fully embrace their duties as santans [children of the Mother].   
The foregrounding of Krishna in the Dedication reflects the deity’s overall 
prominence in the novel. Though the ascetics fight on behalf of the Mother, they actually 
belong to the Vaishnava sect of Hinduism and revere Krishna.49 Their veneration of this 
particular god reflects Bankim’s careful emphasis and embellishment of certain aspects of an 
amorphous Hindu tradition for self-serving ends. Having been drawn to Krishna since he 
was a child, Bankim reconfigured the deity to provide a role model for subjugated Bengalis.50 
Eschewing popular folk tales about the mischievous boy who would steal butter and harass 
milkmaids, Bankim emphasized Krishna’s qualities as the dignified hero and divine 
counselor of the Mahabharata who helped Arjun realize that his dharma lay in fighting his kin 
to reclaim his kingdom. In Anandamath, the ascetics similarly educate Mahendra Simha, a 
                                                
48 Bankimcandra Chattopadhyay, Anandamath, or The Sacred Brotherhood, 127. “Partha” is one of the twelve names 
of Arjun, the hero of the Hindu epic the Mahabharata. Krishna is one of the ten avatars of the supreme Lord 
Vishnu who manifests himself in the world in times of darkness, i.e., when dharma has disappeared and 
“adharma” [iniquity, corruption] has become rampant.  
49 Gavin Flood explains that in early Vaishnava traditions, devotees tended to cluster either around Vishnu or 
Vishnu’s eighth incarnation, Krishna. There was in fact a “Krsnaism” tradition in which Krishna was 
considered far more than a mere incarnation of Vishnu but the actual Transcendent Being or Godhead. The 
brotherhood appears to occupy a middle ground; while they revere worship both Vishnu and Krishna, they 
find the latter especially significant. See Flood, An Introduction to Hinduism, 117. 
50 Bankim developed his critiques on Hinduism in his religious commentaries Krsnacaritra (1886), Dharmatattva 
(1888), and the posthumously published Srimadbhagavadgita. In Dharmatattva, Bankim critiques the abstract 
dictums of Vedantaism, positing a basic human need for inspiring anthropomorphized deities: “Religion in its 
fullness cannot be found in the quality-less god of the Vedanta, because he who is without qualities cannot be 
an example to us…There can be no complete religion in the worship of a philosophical or scientific deity. The 
basis of religion is a God with qualities, such as in mentioned in our Puranas and in the Christian Bible, because 
He and He only can be our model. The worship of an impersonal god is sterile; only the worship of a personal 
God has meaning to man.” Qtd. in Clark, “The Role of Bankimcandra in the Development of Nationalism,” 
432. 
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figure who stands in for the ideal (or representative) Bengali man; they teach him the lessons 
of a revitalized, muscular Hinduism in which love of the homeland is a primary tenet. 
Corresponding to Krishna’s role in the Bhagavad Gita, the ascetics urge Mahendra to 
recognize that his dharma resided in joining their campaign to liberate the Mother. Thus 
despite his depiction of a specific Hindu sect, Bankim strives to unify the Hindu community 
as a whole behind the political cause of defending the homeland with Krishna serving as 
both guide and conduit. As Bankim wrote later in life, “We are Hindus; we are not members 
of a particular sect. I did not say this in support of a particular sect, I said this in support of 
the Hindu race.” 51 
While the Dedication conveys the necessity of sacral devotion by referencing a well-
known passage of the Gita, the Prologue uses pathos. The narrator describes a vast, dark, 
and eerie forest bereft of the usual sylvan activities. But from within this silence, “a voice 
was heard: ‘Will my heart’s desire never be fulfilled?’” This question is repeated before an 
answer, from an equally mysterious source, is offered: 
Then, an answer came: “What will you pledge in return?”52 
“The pledge is my life, my all,” was the reply. 
“Life is trifling; anyone can give up their life.” 
“What else is there? What else can I offer?” 
And the answer came: “Dedication.”53 
 
Like Krishna, this enigmatic entity demands devotion. The cryptic nature of this exchange, 
with unidentified agents addressing one another in a dark forest, lends to a dramatic and 
foreboding scene evocative of the supernatural. Yet Julius Lipner’s translation of bhakti in 
the original as “dedication” belies the intense religiosity manifest in this exchange and the 
                                                
51 Bankim made these remarks in his 1873 review of Rajnarain Basu’s well-known treatise Hindudharmer Sresthata 
[The Superiority of the Hindu Religion]. Qtd. in Lipner, “Introduction,” 22. 
52 This particular line is admittedly quite confusing in context. The speaker is presumably the Mother, but the 
statement is not an answer but a question. The exchange only makes sense if this line is ignored or modified to 
this effect: “Then, a new question came: ‘What will you pledge to me?” 
53 Bankim, Anandamath, 129-130.  
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Prologue as a whole. Though not yet apparent to the reader, this reply comes from the 
enslaved Mother goddess who demands liberation. Here Bankim had used the 
Bengali/Hindi word bhakti [devotion], which provides a better sense of the type of intense 
religious devotion being summoned.54 For the Mother whose “heart’s desire” is blighted, the 
sacrifice of one’s life is negligible compared to wholehearted devotion to her cause on a mass 
level. The juxtaposition of the Dedication and Prologue is telling because the Mother’s 
demand for bhakti suggests that, like Krishna, she is similarly divine. Consequently even 
before the novel opens Bankim intimates that the Hindu homeland is not an object but a 
subject deserving of bhakti, whether construed locally as Bengal or broadly as Bharat. The 
purpose of Anandamath may thus be considered analogous to those of holy texts such as the 
Gita or the Bible due to its didactic aims of inculcating proper religious beliefs and providing 
models for righteous, dharmic behavior.   
Alongside Hindu religious doctrine, Bankim freely manipulated elements of the mid-
to-late eighteenth-century historical record to promote patriotism. Similar to the post-1857 
histories discussed earlier, Anandamath turns to a relatively underdetermined yet pivotal 
period in Bengali history, when the Mughal Empire’s authority was waning and the 
Company began assuming matters of governance. In addition to stressing the contingencies 
of particular episodes, Bankim retells key incidents by mixing fact and fiction liberally. 
Among the events that Bankim reimagines are the British assumption of the diwani, the 
catastrophic Bengali famine of 1770, and the Sannyasi Rebellion. Historical figures both 
well-known and obscure—e.g., Warren Hastings and Captain Thomas—become fictional 
                                                
54 In his prodigious Critical Apparatus Lipner explains that at the time Bankim was writing Anandamath his 
understanding of bhakti was changing to encompass worldly objects and concerns as part and parcel of one’s 
love of God: “Love of self, of family, of society, of country, and of all sentient beings was to be incorporated in 
one’s love of God…Thus service of and love for one’s country (itself a complex idea) is a necessary and 
superior facet of bhakti, and it partakes of the all-consuming nature of bhakti per se” (235). 
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characters on the pages of Anandamath, entirely subservient to the whims of their creator. 
The Mughal defector Mir Jafar and General Robert Clive are also mentioned, further lending 
to the air of historicity. Bankim additionally enhances the novel’s ostensible veracity by 
including the names of actual geographic locations and landmarks in Bengal, such as 
Birbhum, Bhairabipur, Barendrabhumi, and the Ajay River.55 While it is unclear how familiar 
Bankim’s Bengali readers may have been with these individuals and events, the references to 
extant locations in Bengal certainly heightened the suspense of the novel if not its 
verisimilitude. The result was a highly persuasive and compelling account that, while it 
gestured to actual historical incidents, remained completely and utterly fictional.  
 The intergeneric hybridity of Anandamath helps explain its popularity and commercial 
success. In addition to references to Hindu beliefs on the one hand and significant historical 
personages and events on the other, Bankim incorporates many features of the Indian epic 
tradition that were likely to have been familiar with his readers, including symbolic settings, 
idealized characters, an episodic structure, and miraculous occurrences. The location of the 
ascetics’ monastery within an enigmatic forest, for instance, alludes to the significance of 
sylvan areas as mysterious spaces of transformation and spiritual awareness. After 
inadvertently stumbling into this numinous space, Mahendra and his wife Kalyani come to 
learn of the Mother and the brotherhood’s fight for her liberation. Representing the ideal 
Hindu man and woman, Mahendra and Kalyani diligently perform their familial duties 
                                                
55 Lipner notes that the serial version and first four editions of the novel explicitly referenced the West Bengali 
district of Birbhum as the setting of the novel (36). While the references to Birbhum were excised from the 
fifth edition, it is still obvious that the narrative action takes place in north and west Bengal. For example, 
“Bhairabipur,” the location of Nimai’s marital home, is most likely a reference to the town of Bhairabpur in 
West Bengal (174). There is an odd reference to “Barendrabhumi” in Part III after the santans have won a 
battle (212). Also known as “Barind” and “Varendra,” Barendrabhumi was apparently a region in East Bengal. 
Suggestive of a possible link with Barendrabhumi, the city of Rajshahi in present-day west Bangladesh is the 
home of the Varendra Research Society, an institution established in 1910 for the study and research of ancient 
and medieval Bengali history and culture <http://www.ru.ac.bd/?page_id=146>. The Ajay River flows 
through the Indian states of Jharkhand and West Bengal.  
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towards one another and their infant daughter. In line with Bankim’s praise of companionate 
marriage, Mahendra is markedly kind and gentle with Kalyani, who, of course, is a paradigm 
of pativrata, or wifely devotion. After their respective encounters with the Mother, their 
ideality culminates with their willingness to sacrifice everything, including one another, in 
order to aid in her liberation. Kalyani appropriately modifies her pativrata after a dream in 
which the Mother directs her to leave Mahendra so that he can serve her. Overcome by the 
vision, Kalyani ingests poison so that Mahendra may join the brotherhood unfettered from 
his obligations to her as husband and provider: “I’ve done the right thing, so that you don’t 
neglect God’s work for the sake of a useless woman.”56 The heroine Shanti is similarly a 
model of pativrata, though in a unique way. Like Kalyani, Shanti enables her husband 
Jibananda to serve the Mother but does so by cross-dressing and assuming the identity of the 
male ascetic “Nabinananda” in order to join the brotherhood herself and fight alongside 
him.57  
Orality is a crucial element of Anandamath as the narrator recounts his story actively, 
making clear to the readers his thoughts and opinions on the proceedings he describes. The 
narrator reminds the reader of what has been mentioned previously, surmises the cause of 
certain events, and apostrophizes.58 But though the narrator recounts past occurrences, he is 
fixed squarely in the present. Functioning as Bankim’s mouthpiece, the narrator paints a 
stark picture of late eighteenth-century Bengal in which lawlessness and disorder are 
rampant: “Today we live in a time of order; at that time there was no order. Compare the 
                                                
56 Bankim, Anandamath, 155.  
57 Ibid., 184. 
58 In one notable example, the narrator, overcome by grief, apostrophizes the Mother: “Alas, Mother, will they 
ever return? Will you ever again bear in your womb a son like Jibananda and a daughter like Shanti?” (228). 
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times of order and disorder.”59 Through such remarks, the narrator directs his audience to 
reach a foregone conclusion: “Muslims” remain entirely liable for Bengal’s woes, both past 
and present, and that, in comparison, British rule is a boon.  
Bankim initiates this evaluation by opening his story with a poetic description of the 
misery of Padacinha, a representative Bengali village:  
It is summer one day in 1770 in the village of Padacinha, and the sun beats down 
fiercely. The village is full of homes, but there is no one about. There are rows of 
shops in the bazaar and lines of makeshift stalls in the marketplace, there are 
hundreds of mud houses in every quarter, with brick buildings of varying sizes in 
between, yet today everything is silent. The shops are closed, and no one knows 
where the shopkeepers have fled. It’s the day for the local market, but the place is 
empty. The beggars are supposed to come out today, but none are about.  
 
The weaver has shut his loom and lies weeping in a corner, the trader has forgotten 
his trading and sobs with infant [sic] in his lap, the givers have stopped their giving, 
the teachers have closed their tols [traditional schools for boys], and even babies, it 
seems, lack the will to cry. No folk on the main roads, no bathers in the large ponds, 
no people at their doors, no birds in the trees, no cattle in the pastures—only jackals 
and dogs in the cremation ground.60  
 
The staccato phrasing and anaphora in these sentences emphasize the dramatic upending of 
normalcy in Padacinha. The reader soon learns that a “massive famine” is the cause. The 
region is almost entirely vacant because the inhabitants have either fled or perished from 
starvation or disease.61 People have even resorted to cannibalism out of desperation.62 The 
narrator remarks that the king’s revenue officer, Muhammad Reza Khan, continues to tax 
the villagers at high rates despite the famine, thus exacerbating its effects.63 While here the 
                                                
59 Ibid., 158. 
60 Ibid., 131. 
61 Ibid., 132. 
62 Ibid., 135. 
63 Ibid., 132. Lipner notes that in both the serial version and the first edition of the novel, the narrator went on 
to state outright that the revenue officer was a Bengali Muslim. Thus in these two iterations, the attack on 
Muslims begins right away due to the suggestion that even Muslims who were native to Bengal were callous to 
the suffering of the (Hindu) masses, a dehumanizing depiction that renders the community perpetual outsiders 
to Bengal. 
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narrator only hints that the Mughal king and his administration are ineffective, blame is soon 
cast upon them directly: 
In 1770 Bengal had not yet fallen under British sway. The British at the time were 
Bengal’s tax collectors. All they did was collect the revenue; they took no 
responsibility for overseeing the lives and property of Bengalis. Their task was to 
collect the money, while the responsibility for life and property belonged to the evil 
Mir Jafar, a vile, treacherous blot on the human race. He was unable to look after 
himself, so how could he look after Bengal? Mir Jafar took opium and slept, the 
British took in the money and issued receipts, and the Bengali wept and went to ruin. 
So the Bengal’s revenue belonged to the British, the burden of government fell on 
the nawab.64 
 
Bankim skillfully mixes fact and fiction in this passage. Since Mir Jafar was “responsibl[e] for 
overseeing the lives and property of Bengalis,” the narrator suggests that he could have 
forbidden the Company from collecting exorbitant taxes but failed to do so. This was not at 
all the case. Due to Clive’s victory at Plassey, Mughal rulers in Bengal had not exerted 
authority over the region in earnest since approximately 1757. It was at this time that the 
Company became the de facto governing authority of Bengal; the assumption of the diwani in 
1765 further entrenched its growing power.65 Consequently, any Mughal revenue collector at 
this time would have been a British lackey. A catastrophic fame did occur in 1770, but it was 
the Company’s malfeasance that exacerbated its effects.66 Mir Jafar could not have been so 
despised in 1770 because he had died in 1765.67 Here Bankim takes an already-reviled 
Mughal figure and blames him for acts for which he could not have possibly been 
                                                
64 Ibid., 140. 
65 Metcalf and Metcalf, A Concise History of Modern India, 53. 
66 Historians have explained that after secured the diwani [tax-collecting rights] for Bengal in 1765, British 
officials were ignorant of how the Mughal revenue management system worked. Warren Hastings initiated a 
series of ill-conceived experiments that involved the leasing and auctioning of the right to collect taxes in 
Bengal’s districts. The resultant mishandling of land revenue exacerbated the effects of the famine. Estimates 
of the death toll vary from one-quarter to one-third of Bengal’s population. See Metcalf and Metcalf, A Concise 
History of Modern India, 77-78; Bose and Jalal, Modern South Asia, 43. 
67 As noted earlier, many Bengali historians writing in the 1860s and 1870s had viewed Mir Jafar negatively due 
his disaffection from the Nawab of Bengal, an act which, these scholars submitted, led to Clive’s success at 
Plassey.  
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responsible. This excerpt demonstrates the author’s manipulation of certain facts that were 
likely to be familiar to segments of his readers—the British assumption of the diwani, a 
devastating famine, the perceived perfidy of Mir Jafar—which were then cleverly inserted 
into an alternate history of mid-to-late eighteenth century Bengal. The result was a highly 
persuasive document that substantiated Bengali Hindus’ perception of long-standing Muslim 
tyranny. 
 The brotherhood’s conviction that the Mughal regime is liable for the dismal 
conditions of Bengal fuels their revolution. Convinced that serving the Mother is dharmic, the 
ascetics freely engage in criminal acts that they consider warranted and just. For example, 
when a group of sepoys arrests Mahendra in the forest, the santans do not hesitate to engage 
in violence to free him. In a dramatic, suspenseful, yet highly fantastic scene, Jibananda 
arrives with a group of two hundred fellow santans in tow.68 He shoots the havildar [sergeant] 
as his followers surround the sepoys while “shouting the name of Hari.”69 Bhabananda 
intrepidly decapitates the commander with his own sword, a death that oddly incapacitates 
the sepoys (who surely have pistols and muskets) and renders them vulnerable to attack.70 
After the ascetics kill and injury many of the sepoys, they seize the collected revenue that the 
latter had been transporting. When Mahendra protests that this act constitutes theft since the 
money belongs to the Mughal king, Bhabananda offers a dharmic explanation that the 
confiscation is justified: “A king who doesn’t look after his kingdom is no king.”71 For 
Bhabananda, a ruler is entitled to tribute not by his title but by his deeds. Mahendra remains 
                                                
68 Bankim, Anandamath, 142-143. 
69 The havildar is most likely a Mughal official. As Lipner notes in an explanatory footnote, this was a 
“noncommissioned Indian officer of the rank of sergeant” (142, fn. 22); Lipner’s spelling of the word as 
havildar—rather than havaldar—reflects an antiquated British variation of the term. 
70 Ibid., 143. 
71 Ibid., 146. Notably, in the first edition, Bankim originally had the following rhetorical question instead: 
“Should there be a Muslim king in a Hindu kingdom?” 
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skeptical, and the ascetic then offers a more compelling explanation for the brotherhood’s 
deeds: 
Mahendra Simha, I thought you might be a real man, but I see now that you’re like 
the rest of them—a devourer only of fine things! Look, the snake crawls about flat 
on the ground, the lowliest creature around, but step on it and even the snake rears 
its hood! Aren’t you even a little fed up with the way things are? Look at all the other 
places—Magadha, Mithila, Kashi, Kanci, Delhi, Kashmir—where else is in such a 
mess? Where else do people have to eat grass for lack of food? Or thorns, or anthills, 
or creepers from the forest? Where else do they eat dogs and jackals and dead 
bodies? Where else can’t folk have peace of mind even when they’ve locked away 
their money, or installed the shalogram at home, or kept their wife and daughter 
indoors, or when their womenfolk are expecting? Here they cut open the womb and 
tear out the child! Everywhere else there’s a pact with the king for protection, but 
does our Muslim king protect us?72 We’ve lost our religious way of life, our caste 
status, our self-respect, our family connections—and now we’re about to lose our 
lives! If we don’t get rid of these bearded degenerates will anything be left of our 
Hindu identity?73 
 
Likely composed in 1881, this passage contains several key ideas that became prominent in 
the ensuing Indian nationalist movement. Here Bankim totalizes the particularity of Mughal 
rule into the contrived category of invading, illegitimate Muslims who threaten “Hindu 
identity.” Bhabananda begins his appeal by again offering a dharmic explanation of the 
brotherhood’s crimes—the Mughal king does not govern effectively and the people suffer 
under his rule. That conditions in other regions are apparently adequate heightens the 
malfeasance of the local Mughal regime.74 But this is only part of a larger problem. 
Bhabananda reveals that an urgent need to safeguard “Hindu identity” also forms the basis 
                                                
72 Lipner notices that in the first three editions, the adjective “Muslim” was not present in this rhetorical 
question (241). Nevertheless, it was still obvious that the Bhabananda was referencing Muslims due to the 
inclusion of the insulting phrase “bearded degenerates” (Muslim men typically grew beards). 
73 Bankim, Anandamath, 146-147. My emphasis is underlined. The italics of shalogram is in the original; this is a 
spherical fossil, usually black, that is worshipped as a representation of Vishnu.  
74 Lipner, “Critical Apparatus,” 245. While Lipner is correct to point out that some of the places referenced 
have Muslim rulers, I disagree with his assessment that their inclusion suggests that Muslim rule itself is not 
being criticized. Considering the virulent tone of the passage, I do not see how such an interpretation is 
possible. I propose that the passage evidences the indiscriminate nature of Mughal rule; the fact that certain 
places have a pact with the king for protection suggests that such safeguards are required in order to protect 
Hindus from tyrannical Muslim rulers who cannot be trusted to adhere to dharma. Moreover, the reference to 
locations as far away as Kashmir demonstrates the relevance of the extra-regional to Bengal, suggestive of the 
understanding of India as Bharat.  
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for their revolutionary activities. The ascetics contend that “these bearded degenerates” 
endanger, apparently, not just Hindu lives, but something far more precious: “our religious 
way of life, our caste status, our self-respect, our family connections.” Such formulations of 
a “Hindu identity” and way of life reflect Bankim’s belief that promoting and maintaining a 
cohesive Hindu samaj in the present moment was critical. This portrayal of such a fervent 
understanding of samaj existing in the late eighteenth century —let alone an endangered 
Hinduism—is of course anachronistic, a strategic move on Bankim’s part to portray Muslims 
as a long-standing enemy of Hindus. To this end, Muslims are repeatedly vilified in the text 
not only as “bearded degenerates,” but as “baldies,” “Muslim foreigners,” and “swine.”75 
Compounding this profound overdetermination of Mughal rule is the fact that there is not 
one individualized character of Muslim belonging in the text, i.e., a man or woman that acts 
or speaks in his or her own right. The narrator only mentions Muhammad Reza Khan in 
passing; the “Muslim king” is not named.76 In this text that liberally expresses hostility 
against Muslims, the latter predominantly appears only as frantic mobs trying to escape the 
santans, who do not hesitate to commit murder, arson, and other acts of aggression against 
them.77 The violence reaches such proportions that many Muslims try to pass as Hindu in 
order to save themselves: “…many Muslims got rid of their beards, smeared clay on their 
bodies and began to call on Hari; when questioned they would say, awkwardly, “I’m a 
Hindu.”78 
                                                
75 Bankim, Anandamath, 167, 169. 
76 The only possible exception to this observation is the jamadar Nazir-uddin who finds Mahendra and 
Satyananda weeping after Kalyani has presumably died after ingesting poison. Nazir-uddin is likely the “he” 
who seizes Satyananda and exclaims: “This scoundrel’s an ascetic!” (157). The omission of the name of the 
reigning “Muslim king” is specific only to the fifth edition of Anandamath, a deliberate excision on Bankim’s 
part in order for the novel to be less like history and more like a fictionalized account. Such omissions had the 
effect of furthering the overdetermined characterization of evil “Muslims.” 
77 Ibid., 189. 
78 Ibid., 214. 
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Bhabhananda’s accusation that Mahendra was not a “real man” further alludes to 
disparaging views about Bengali masculinity. That Bengalis were an inherently effete people 
was a belief widely held by the British and other Indian communities and had long been 
internalized by many Bengalis themselves. Bhabhananda’s charge that Mahendra is among 
the many Bengali men who merely wish to enjoy “fine things” echoes derogatory opinions 
about their overall passivity and lack of valor. The ascetic continues his tirade by appealing 
to Mahendra’s responsibilities as a husband and father, arguing that Hindu men must protect 
their wives and daughters from the harmful influence of Muslims.79 He finally concludes his 
appeal by suggesting that Hindu men have no excuse not to fight Muslims, because, unlike 
the British, they are a vulnerable and cowardly adversary: 
“Listen” said Bhabananda, “an Englishman won’t flee even to save his life, whereas 
the Muslim will run off when he begins to sweat; he’ll slope off in search of a cool 
drink! Again, the English hang on, they’ll finish what they’ve begun. But the Muslim 
plays fast and loose. The sepoys risk their lives for money, even then they don’t get 
paid. And finally, it’s a question of courage. The cannonball can fall only in one place 
not in ten, so there’s no need for two hundred to run when they see a single 
cannonball. Yet when they see a single cannonball a whole tribe of Muslims will flee, 
whereas a tribe of cannonballs can’t make a single Englishman run!”80 
 
In this excerpt Bankim transfers to Muslims the widespread British stereotype about the 
effeminate Bengali. Much as the British had often portrayed Bengali Hindus, here Muslims 
are cast as lazy, uncommitted, and cowardly. The reader will notice discrepant views being 
advanced in the text. In the previous battle the narrator had remarked that the death of the 
(likely British) commander had unsettled the sepoys serving under him, thus enabling the 
santans to rob them: 
Suddenly seeing that their commander was headless and that there was no one to 
give orders to protect them, the frightened sepoys were briefly at a loss to know 
                                                
79 As I have discussed earlier, Muslims were often considered liable for the fallen state of Hindu women, a 
critique that was part and parcel of their overall vilification as culprits of Bharat’s decline into degeneracy.  
80 Bankim, Anandamath, 147-148. 
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what to do. Taking advantage of this, the daring bandits killed and wounded many of 
them, and reaching the carts captured the money chests. At this, the defeated sepoys 
lost heart and fled.81  
 
The only way in which Bhabananda’s observations can reconcile with the cowardice of these 
sepoys is if the regiment was composed entirely of Muslims, but the narrator had suggested 
earlier that they were British.82 As I mentioned in Chapter One, sepoy regiments were 
actually composed of Indians from a variety of backgrounds that were led by a small 
contingent of British officers. Adding to the confusion is the later suggestion that the 
Muslims who had conquered the Hindu homeland long ago were, in fact, a formidable 
enemy. As the leader of the brotherhood Satyananda informs Mahendra: “We were defeated 
because we lacked proper weapons. What can staves, cudgels and spears do against guns, 
shot and cannon? Because our efforts were inadequate we were overcome.”83 Such a 
statement contradicts Bhabananda’s earlier comments, for cowardly Muslims would certainly 
not use such armaments in battle.   
These are just two of several instances in which Bankim sacrifices realism, logic, and 
accuracy for the sake of a politically advantageous portrayal of valiant Hindus and their weak, 
scheming Muslim foes. Rather than inquire into how a group of Hindu ascetics could defeat 
armed British soldiers, the reader is encouraged to understand that the santans’ success 
verifies the righteousness of their dharmic battle against an evil enemy. Likewise, Satyananda’s 
statement that Muslim conquerors had superior weapons reinforces extant perceptions of 
their villainy and foreignness to the Hindu homeland—they are intruders who unhesitatingly 
                                                
81 Ibid., 143.  
82 As described in the following passage, the sepoys appear to be British: “As the sepoys waited for their 
commanding officer to come up, the latter thinking that bandits were upon them, rushed up to the carts and 
gave the order to form a square, for in times of danger the English overcome their addictions” (142; emphasis added). It 
indeed makes sense that the sepoys would be British because, as the narrator mentioned earlier, the defunct 
Mughal ruler Mir Jafar relied on them to collect taxes (140).  
83 Ibid., 176. 
  
98 
exploited their advantage over a weaker adversary in order to seize territory. Within 
Anandamath’s fantastic world, such simplifications and inconsistencies help posit a stark 
Manichean struggle between noble Hindus and evil Muslims. In this novel where the 
narrative action moves rapidly and the plot centers around several grandiose events, close 
and attentive reading practices are neither encouraged nor rewarded. The resulting queries, 
and their deflating answers, would most certainly undermine the goal of portraying Hindu 
heroics.84 Due to its incorporation of several different genres as well as its lofty political 
goals to portray Hindu heroism, Anandamath was quite cumbersome and awkward in form; 
as a literary work it was mediocre at best. 
 
Restoring the Motherland 
This casus belli against the oppressive Mughal regime is also cast positively as a quest 
to restore the Mother. Like the overdetermined Muslim, the Mother is similarly an abstract 
figure, capable of bearing multiple significances. Given that the action of Anandamath takes 
place in Bengal and that the novel itself was originally composed in Bengali, it has been 
tempting for critics to construe Bankim’s project as insular. In her 1982 essay “Anandamath: 
A Political Myth,” Meenakshi Mukherjee suggests that even though the novel resonated 
across India, Bankim’s goals were likely provincial: “It is doubtful if Bankim’s vision of the 
regenerated Hindu ethos included the whole of India....he was concerned more with the 
identity of the Bengali people and recovering their forgotten glory, than with the national 
identity of India.”85 This interpretation overlooks the fact that many Indian writers in this 
period, Bankim included, were steadily identifying events outside of their particular local or 
                                                
84 My thinking on melodrama and speed is informed by Jeffrey Cox, who puts it succinctly, “Melodrama is built 
for speed.” See Cox, “The Death of Tragedy; or, the Birth of Melodrama,” 170. 
85 Mukherjee, “Anandamath: A Political Myth,” 903. 
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regional milieus as relevant to themselves.86 Moreover, as I have already noted, the evolving 
conception of India as the inherently Hindu space Bharat further suggested an imagined link 
between the local, regional, and national that did not exist before in the mid-nineteenth 
century.     
Like Bharat, the figure of “Bharat Mata” [Mother India] also became common 
during the 1860s and 1870s both within and outside of Bengal.87 In 1867, Satyendranath 
Tagore composed his famous patriotic song “Mile Sab Bharat Santan” [With All of India’s 
Children United], which likely informed Bankim’s own momentous contribution, “Bande 
Mataram” [“Hail to the Motherland”].88 Bankim’s hymn—the majority of which was written 
in Sanskrit—stood apart from other iterations of the moment due to its yoking of Bharat 
Mata with the goddess Shakti, representative of the feminine power and energy of the 
universe. In so doing, Bankim persuasively transformed Bharat Mata, a figure that was 
predominantly portrayed as conquered and broken to one that was eternally resplendent. In 
Anandamath, the reader’s first introduction to the Mother occurs when Bhabananda sings 
“Bande Mataram” after the santans defeated the sepoys in the unlikely victory discussed 
earlier:    
                                                
86 See for example Ramya Sreenivasan’s monograph, The Many Lives of a Rajput Queen: Heroic Pasts in India, c. 
1500-1900 (2007), which discusses how the legend of the medieval Rajput queen Padmini travelled throughout 
colonial India.  
87 For an example of a portrayal of Bharat Mata outside of Bengal, see Goswami’s discussion of a Hindi play 
that explores the historical destiny of Bharat Mata that was published in 1876 in Kavi Vachan Sudha, one of the 
oldest Hindi newspapers in the United Provinces (200).   
88 Satyendranath Tagore, older brother of Rabindranath, was notably the first Indian to be admitted to the 
Indian Civil Service in 1863. “Mile Sab Bharat Santan” was among his many patriotic songs. In 1873, Bankim 
effusively praised the hymn: “May this Great Song be sung everywhere in India! May it echo from the 
Himalayas to the valleys…” (Lipner 33, fn. 58). It seems quite likely that Satyendranath’s song informed the 
creation of “Bande Mataram,” which Bankim composed in approximately 1874-1875 (Lipner 91, fn. 139). 
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[1] I revere the Mother! The Mother 
  Rich in waters, rich in fruit, 
  Cooled by the southern airs, 
  Verdant with the harvest fair.  
 
[2] The Mother—with nights that thrill 
  in the light of the moon,  
  Radiant with foliage and flowers in bloom,  
  Smiling sweetly, speaking gently, 
  Giving joy and gifts in plenty. 
 
 [3] Powerless? How so, Mother, 
  With the strength of voices fell, 
  Seventy millions in their swell! 
  And with sharpened swords 
  By twice as many hands upheld! 
 
 [4] To the Mother I bow low, 
  To her who wields so great a force, 
  To her who saves, 
  And drives away the hostile hordes! 
 
 
[5] You our wisdom, you our law, 
     You our heart, you our core, 
     In our bodies the living force is thine! 
 
[6] Mother, you’re our strength of arm, 
     And in our hearts [bhakti]89, 
     Yours the form we shape in every shrine! 
 
[7] For you are Durga, bearer of the tenfold    
     power, 
     And wealth’s Goddess, dallying on the              
     lotus flower, 
     You are Speech, to you I bow, 
     To us wisdom you endow. 
 
[8] I bow to the Goddess Fair, 
     Rich in waters, rich in fruit, 
     To the Mother, 
     Spotless—and beyond compare! 
 
[9] I revere the Mother! the Mother 
     Darkly green and also true, 
     Richly dressed, of joyous face, 
     This ever-plenteous land of grace.90 
 
In this patriotic hymn, Bankim deifies the Hindu homeland as various incarnations of Shakti, 
including Durga, Kali, Lakshmi, and Saraswati. Here the author tapped into Bengal’s 
prevalent Shakta tradition, which revered Shakti and her multiple manifestations as a divine 
“Mother.”91 The first two stanzas glorify the generous fertility and bounty of the homeland 
that sustain all life, such as abundant water, clear air, and plentiful harvests. The third and 
fourth stanzas evoke Kali (the fearsome goddess associated with destruction and 
empowerment) as the speaker contemplates the Mother’s subjugation and the destruction 
that would necessarily ensue as “seventy million” rise to restore her. The figure of seventy 
                                                
89 Here I have retained the Hindi/Bengali word used originally, bhakti. See Lipner, “Critical Apparatus,” 245. 
90 Bankim, Anandamath, 145-146. 
91 Due to the prevalence of the Shakta tradition in Bengal, Bankim had at his disposal a rich devotional 
tradition in praise of the female Godhead as Mother, including, for instance, the well-known hymns in praise of 
Kali by the famous eighteenth-century Shakta poet Ram Prasad Sen; see Clark, “The Role of Bankimcandra in 
the Development of Nationalism,” 438. See also Jasodhara Bagchi, “Representing Nationalism,” 66, and Flood, 
An Introduction to Hinduism, 175-178.  
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million accurately reflected the population of Bengal in the early 1880s, thus apparently 
including Muslims among the Mother’s “Children.” 92 The fifth and sixth stanzas indicate 
that the Children’s pledge to fight for the motherland arises not out of obligation, but rather 
an affective bond of ever-flowing strength and power between the two: “In our bodies the 
living force is thine!” When the Mother is weak, the Children are enfeebled, and when she is 
strong, they are empowered. Thus any subjection the Mother may experience can only be 
temporary, for triumph is assured provided her Children remain united in her cause. 
Though Muslims are ostensibly among the Mother’s “seventy million,” an important 
shift occurs midway through the song that challenges their inclusion within a homeland that 
is repeatedly being envisioned as Hindu. In the seventh stanza, the speaker expressly 
identifies the Mother as Durga (“bearer of the tenfold power”), Lakshmi (“wealth’s 
Goddess”), and Saraswati (the goddess of knowledge), three well-known forms of Shakti. 
The praise of the Mother in these terms helped Bankim cast this new goddess as comparable 
to these familiar divinities. Having given proper obeisance to the Mother by recognizing her 
celebrated (Hindu) forms, the speaker ends the hymn as he began, by lavishing praise on the 
motherland as a glorious provider and sustainer of life.  
The predominant composition of “Bande Mataram” in Sanskrit further conveyed its 
Hindu character and pan-Indian appeal. Considered the language of the gods [devavani], 
Sanskrit was esteemed as a sacred tongue in Hinduism.93 The novel’s departure from prose 
Bengali (in the style of calit bhasa) to Sanskrit marked a transition from the profane to the 
                                                
92 The figure of seventy million is important to mark here as it accurately reflected the population of Bengal in 
the early 1880s. In the first census taken in 1872, Bengal’s population was determined to be 62,705,718; the 
census of 1881 determined that the population had risen to 69,536,861. As a civil servant, Bankim was likely 
able to view these documents. See “Census of Bengal, 1881,” 680. 
93 On the sacred nature of Sanskrit, see Flood, An Introduction to Hinduism, 227, 249. Sanskrit remains a liturgical 
language among Hindus; holy rites and rituals are almost exclusively conducted in the language.  
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(Hindu) sacred.94 Lipner explains that out of the nine stanzas of the hymn, only three were 
not in a “Bengalified” Sanskrit. For those Bengali Hindus who were not adept with Sanskrit, 
this hybridization likely assisted in their grasping, at the very least, the gist of the song.95 
While the hymn’s composition in Sanskrit legitimized the deification of the Mother for both 
Bengali- and non-Bengali speaking Hindus alike, it simultaneously excluded Bengali Muslims 
from the nation being envisioned. Through both its form and content, the hymn was 
expressly marked for and addressed to Bengali Hindus. The only portion of “Bande 
Mataram” that was wholly in Bengali and thus linguistically available to Muslim readers, 
stanza six, was still exclusionary because it unreservedly praised concepts alien to Islam like 
worshipping the divine through a form or image. 
Bankim’s anthropomorphism of the Hindu homeland as a magnificent maternal 
divinity in “Bande Mataram” provided an alluring symbol for contemporary samajik debates 
regarding who could stake an authentic claim to the Indian nation. As Sudipta Kaviraj has 
argued, the determination of which communities were essential to the nation, and thus what 
the nascent nation could (or should) look like, necessarily preceded the push for 
independence or sovereignty.96 Like Bharat, the samajik figuration of Bharat Mata advanced 
this project of imagining the nation by naturalizing two recent tautological ideas: one, that 
India was (and always had been) a Hindu homeland; and two, that Hinduism involved an 
affective attachment with India. The poignant and emotive icon of a resplendent “Mother” 
                                                
94 Clark explains that as Bengali prose developed over the nineteenth century, two styles emerged, that of calit 
bhasa and sadhu bhasa: “Sadhu bhasa implied a preference for the Sanskritic elements in the vocabulary and the 
use of the longer verbal and pronominal forms; calit bhasa implied a preference for the more colloquial elements 
and the use of the shorter verbal and pronominal forms, which as written corresponded fairly closely with 
those current in the spoken language.” See Clark, “Bengali Prose Fiction,” 60. 
95 Lipner appears to suggest that at least the first three stanzas of “Bande Mataram” demonstrate a 
“Bengalified” Sanskrit, which I take to mean a Sanskrit that could be intelligible to the patient and educated 
Bengali reader, one who would more likely than not be Hindu (94, 244).  
96 Kaviraj, The Imaginary Institution of India, 106. 
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symbolized such nationalist desire, a longing to regenerate and (re)experience a utopic 
organic unity of Hindus.97 Bankim’s refusal to identify the Mother explicitly as either “Banga 
Mata” [Mother Bengal] or “Bharat Mata” thus constituted a productive ambiguity that 
facilitated the song’s detachment from Anandamath and its subsequent deployment in a 
variety of contexts, such as the swadeshi movement of the early twentieth century.98 As Tanika 
Sarkar has observed, “…it has never been firmly established…whether Anandamath’s 
Motherland encompasses only Bengal or all of India.”99 
Within Bankim’s narrative “Bande Mataram” plays a crucial role in facilitating 
Mahendra’s embrace of the Mother’s cause.100 While he is initially wary of the militant 
ascetics, it is precisely after hearing Bhabananda sing the anthem that Mahendra finds 
himself drawn to them.  Similar to Bhabananda who had “wept as he sang,” Mahendra too 
experiences a powerful visceral reaction when he sings the hymn: “As he sang, he noticed 
that tears came to his eyes.”101 Mahendra’s conversion is assured when he beholds several 
stirring images of the Mother within the brotherhood’s temple, experiences representative of 
the Hindu belief in the power of darshan.102 Like a child, Mahendra is escorted through the 
sanctuary and reintroduced to well-known deities in the Hindu pantheon as interpreted by 
the brotherhood. Upon entering he sees a visually imposing display of prominent Hindu 
                                                
97 See Goswami on this point: “Bharat Mata was conceived as at once a place of originary plenitude, an object 
of affective identification and collective desire, as well as the territorial-economic whole within which [Hindu] 
nationals were organically bound” (199). 
98 Notably, even before the first serial installment of Anandamath had concluded in 1882, “Bande Mataram” had 
been performed in both public and private meetings convened by the Bengali literati. See Lipner, 
“Introduction,” 74. The swadeshi movement, spurred by George Curzon’s decision to partition Bengal in 1905, 
is addressed in Chapter Four. 
99 Tanika Sarkar, Rebels, Wives, Saints, 230. 
100 Lipner correctly suggests that “Bande Mataram” helped further the patriotic message of Anandamath: “It 
seems clear that the original context [of the song], the novel Anandamath, was intended to use the Bengal of the 
time as a symbol of a wider India (Bharatbarsa) as the motherland for patriots.” See Lipner, “Introduction,” 72. 
101 Bankim, Anandamath, 146-148. 
102 Darshan may be defined as the Hindu belief that a viewing the divine constitutes an ominous, propitious 
event. As Flood states, “To witness the icon is to have the auspicious ‘vision’ [darsana] of the deity and so to 
receive its blessing” (211). 
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deities; Vishnu, Lakshmi, and Saraswati, with the Mother seated on Vishnu’s lap: “On 
Vishnu’s lap sat an enchanting image, more beautiful and glorious than Lakshmi and 
Sarasvati. Gandharvas, kinnaras, gods, yakshas, and sprites paid her homage.”103 The physical 
placement of the Mother among these revered male and female deities naturalizes her as a 
goddess in her own right. The particular configuration of the gods and goddesses reflects the 
Mother’s importance as she is seated in the protective embrace of Vishnu and flanked by 
Lakshmi and Saraswati on either side, making explicit Bankim’s claim that the Hindu 
homeland is a goddess deserving of reverence. While in “Bande Mataram” the Mother was 
apostrophized as Lakshmi or Saraswati, here she is suggested to be more precious than these 
two goddesses. The proximity of the Mother to Vishnu in particular demonstrates the 
interconnection of the two deities for the brotherhood. While the ascetics primarily invoke 
Krishna (and Vishnu to a lesser extent), they direct all of their energies towards the Mother’s 
liberation.  
As in “Bande Mataram,” three specific manifestations of the Hindu goddess Shakti 
symbolize the Mother’s past, present, and future states. While in the anthem these goddesses 
were Durga, Kali, Lakshmi, and Saraswati, here they are Jagaddhatri, Kali, and Durga 
respectively. After viewing the initial deities, Mahendra is escorted into another chamber 
where he is introduced to the Mother in her past state. She is Jagaddhatri, who was “happy 
and beautiful, adorned with every ornament, radiant as the risen sun and full of majesty.” 104 
While this image of the “Mother-as-she-was” is prominently positioned in the temple, 
Mahendra must descend into a dark tunnel in order to view the “Mother-as-she-is.” Tropes 
                                                
103 Bankim, Anandamath, 149. Lipner explains that “gandharvas,” “kinnaras,” and “yakshas” are various non-
human mythical beings (ibid., fn. 33). 
104 Ibid., 150. Similar to Kali, worship of Jagaddhatri was very common in West Bengal. See Rachel McDermott, 
Revelry, Rivalry, and Longing for the Goddesses of Bengal, 21. 
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of darkness and light are prominent as Mahendra gradually discerns the image of Kali in dim 
lighting: 
“Kali!” said Mahendra fearfully. 
 
“Yes, Kali,” said the monk. “Blackened and shrouded in darkness. She has 
been robbed of everything; that is why she is naked. And because the whole land is a 
burning-ground, she is garlanded with skulls. And she’s crushing her own gracious 
Lord [Shiva] underfoot. Alas, dear Mother!’  
 
The tears streamed down the monk’s face. Mahendra asked, “Why has she a 
club and begging-bowl in her hands?” 
 
“We’re her Children, and that’s all we could put in her hands as weapons,” 
said the monk. “Now say, Bande Mataram.”105  
 
Bankim’s advancement of Kali as representative of the present condition of the Mother is 
telling because the goddess had a very arresting appearance.106 As Flood observes, within 
Shakta traditions Kali was typically visualized as “‘black’ or ‘blue’, garlanded with severed 
heads, girdled with severed arms, with rolling, intoxicated eyes and a lolling tongue [who] 
dances on the corpse of her husband Siva.”107 Due to the popularity of Kali in Bengal, 
Bankim’s readers would likely have been able to conjure a visual image of this fearsome 
goddess. In a significant move, Bankim fetishizes the natural appearance of Kali as a 
function of the motherland’s decline. While in her previous state she was the splendid 
Jagaddhatri, the Mother has degenerated to a grotesque degree, becoming “blackened and 
shrouded in darkness,” “robbed of everything,” and “naked.” Likewise, the Mother-as-she-
is/Kali is no longer fierce and powerful; like the Hindu homeland she personifies, the 
goddess is pathetic and weak. For example, instead of bearing her usual weapons, Kali too 
has suffered from Bengal’s poverty and now possesses only a “club and begging-bowl.”  
                                                
105 Bankim, Anandamath, 150. 
106 “Kali” is the feminine form of the Hindi and Bengali word for the color black. 
107 Flood, An Introduction to Hinduism, 178. 
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 This heavy-handed figuration of Hindu goddesses as the Hindu homeland 
culminates in the unveiling of the Mother-as-she-will-be, Durga. Continuing the imagery of 
darkness and light, the narrator notes that Mahendra beholds this vision of the Mother in the 
morning sunlight:  
Mahendra saw a golden ten-armed image of the Goddess in a large marble shrine 
glistening and smiling in the early morning rays. 
 
Prostrating himself, the monk said, “And this is the Mother-as-she-will-be. Her ten 
arms reach out in ten directions, adorned with various powers in the form of the 
different weapons she holds, the enemy crushed at her feet, while the mighty lion 
who has taken refuge there is engaged in destroying the foe. Behold her whose arms 
are the directions”—here Satyananda’s voice broke down and he began to weep—
“whose arms are the directions, who holds various weapons and crushes the enemy 
and roams on the lordly lion’s back, who has Lakshmi personifying good fortune on 
her right, and the goddess of speech who bestows wisdom and learning on her left, 
with Kartikeya signifying strength and Ganesh good success, in attendance! Come, 
let us prostate ourselves before the Mother.”108 
 
The striking personage of Durga as the ten-armed goddess who was found seated on or 
attended by a lion or tiger suggests the commanding, imposing character of the future Hindu 
India. In contrast to the darkness surrounding Kali, the profusion of sunlight and “morning 
rays” that attend Durga herald her arrival like the morning dawn, symbolic of a desirable 
new beginning for India. As with Kali, Bankim takes liberties with common understandings 
of Durga for narrative purposes. For example, rather than merely carrying weapons, the 
goddess’s ten extended arms may be construed as staking a claim to all of India’s territories, 
suggesting that she stands ready to defend the homeland from any and all adversaries that 
may threaten. Durga was also not typically attended by other deities. The addition of 
Saraswati, Lakshmi, Kartikeya, and Ganesh alongside the goddess portends that her arrival 
will necessarily be a fortuitous and blessed event. This bookending of depictions of the 
Mother surrounded by other deities—i.e., in her form as the Mother-as-she-was and as the 
                                                
108 Bankim, Anandamath, 150.  
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Mother-as-she-will-be—serves to reaffirm and naturalize the goddess as equivalent to these 
more familiar divinities.   
Embedded within Bankim’s conflation of Hindu goddesses with India in past, 
present, and future states is a powerful challenge to British historiographical understandings 
of India and the colonial project that it sanctioned. The author’s tri-pronged argument that 
India was once glorious, is now degenerate, and will one day become powerful constituted a 
fundamental challenge to the prevailing British apprehension of the Raj as a just, warranted, 
and necessary intervention in a backward society. As Henry Maine’s anxieties had 
demonstrated, Britain could not imagine a future in which India would not require its 
guiding hand. While Bankim certainly agreed with prevailing British views that India’s 
present condition was deplorable, with Anandamath he not only provided the reason—the 
iniquities and malfeasance intrinsic to past Mughal rule—but also the promise that the Hindu 
homeland would one day reclaim its former majesty. Indeed what was most ingenious about 
Bankim’s depiction about the “Mother-as-she-will-be” is not so much that Durga is taken to 
be the embodiment of this state, but rather that her eventual materialization is foretold as 
prophecy. This future version of the Mother/homeland will appear, though it is unclear when 
exactly.  
 It is precisely this alluring promise of the Mother’s appearance in her future potent 
state that pushes Mahendra to join the brotherhood. While he was initially quite skeptical of 
the santans, his repeated darshan of the Mother in her different forms has overwhelmed him. 
Like Arjun who was similarly transformed upon his perception of Krishna in his beatific 
state, Mahendra’s desire to join the brotherhood becomes inevitable after beholding familiar 
Hindu goddesses in persuasively reconfigured forms that explain current realities. Overcome 
by the sublime vision of Durga as the Mother-as-she-will-be, Mahendra changes dramatically 
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upon learning that this form of the Mother will only materialize, when, as Satyananda 
explains, “all [of the] Mother’s children recognize her as the Mother, she will be gracious to 
us.”109 In other words, Bengali Hindu men like Mahendra must prove themselves worthy of 
this commanding vision of the Mother in order for her to manifest. As the exemplary Hindu 
man, Mahendra now becomes willing to commit fully to the cause, encouraging Bengali 
Hindu men to take similar action in the contemporary moment. 
 Most important, Mahendra exemplifies the fact that acceptance of this muscular 
Hinduism required far more than just the passive belief in its tenets, but the actual labor of 
bhakti and sacrifice in order to realize its goals. As required by the brotherhood, Mahendra 
decides to renounce his householder roles as husband and father and take the required vow 
of celibacy in order to dedicate himself fully to the cause of the Mother.110 While it was the 
case that orthodox Hindu doctrine required sannyasis [renouncers] to abandon familial ties 
towards the end of life and embrace a state of celibacy, the brotherhood’s adherence to such 
teachings stops here.111 Though the Children are renouncers, their dharma resides not in 
passive spiritual acts such as meditation, but rather the active cultivation of hardy skills 
required of warriors fighting for cherished beliefs.112   
 The brotherhood’s militant approach forms yet another instance of Bankim 
manipulating aspects of Hinduism to make it address the needs of the Bengali Hindu samaj. 
                                                
109 Ibid., 151.  
110 The brotherhood’s requirement of celibacy, or brahmacharya, references the Hindu belief that sexual energy 
can be harnessed and sublimated for a spiritual purpose, in this case, for the cause of the Mother (Flood, 63). 
In 1906 M.K. Gandhi began to experiment with brahmacharya, a practice he had long admired. See Rajmohan 
Gandhi, Gandhi: The Man, His People and the Empire, 108-109. 
111 It should also be stressed that the actual Sannyasi Rebellion of the late eighteenth century was a movement 
comprised of ascetics belonging to both the Hindu and Muslim faiths who protested the Company’s growing 
authority in Bengal.  
112 As put forth in the Manu Smriti [the Laws of Manu], a Hindu man’s dharma entailed his renunciation of 
householder roles towards the end of life in order to achieve total detachment from the material world and the 
attendant ability to devote oneself entirely to spiritual pursuits. To this end, the sannyasi [renouncer] would 
engage in meditation and other such contemplative acts of the divine in order to achieve moksha, release from 
the cycles of birth and rebirth; see Flood, An Introduction to Hinduism, 64. 
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Should readers have any lingering doubts as to the virtues of these new teachings, the author 
portrays a discussion between the leader Satyananda and the disciple Mahendra comparable 
to Krishna’s instruction to Arjun about fighting to reclaim his kingdom. In reply to 
Mahendra’s confusion regarding how the ascetics can sanction aggression and militancy 
when Vaishnava practice conventionally espouses nonviolence, Satyananda distinguishes 
between “false” and “authentic” Vaishnavism. The god Vishnu, who repeatedly incarnated 
himself to rid the world of demons, is the Children’s “chosen” deity; following his example, 
the brotherhood understands “authentic” Vaishnavism to consist in “subduing the evildoer 
and rescuing the world.”113 In response to Mahendra’s skepticism that he espouses a 
“newfangled teaching,” Satyananda asserts that his views are correct because they were 
espoused by their Hindu forebears: “I’m saying exactly the sort of thing our ancestors have 
believed for generations.”114 Violence for the purpose of vanquishing evildoers is thus cast as 
intrinsic to and sanctioned by Hindu doctrine. Just as Vishnu and Krishna conquered 
demons, the santans’ aggression against Muslims is permissible because “they are the enemies 
of our Lord.”115  
 
Heroes and Heroines: Gender Roles and the Nation 
 While it proved relatively easy for the brotherhood to take up arms against the 
Mughal rulers and their British allies, Bankim demonstrates the difficulty for even the most 
resolute of heroes to forsake worldly attachments, namely sexual desire, for the sake of the 
nation. The vow of celibacy was not a matter to take lightly, and the brotherhood recognized 
the enormity of this sacrifice by instituting a hierarchy. Only those Hindu men able and 
                                                
113 Bankim, Anandamath, 179. 
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willing to abandon familial ties and embrace celibacy could enter the intimate circle of fully 
“initiated” santans. These select men received names ending in ananda to match their 
newfound identities, thus forming the anandamath [monastery of anandas].116 It is this small 
contingent that leads a much larger mass of “uninitiated” men who remain tethered to their 
worldly existence as householders, beggars, and the like.117 By making such a distinction 
Bankim suggests that only those men capable of this enormous sacrifice possessed the 
discipline and fortitude necessary to guide others in the Mother’s divine cause. 
The immense difficulty of renouncing worldly ties and sexual desire in particular is 
demonstrated in the respective “falls” of Bhabananda and Jibananda. Both men are willing 
to renege on their sworn vows and renounce the brotherhood in order to be with Kalyani 
and Shanti respectively. During a forbidden visit to his home, Jibananda expresses to Shanti 
the difficulty of complying with the brotherhood’s austere demands: 
…now that I’ve seen you, I can’t tear myself away. That’s why I told Nimai it would 
do no good to see you again. Now that I’ve seen you, I just can’t go back. On the 
one side there’s duty, wealth, pleasure, salvation, the concerns of this world, my vow 
and its religious rites. All this on one side—and on the other, there’s you—you 
alone! And I can never work out which is the weightier! Shanti, you are my country! 
What use is it to me without you? Give me a small piece of land, and with you I could 
turn it into heaven. What would I do with it otherwise? The sorrows of our people? 
Is there anyone sorrier in the land than he who’s had you for a wife and then left 
you? And who’s more needy in the land than he who’s had you for a wife and then 
left you? And who’s more needy in the land than he who’s seen you in these tattered 
clothes? You’re the prop of everything that I can call duty…118 
 
In this passage Bankim complicates the depiction of the ascetics as dutiful soldiers and 
emphasizes the immense effort and discipline required to dedicate oneself fully to the nation. 
Deeply in love with his wife, Jibananda is torn between his desire to stay with her and his 
duty to the Mother. Departing from the simple characterization of the ascetics given thus far, 
                                                
116 Ibid., 185. 
117 Ibid., 178-179. 
118 Ibid., 166. Emphasis added. 
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the writer endows Jibananda with a considerable degree of verisimilitude as the latter reflects 
on the challenge of leaving Shanti yet again in order to fight for the motherland. In contrast 
to the rather simple-minded ascetics seen so far, Jibanananda emerges as a sympathetic 
figure with familiar attachments and struggles. 
 Yet such grandeur of the Hindu hero often comes at the cost of a woman’s 
personhood. For every man who wishes to resign from the national cause, there is a woman 
parroting the ideals of this new patriotic Hinduism who urges him to persist. Paragons of 
virtue, both Kalyani and Shanti refuse Bhabananda and Jibananda’s respective advances and 
denounce their willingness to abandon their sworn oaths so easily. Though she is seemingly 
free to marry, Kalyani rejects Bhabananda’s proposal of marriage and remains loyal to 
Mahendra, even though he believes that she has died. The highly religious space in which 
Kalyani rebuffs Bhabananda—a room filled with images of Krishna—emphasizes her 
ideality as the pious and pure Hindu wife.119 Ever the devoted companion to Mahendra and 
daughter of the Mother, Kalyani shames Bhabananda as a “sinner who has broken his 
vow.”120 Similarly, Shanti urges Jibananda to return to the brotherhood so that she can 
continue to be a hero’s wife: “Shame! You are a hero! The great joy of my world is that I’m a 
hero’s wife! How can you abandon a hero’s duty for the sake of a lowly woman? Do not love 
me. I don’t want that happiness. But never abandon your duty as a hero.”121 Such statements 
indicate that Hindu women should not only embody the nation as an idea worth fighting 
(and dying) for, but also facilitate men’s performance of these noble duties. While Kalyani 
encourages both Mahendra and Bhabananda respectively to join and return to the 
                                                
119 Having rescued Kalyani from her self-inflicted poisoning, Bhabananda deposited her in a home ostensibly 
for widowed or forsaken Hindu women. The narrator tells the reader that Kalyani’s room contains religious 
manuscripts, a rosary, and numerous images of Krishna (195). 
120 Ibid., 198. 
121 Ibid., 166. 
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brotherhood, Shanti cross-dresses and poses as a man in order to enter the brotherhood 
herself and fight alongside Jibananda. Her alternate identity as the monk “Nabinananda” 
ensures that she does not “tempt” the men into breaking their vows. However, Shanti’s 
apparently daring acts should not be misinterpreted as markers of Bankim’s feminism but 
rather reflections of his belief that women ought to assist men in performing patriotic duties 
as their circumstances will allow.  
 Rather than the seasoned warriors of the brotherhood, it is actually Mahendra who 
emerges as the hero of the novel. In the final chaotic battle scene, Mahendra’s full 
conversion to the cause of the Mother is complete when he incites a group of uninitiated 
santans to attack the joint British and Muslim forces. As a matter of course, only the Muslims 
are vilified: 
“Santans!” [Mahendra] cried out to the Children, “Look, our Master, Satyananda 
Goswami’s banner can be seen at the top! Today the Lord himself, Mura’s Foe, 
Slayer of Madhu and Kaitabha, Destroyer of Kamsa and Keshi, has entered the 
battle. There are a hundred thousand santans on the hillside! Shout Hare Murare! Hare 
Murare! Rise up! Crush the Muslims and kill them! […]”122 
 
Mahendra’s battle cry, rife with allusions to Krishna’s slayings of demons and vitriol against 
Muslims, renews the santans’ desire to fight. His appeal is persuasive because, like elsewhere 
in the narrative, attacking Muslims has been cast as a religious duty for Hindus. Romantic 
melodrama is at its height in this scene because the Children’s eventual victory defies all logic. 
Though the British had been overpowering them, the santans experience an inexplicable 
surge of renewed vigor and rout the joint forces: “And even as a tiny fly is crushed by the 
collision of two massive blocks of stone, so the rulers’ huge army was crushed by the two 
santan armies. And none remained to carry the news to Warren Hastings.”123  
                                                
122 Ibid., 225. Italics in original; my emphasis is underlined. 
123 Ibid. 
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 In Anandamath’s bold rewriting of key moments in Bengali history, the Children’s 
highly improbable victory is understood as the merited outcome of their dharmic struggle. 
Due to the profusion of elements of epic and romance in the narrative, any attempt to 
provide a plausible explanation for this fantastic turn of events is futile. As Bankim had 
indicated in his impassioned plea for histories about Bengali written by Bengalis, what the 
community desperately needed was not realism and reason, but heroism and honor, stories 
that would rejuvenate the people’s demoralized sense of self and unite them for a common 
purpose. Through Anandamath he offered precisely such an account as acts of courage and 
sacrifice were rewarded and those of wrongdoing and malfeasance were punished. For 
example, Mahendra’s bravery and heroism is rewarded with the Children’s victory in the 
battle.124 Likewise, since Kalyani’s apparent death prompted Mahendra to join the 
brotherhood in the first place, she too is blessed with the return of her daughter and what is 
ostensibly a brief reunion with Mahendra.125 Both Bhabananda and Jibananda die in battle 
not because they suffered fatal wounds, but because they violated the sworn oaths.126 Their 
deaths demonstrate the gravity of the santans’ code, which is exacting precisely because it 
amounts to a covenant with the divine. Even though Bhabananda and Jibananda technically 
remained celibate—there is no sex in Anandamath—their mere desire of Kalyani and Shanti 
warranted severe punishment. But in yet another quixotic twist, Jibananda is again saved by 
Shanti. Jibananda’s miraculous resuscitation by a mysterious divine-like Healer constitutes 
her prize for numerous acts of sacrifice and valor both in and out of battle.127   
                                                
124 Ibid. 
125 Ibid., 216-217. 
126 Ibid., 211, 225-226. 
127 Ibid., 226-228. 
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 Under Mahendra’s leadership the santans emerge victorious over the joint Mughal-
British forces; their unlikely success informs Anandamath’s pivotal concluding scene. After 
reviving Jibananda, the enigmatic Healer appears before Satyananda and instructs him to 
desist from fighting and to sanction the emergence of British rule. Instead of Hindu rule, a 
British regime needs to be established. While the narrator has repeatedly cited the benefits of 
extant British governance for the reader, Satyananda is dumbstruck by the Healer’s 
pronouncement. Their exchange is highly significant and worth quoting at length: 
“Muslim rule has been destroyed,” said Satyananda, “but Hindu rule has not been 
established. Even now the English remain powerful in Kolkata.” 
 
The other said, “Hindu rule will not be established at this time. If you remain, people 
will die needlessly. So, come away.” 
 
When he heard this, a sharp pang of anguish pierced Satyananda. “Master,” he said, 
“if Hindu rule will not be established then who will be king? Will the Muslims rule 
again?” 
 
“No,” replied the other. “Now the English will rule.” 
 
Satyananda’s eyes streamed with tears. Turning to the image of his birthland in the 
form of the Mother mounted on high, he joined his hands together and said in a 
voice choked with tears, “Oh Mother, I’ve not been able to set you free. Once more you 
will fall into the hands of unworthy foreigners. Do not be offended with your Child. Alas, 
Mother! Why did I not die on the battlefield today?” 
 
The Healer said, “Satyananda, do not grieve. It was mistakenly, by means of banditry, that 
you gathered wealth and won your victory. Wrongdoing can never produce holy fruit. So you will not 
be able to free the land. What will happen will happen for the good. Unless the English rule, it will 
not be possible for the Eternal Code to be reinstated. Listen carefully, I’ll explain it to you 
according to the mind of the Great Ones.” 
 
“To worship three hundred and thirty million gods is not the Eternal Code. That’s a 
worldly, inferior code. Through its influence the real Eternal Code—what the foreigners call the 
Hindu rule of life—has been lost. The true Hindu rule of life is based on knowledge, not on action. 
And this knowledge is of two kinds—outward and inward. The inward knowledge is the chief part 
of the Eternal Code, but unless the outward knowledge arises first, the inward cannot arise. Unless 
one knows the gross, one cannot know the subtle. 
 
“For a long time now the outward knowledge has been lost in this land, and so the true Eternal 
Code has been lost too. If one wishes to reinstate this Code, one must make known the outward 
  
115 
knowledge first. The outward knowledge no longer exists in this land, and there’s no one to teach it; 
we ourselves are not good at teaching people such things. So we must bring in the outward knowledge 
from another country. The English are very knowledgeable in the outward knowledge, and they’re 
very good at instructing people. Therefore we’ll make them king. And when by this teaching our 
people are well instructed about external things, they’ll be ready to understand the inner. Then no 
longer will there be any obstacles to spreading the Eternal Code, and the true Code will shine forth 
by itself again. And till that day comes—so long as the Hindu is not wise and virtuous and strong 
once more—English rule will remain intact. Their subjects will be happy under the English, and 
they will be free to follow their religion. Therefore wise one, refrain from fighting the English, and 
follow me.” 
 
Satyananda said, “O Great One! If English rule was your aim, and if it is good for 
the land to be under English rule at this time, then why did you engage us in this 
cruel war?” 
 
The Great Man replied, “At present the English are traders. They’re intent on amassing wealth 
and do not wish to take on the burden of ruling a kingdom. But because of the Children’s rebellion, 
they’ll be forced to take on the burden of ruling, for without this they cannot collect wealth. The 
rebellion came about to usher in English rule. Now come—as you acquire knowledge, you yourself 
will be able to understand everything.” 
 
Satyananda said, “O Great One, I do not yearn to acquire knowledge. I have no use 
for knowledge. All I want is to keep the vow I have taken. Bless me so that my love 
for the Mother remains steadfast.” 
 
“You have kept your vow,” returned the other, “and you’ve ensured the Mother’s well-being, for 
you have brought in English rule. Now give up warfare, let people cultivate the land, may the earth 
abound in crops and let the people grow in prosperity.” 
 
Satyananda’s eyes sparked fire as he said, “I’ll make the Mother abound in crops by 
drenching her in the blood of her enemies!” 
 
“Who is the enemy?” asked the Great Man. “The enemy’s no more. The English will 
rule as friends. Besides, no one has the power to fight the English and win.”128 […] 
 
The arrival of this enigmatic sage functions as a divine intervention, which was very 
common in Indian epics and mythological ballads called mangalkavya.129 While Bankim’s 
insertion of a deus ex machina figure is frustrating in a novel that already contains a surplus of 
improbable plot twists, the need for a narrative exit plan of this sort was understandable. In 
order for Anandamath to remain a historical novel and not transform into a heroic epic, 
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Bankim needed to reconcile his portrayal of Hindu unity and valor with the inescapable fact 
of British rule. The sage’s final pronouncements explain how the British came to assume 
power despite the santans’ victory in the concluding battle. This extraordinary personage is 
truly god-like as he delivers a momentous revelation that modifies several key assumptions 
of the brotherhood and commands a very specific view of Britain’s occupation of India. The 
far-reaching import of the sage’s message further evidences the romantic melodrama of 
Anandamath, which, as discussed, all too often defies reason and logic. With this divine 
Healer as his mouthpiece, Bankim gives a final lesson in his revisionary Hinduism, 
specifically how the late nineteenth-century Hindu samaj ought to understand British 
colonialism as an opportunity to rejuvenate itself and lay the groundwork for future 
autonomy. It is only under such conditions that an independent motherland will (re)emerge.  
 Through the figure of the sage, Bankim extrapolates the consequences of the 
brotherhood’s militant activities in Bengal for the wider Hindu polity. The Healer indicates 
that the Children’s defeat of the Muslim regime is profoundly consequential because it has 
led to the advent of “English rule.” While Satyananda takes this to mean the continued 
subjugation of the Mother under another regime of “unworthy foreigners,” the sage explains 
that this is not the case. Furthering the novel’s comparison between the respective Muslim 
and British regimes, the sage divines that the latter’s rule will prove beneficial for the Hindus. 
This deific personage clarifies that it is precisely by routing the Muslims that the Children 
have, in fact, performed their duty to the Mother because the British will now take over. 
Consistent with the anti-Islamic theme of Anandamath, the sage criticizes only the Children’s 
“banditry” and not their violence against Muslims. Since the Healer has been likened to a 
divine figure, such failure to censure the brotherhood reinforces the troubling idea that 
aggression against Muslims was indeed a religious and patriotic duty for Hindus. 
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 Considering the profound importance Bankim placed on religious belonging in 
Anandamath, it is not surprising that this welcoming of British rule is parsed in terms of the 
benefits and improvements that the Hindu community will receive. The ideal state of 
Hinduism envisioned by the sage is notably laced with several paradigmatic ideas of British 
Orientalism. Hindus are to understand that colonial rule has not only saved them from a 
depraved Muslim regime, it provides an opportunity for reform and improvement. 
Evocative of British Orientalist ideas regarding the decline of Hindus from a magnificent 
Golden Age, the sage explains that the “Eternal Code” of the Hindus has degenerated and 
requires restoration.130 The absurdity of “worship[ping] three hundred and thirty million 
gods” indexes the erosion of the Eternal Code, which requires a certain level of “outward 
knowledge” in order to apprehend inner, spiritual truths. In a crucial move, Bankim yokes 
into a causal relationship two key indicators of European modernity that Hindus were 
deemed to lack—worldly technical knowledge and a suitable religious tradition. The Healer 
suggests that as Hindus learn material skills from the British (outward knowledge), a proper 
understanding of matters of faith (inner knowledge) will emerge once again. This connection 
was critical, for it enabled Bankim to reconcile a seemingly incompatible message about the 
latent promise of Hinduism alongside the considerable ways in which Hindus stood to gain 
from the advancements and knowledge of their colonial rulers.131  
 There is a critical subtext to the Healer’s words because the demonization of 
Muslims is essential for this counterfactual postulation to work. Far more than just being 
ineffective administrators of Bengal, Muslims are implicated in the corrosion of the Hindus’ 
                                                
130 This formulation of an “Eternal Code” was specific only to the fifth edition of the novel; earlier editions had 
“Aryan Code.” See Lipner, “Critical Apparatus,” 279. Bankim’s characterization of the code as “Aryan” 
suggests his belief in Max Müller’s postulation that Aryans were the originary inhabitants of India. 
131 Raychaudhuri, Europe Reconsidered, 155, 196. 
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Eternal Code. The Healer’s observation that the loss of outward knowledge contributed to 
the Eternal Code’s deterioration substantiates the santans’ perception that Muslims have 
substantially compromised a “Hindu identity” and a “Hindu rule of life.”132 As with his 
failure to criticize the santans’ violence, the sage’s implicit confirmation that Muslims were 
involved in the waning of the Eternal Code is highly prejudicial. Due to their false 
implication in this consequential sequence of events, “Muslims” are ultimately liable for the 
santans’ inability to establish Hindu rule. The sage’s comments establish a series of 
counterfactual conditionals as follows: If Muslims had not invaded the motherland and 
corrupted it, then Hindus would have been able to retain outward knowledge. If Hindus had 
been able to retain outward knowledge, then the Eternal Code would not have waned. If the 
Eternal Code had not waned, then the Hindus would have kept the balance of inner and 
outer knowledge necessary to assume governance immediately, instead of having to summon 
the British to “step in” magnanimously. Especially given that the santans were victorious in 
the ultimate battle, this narrative outcome was rather damaging to Indian Muslims because it 
promoted Hindu hatred towards them on yet another level. It is precisely through such 
insinuations that Bankim contributed powerfully to the ongoing politicization of religious 
identity in India.  
 This portrayal of an age-old conflict between Hindus and Muslims further explains 
why the Children perceive the British to be nothing more than an annoying nuisance in their 
revolution: 
                                                
132 Reminiscent of Bhabananda’s earlier diatribe against Muslims, the narrator explains the continuing 
incompetence of the Muslim ruler as well as the deterioration of the Hindu samaj steadily increased the ranks 
of the Children: “In particular everyone was angry with the Muslims for the anarchy and lawlessness of their 
reign. Because the Hindu rule of life had disappeared, many Hindus were keen to establish a Hindu identity. 
Thus, day by day the number of Children began to increase.” See Bankim, Anandamath, 189. 
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“Let me ask you something. Why do you people interfere in a fight between Hindu 
and Muslim? Go back to your own home.”133 
 
“Captain Sir, I shan’t kill you, the English are not our enemies. But why are you here 
to help the Muslims? Here, I spare your life, for the time being you are my prisoner. 
Victory to the English! We wish you well!”134  
 
Spoken respectively by Shanti and Bhabananda, these passages demonstrate the santans’ 
confusion as to why the honorable and valiant British have allied with the corrupt Mughal 
rulers. In the context of the Children’s dharmic struggle, the British alliance with the depraved 
Muslim authorities is inexplicable. But for the narrator and the Healer, who are able to divine 
past and future respectively, the presence of the British is a godsend. Situated firmly in the 
present moment, the narrator explains the Children’s ignorance: “Of course, the santans 
didn’t know then that the English had come to rescue India. How could they? Even Captain 
Thomas’s English contemporaries didn’t know. At the time it was known to Providence 
alone.”135  
 The Healer enlightens Satyananda as to why Hindus are not yet qualified to rule, but 
what about the exceptional, heroic santans? Bankim again evinces British Orientalist ideas as 
he explains away this narrative possibility. As noted in the sage’s observation that “The true 
Hindu rule of life is based on knowledge, not on action,” the santans do not yet possess the 
requisite “outward” knowledge to govern their homeland. Even though the Children had 
altered Hinduism productively—i.e., by worshipping primarily one deity—the Healer 
insinuates that their efficacy ends at popular leadership. While the santans may be valiant 
warriors and inspiring leaders, they do not have the skills necessary to be actual rulers or 
administrators. Hindus’ deficiency in technical knowledge, the sage states, is precisely why 
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British rule is warranted and desirable in the present. Enriched by the outward knowledge 
that the British will provide, the Hindu samaj is certain to regain the wisdom, virtue, and 
strength in which they have been deficient for so long, leading to “the true Code…shin[ing] 
forth by itself again.”  
 This is a stunning rewriting of history as Bankim recasts the British assumption of 
power as a desirable event, and one that Hindus were wholly responsible for orchestrating. 
The Healer’s matter-of-fact tone about the need for British rule encourages Bankim’s readers 
to understand the present situation in a similarly pragmatic manner. Rather than the British 
unilaterally exploiting India, Bankim upends the entire colonial enterprise as an opportunistic 
endeavor on the part of Hindus to learn outward knowledge from those who were experts: 
“… we must bring in the outward knowledge from another country. The English are very 
knowledgeable in the outward knowledge, and they’re very good at instructing people. 
Therefore we’ll make them king.” Quite strikingly, British agency has been taken out of the 
equation; they did not assume power out of their own accord but rather because they were 
“summoned” to do so. Through such compelling propositions, Bankim empowers his 
readers to evaluate colonial rule selfishly. Just as the British exploit India, Hindus should 
similarly seize what is advantageous from them. The actual reality of the matter, that “no one 
has the power to fight the English and win,” is a moot point, an inconsequential 
afterthought precisely because colonial rule has been made desirable.  
 Essential to Hindus’ initiating British governance is their ability to set its terms. 
Perhaps the most critical implication of the unilateral “contract” the Healer advances is that 
British rule constitutes a temporary period of tutelage for Hindus. Under no circumstances can 
British authority be indefinite, because its introduction necessarily entails Hindus’ 
development of outward knowledge and the resultant capacity to assume their own 
  
121 
governance at some point in the future. The sage’s comments that Hindus will be “happy 
subjects” and that the British will rule as “friends” encourage the view that the latter has 
been permitted to govern India in what Edmund Burke had famously termed a “trust” just 
over one hundred years earlier, and will graciously cede authority in due time.136 Moreover, 
unlike the Muslim regime that had so endangered the Hindu samaj, the sage declares that 
Hindus will be “free to follow their religion.” As discussed earlier, it was indeed the case that 
Queen Victoria had pledged religious freedom in her 1858 Proclamation: “In [Our Subjects’] 
Prosperity will be Our Strength; in their Contentment Our Security; and in their Gratitude 
Our best Reward.” Through this portrayal of Hindus’ having consented to temporary, 
amicable British governance, Bankim’s readers are positioned to criticize extant British 
antagonism not only as a failure to adhere to a mutually beneficial agreement, but also as a 
betrayal between “friends.”  
 Embedded within the idea that Britain would govern India in trust resided a latent 
warning to the colonial state. The Healer’s directive to Satyananda to sanction temporary 
British rule empowers readers to question extant British rhetoric about colonialism as 
inevitable and necessary. By suggesting that the advent of British rule arose from various 
contingencies, Bankim encourages his readers to understand their authority as provisional. 
Just as the Children had shown with the worthless Mughal regime, if rulers prove 
unsatisfactory they can be removed. Should the British not govern benevolently and with 
due respect to the Hindu people, the latter would be obliged to follow the example of their 
                                                
136 See Edmund Burke’s famous speech on Mr. Fox’s East India Bill delivered to the House of Commons in 
December 1783 in which he claimed that the various rights or privileges attendant with “….every species of 
political dominion and every description of commercial privilege, none of which can be original, self-derived 
rights, or grants for the mere private benefit of the holders….are all in the strictest sense a trust: and it is of the 
very essence of every trust to be rendered accountable—and even totally to cease, when it substantially varies from 
the purposes for which alone it could have a lawful existence.” See Edmund Burke, “Speech on Mr. Fox’s East 
India Bill,” 366. Emphasis in original. 
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heroic forebears and agitate to remove their adharmic rulers. Perhaps then Hindus would 
decide to install another teacher of outward knowledge or assume India’s governance 
themselves? Certainly the answer mattered far less than the question itself as Hindus were 
now determining agents instead of helpless subjects. 
 
Questions of Censorship and Authorial Intent 
  The fact that Bankim composed Anandamath under the watchful eyes of a colonial 
regime has understandably led critics to question whether his portrayal of Hindus’ accepting 
British authority amounted to a genuine endorsement. Could Muslims have functioned as a 
proxy for the British such that the venom directed towards them was really intended for 
colonial officials? In his 1984 study of Bankim, Sisir Kumar Das argues along these lines. He 
submits that Bankim’s patriotism was “free from racial hatred” and Anandamath was 
“directed against the British.”137 In an apology entitled “A Muslim Baiter?”, Das elaborates 
that Anandamath “was not intended against the Muslims…The main target of the santans in 
the novel was the British army, not the Muslims.”138 Likewise, in Europe Reconsidered Tapan 
Raychaudhuri makes a more measured yet similar claim that the sanction of British rule in 
the concluding scene of Anandamath is “nowhere echoed in [Bankim’s] serious essays” and 
speculates that it may have been a part of an overall attempt to compensate for the novel’s 
“seditious undertone.”139 More recently, Priya Joshi has argued that “…the celebration of the 
                                                
137 See Sisir Kumar Das, The Artist in Chains, 130, 141. Das goes on to argue: “There is enough evidence to 
show that Ananda Math was designed to arouse patriotism and that it was directed against the British. But for 
reasons best known to him, Bankim never made that intention explicit, rather made several changes in the 
subsequent editions of the novel to camouflage it” (141).  
138 Ibid., 237. 
139 Raychaudhuri’s full remarks are as follows: “The advent of the British is [in Anandamath and Debichaudhurani] 
described as ordained by God for India’s regeneration. Such sentiments are nowhere echoed in the serious 
essays and one wonders if these are to be taken at their face value or as devices to counterbalance the seditious 
undertone of the novels in question. Official sensitivity to seditious intent in literary works was well known at 
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British as adept teachers and masters of knowledge remains problematic and unconvincing 
and runs against the passionate patriotism Bankim had already developed, in which the only 
real enemy of importance was the British.”140 
 It was indeed the case that as a civil servant Bankim was especially susceptible to 
colonial scrutiny. In January 1882, shortly before the final serial installment of Anandamath, 
Bankim was inexplicably demoted from the position of assistant secretary to the 
Government of Bengal, a post that he had just attained four months earlier.141 Analysis of 
the six editions of the novel released during Bankim’s lifetime shows several revisions in 
which inflammatory passages about the British were subsequently tempered or absorbed into 
the characterization of Muslims.142 Many of these changes occur in the battle scenes towards 
the end of the novel in which the Children fight the joint Mughal-British forces. The first 
edition’s references of the “English” subsequently become the “Enemy,” “Gunners,” “the 
Foreigner’s Army,” “Baldies,” and the “Forces of Unbelief.”143 In another example, the 
narrator observes that Captain Thomas was a lascivious admirer of “Santal girls, for the 
English in India at that time were not as virtuous as the English of today.”144 These remarks 
are later dropped and instead the narrator makes the innocuous observation that Captain 
Thomas was enthralled by his “bearded cook [who] was a second Draupadi.”145 Bankim also 
mocks British officials’ ineptitude in Bengali, making them the butt of a few jokes along 
                                                                                                                                            
the time when Bankim wrote these novels. The later editions of Anandamath had to be censored by the author 
to excise passages which were considered anti-British.” (183) 
140 Joshi, In Another Country, 164. See also 288, fn. 41. 
141 Lipner, “Introduction,” 47. 
142 Ibid. 
143 Bankim, Anandamath, 204-211. Lipner notes that these references to the “English” occurred within the first 
edition of the novel. See “Critical Apparatus,” 272-273. 
144 Lipner, “Critical Apparatus,” 261. The Santals are a tribal community that live predominantly in west India. 
145 Bankim, Anandamath, 191. In the footnote Lipner indicates that Draupadi, the wife of the five Pandava 
brothers, was reputed to be an excellent cook. 
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these lines.146 In marked contrast, whether as incompetent administrators of the homeland or 
long-standing adversaries of the Hindus, Muslims are excoriated across all editions of the 
novel. 
 Bankim’s consistent characterization of Muslims in all versions of the Anandamath as 
well as his overall ideological aims in producing the text suggests that Das, Raychaudhuri, 
and Joshi’s arguments on its so-called “contradictory ending” are profoundly misguided if 
not absolutely wrong.147 The negative characterization of Muslims was indispensable to the 
plot of Anandamath, for in order for Hindus to emerge as triumphant heroes, ineffective and 
effete Muslims had to be their foil. Considering the profound importance that Bankim 
endowed to history in galvanizing a people, it makes sense that he would cast the Mughal 
regime as that of alien, malevolent Muslims against which a Hindu samaj could be posited 
and fostered. Anandamath additionally evinces his admiration of the perceived benefits of 
British rule, such as physical infrastructure (“roads”), positivist system of governance 
(“order”), as well as the idea of patriotism itself (love of the “Mother”). The Notices to the 
First and Second Editions of the novel invite the reader to reach such conclusions: “The 
English have freed Bengal from misrule”; “The British Government shall remain 
indestructible so long as the Hindus do not once more become great in knowledge, virtue 
and power.”148 Even if one were to grant that Bankim may have been at least partially 
motivated to place these Notices to curry favor with his British superiors and to ward off 
censure (and censorship), similar ideas are to be found throughout Bankim’s fictional and 
                                                
146 Ibid, 141, 191. Notably, in earlier editions of the novel Captain Thomas spoke proper Bengali (191, fn. 5).  
147 Joshi, In Another Country, 288, fn. 41. 
148 Bankim, Anandamath, 127-128. 
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nonfictional oeuvre as well as within contemporary Bengali historical discourse more 
broadly.149  
 
Conclusion 
 Anandamath endures as perhaps the most significant and potent articulation of India 
as Bharat to date. Bankim’s success in this endeavor relied on his deployment of the evolving 
form of the Bengali historical novel in which authors exploited the underdetermined 
landscape of the past to portray pressing concerns of the present. By strategically blending 
fact and fiction as he saw fit, Bankim offered a powerful story of patriotism and love for a 
homeland that was increasingly being cast as fundamentally and righteously Hindu. Through 
this seductive reimagining of key historical events, Bankim’s Hindu readers were empowered 
to regard British rule as a period of tutelage in which they had agency and control. Rather 
than promoting nationalist sentiment against the British as has been suggested in the 
scholarship, Bankim’s novel was only “anti-colonial” in the sense that it challenged 
suggestions that the Raj was an inevitable and indefinite enterprise; by learning valuable skills 
and knowledge in the present, Hindus were to ready themselves for a British-free future. Yet 
unifying the Hindu samaj in this manner required the scapegoating and relegation of Indian 
Muslims, who were increasingly being cast as outsiders with no claim to the nation being 
imagined. Anandamath was significant not only for reifying the emerging conception that 
Hindus were India’s righteous nationals, but also for establishing the expectation that they 
                                                
149 Raychaudhuri’s comment that Bankim’s sanction of British rule is “nowhere echoed in the serious essays” is 
short-sighted in suggesting that Bankim’s nonfictional works may have been more indicative of the author’s 
views (183). Tanika Sarkar has made the important point that such assumptions are misguided and that 
Bankim’s fictional and nonfictional works must be read together as an “interlinked formation.” See Sarkar, 
Hindu Wife, Hindu Nation, 164. Anandamath’s endorsement of British rule may be read as part and parcel of 
Bankim’s overarching admiration and internalization of numerous Western ideas throughout his career, from 
earlier works such as “Samya” and his call for authentic Bengali histories in 1860, as well as later works such as 
Krsnacaritra [The Life of Krishna] (1886) and Dharmatattva [Principles of Religion] (1888).  
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were owed amicable treatment and due respect from the British. The next chapters explore 
how Bengali authors in the twentieth century steadily began to direct this message to the 
British themselves. 
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CHAPTER 3 
HINDU HEROISM IN INDIAN NIGHTS’ ENTERTAINMENT:  
THE TRIALS OF NARAYAN LAL 
 
 
In a now oft-cited example of British perceptions of Bengali effeminacy, in the early 
1840s Thomas Macaulay characterized Bengali men as follows:   
The race by whom this rich tract was peopled, enervated by a soft climate and 
accustomed to peaceful avocations, bore the same relation to other Asiatics which 
the Asiatics generally bear to the bold and energetic children of Europe. . . Whatever 
the Bengalee does he does languidly. His favourite pursuits are sedentary. He shrinks 
from bodily exercise; and, though voluble in dispute and singularly pertinacious in 
the war of chicane, he seldom engages in a personal conflict, and scarcely ever enlists 
as a soldier. We doubt whether there be a hundred genuine Bengalees in the whole 
army of the East India Company. There never, perhaps, existed a people so 
thoroughly fitted by nature and by habit for a foreign yoke.1  
 
The physical organization of the Bengalee is feeble even to effeminacy. He lives in a 
constant vapour bath. His pursuits are sedentary, his limbs delicate, his movements 
languid. During many ages he has been trampled upon by men of bolder and more 
hardy breeds. Courage, independence, veracity, are qualities to which his constitution 
and his situation are equally unfavourable. His mind bears a singular analogy to his 
body. It is weak to helplessness, for purposes of manly resistance; but its suppleness 
and its tact move the children of sterner climates to admiration not unmingled with 
contempt.2  
 
In this stinging, racist appraisal, Macaulay characterizes the “Bengalee” man as a 
fundamentally pathetic figure, one who was extraordinarily weak in both character and 
physicality. Though “voluble in dispute,” the Bengali remained a coward, incapable of 
backing up his bombast with action. Prone to deceit and physically feeble, Bengalis deserved 
their domination by the hardier British. Lord William Bentinck, Governor-General of India 
from 1828-1835, maintained a similar view; for him Bengalis were “a mere flock of sheep 
good only for their valuable fleeces, and having no political or military character whatever.”3     
																																																						
1 T. Babington Macaulay, “Sir John Malcolm’s Life of Lord Clive,” 325. 
2 T. Babington Macaulay, “Warren Hastings,” 465.   
3 Qtd. in John Rosselli, Lord William Bentinck, 193. See also Rosselli, “The Self-Image of Effeteness,” 123. 
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Macaulay’s scornful pronouncements were ironic given that they came less than ten 
years after his famous 1835 Minute on Indian Education, which had successfully advocated 
the colonial state’s sponsorship of English-medium education for the native population. 
Integral to Britain’s mission in India, Macaulay had argued, was the creation of a servile 
“class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in tastes, in opinions, in morals, 
and in intellect” who would serve as “interpreters between us and the millions whom we 
govern.”4 But now the Western-educated effete Bengali “babu” envisioned in his Minute was 
the target of blistering ridicule.5 The cataclysmic Rebellion of 1857 further entrenched 
British assessments of Bengali effeteness as their passivity stood in marked contrast to the 
vigor of the newly designated “martial races.”6  
Efforts of the Bengali community to combat the stereotype over the last third of the 
nineteenth century were futile.7 Nearly fifty years after Macaulay’s indictment, British official 
John Strachey confirmed his predecessor’s views. Though Strachey acknowledged certain 
changes since Macaulay’s time, such as the Bengali elite’s newfound interest in gymnastics 
and the “development of a taste for athletic sports among the educated classes,” he 
nevertheless affirmed the long-held stereotype of their innate effeminacy: “This, however, is 
true of a small section only of the population, and the general character of the people 
																																																						
4 Macaulay, “Minute recorded in the General Department by Thomas Babington Macaulay, law member of the 
governor-general’s council, dated 2 February 1835,” 171. 
5 van der Veer, Imperial Encounters, 95. 
6 Metcalf and Metcalf, A Concise History of Modern India, 105-106. 
7 See Rosselli’s essay, “The Self-Image of Effeteness” (1980), for the various ways in which Bengalis attempted 
to counter the stereotype of effeminacy by embracing a campaign of physical culture, which included organized 
exercise, gymnastics, sports such as lathi-play, and the like. See also Sumit Sarkar’s seminal monograph The 
Swadeshi Movement in Bengal regarding how physical culture had become something of a “craze” among the 
educated young men of Calcutta by the turn of the century (398).  
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throughout the greater part of the province remains as Lord Macaulay represented it.”8 As 
scholars such as John Rosselli and Mrinalini Sinha have documented, for the Bengalis who 
were on the receiving end of such derision, by the turn of the twentieth century, concern 
over masculinity had become nothing short of a cultural crisis.9    
It was within this cultural milieu that Sarath Kumar Ghosh (1883-1920) emerged as a 
Macaulian interpreter of a different sort. Rather than mediating between colonial 
administrators and the local population within India, Ghosh relocated to England, where he 
engaged metropolitan distortions of India as an exotic, otherworldly land full of magic and 
mystery. Feeding a fascination with India and the Orient, Ghosh published a few short 
stories in British periodicals before issuing Indian Nights’ Entertainment: The Trials of Narayan 
Lal, a six-part serialization that ran in Pearson’s Magazine in 1902 and reached audiences in 
both Britain and America.10 Set in the mythic landscape of an alluring, romantic India, it tells 
the suspenseful story of a lowly court juggler named Narayan Lal who, in order to marry a 
beautiful Hindu princess with whom he has fallen in love, must prove his claim that he 
belongs to the kshatriya caste [that of the military and ruling elite] by undergoing a series of 
physically demanding deadly challenges. The princess’s father, a ruthless tyrant, arranges 
these Herculean “trials” to prevent Lal from marrying his daughter. Aided by both a 
mysterious pundit and the princess herself, Narayan Lal ultimately triumphs, thereby proving 
																																																						
8 Having served in India from 1842-1880, Strachey reflected on his tenure in a series of lectures given at the 
University of Cambridge in 1884. See Strachey, India: Its Administration & Progress, 412.  
9 Rosselli, “The Self-Image of Effeteness,” 135. See also Sinha, Colonial Masculinity (1995).  
10 The title of the serialization as it appeared in Pearson’s Magazine was Indian Nights’ Entertainment, a direct 
reference to Arabian Nights’ Entertainments, the title of the first English translation of French Orientalist Antoine 
Galland’s Les Mille et une nuits, contes arabes [Thousand and One Nights, Arabian Tales], published in twelve volumes 
between 1704-1717. A search in the digitized British Newspaper Archive indicates that Ghosh authored at least 
two short stories before this serialization. One was entitled “A Battle Royal with a Tiger” and was published in 
April 1898 in The Wide World Magazine; the other, “The Serpent-Charmer,” was published in The Strand Magazine 
in November 1900. See “Something New in Magazines” in the March 22, 1898 edition of the Pall Mall Gazette 
(3) and “Literary Notes” in the November 8, 1900 edition of the Royal Cornwall Gazette respectively (6). 
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his kshatriya identity and worthiness to marry her. Bolstering his merit even further is the deus 
ex machina revelation at the end of the final test that he is in fact a prince himself. The strange 
“pundit-philosopher,” Rama Krishna, who has been helping Narayan survive the trials, 
makes this melodramatic pronouncement and further reveals that he has been serving as 
Narayan’s guardian and ally ever since the prince had been abandoned by his mother as an 
infant. Ghosh later fleshed out the Pearson’s serialization and published the episodes in 1904 
as 1001 Indian Nights: The Trials of Narayan Lal; beginning in 1905 it was also distributed 
under the title The Verdict of the Gods.   
At face value the 1902 serialization of Indian Nights’ Entertainment and its subsequent 
narrative expansions may appear to be nothing more than the cheap attempt of a self-
promoting Indian author to capitalize upon the contemporary British fascination with the 
Arabian Nights and the Oriental exotic. That literary scholarship on all versions of Ghosh’s 
text is practically nonexistent likely stems from this view as well as an understandable desire 
among critics to examine Ghosh’s more well-known and thoughtful work, The Prince of 
Destiny (1909).11 While it may be tempting to dismiss Indian Nights’ Entertainment as a 
mediocre “Indianized” imitation of the Arabian Nights, this chapter suggests that doing so 
would be shortsighted. Though Ghosh exploited the British appetite for the Oriental exotic 
by appropriating both formal and thematic elements from popular circulating translations of 
the Arabian Nights—most likely Richard Burton’s 1885 edition—he did so for strategic 
purposes. Ghosh’s shrewd appropriation of the tried-and-true platform of the Arabian Nights 
																																																						
11 The sparse critical references on Indian Nights’ Entertainment/1001 Indian Nights/The Verdict of the Gods that do 
exist characterize it pithily, giving it not more than a few paragraphs at most. In 1934, Bhupal Singh noted that 
the text “recounts in the manner of an oriental story-teller the super-normal deeds of Narayan-lal” (306), while 
in 1987 K.S. Ramamurti asserted that the work was “cast in the fashion of The Arabian Nights” (139). In 1978 
Harish Raizada made the astute observation that the spectators of Narayan’s trials “form a pool of common 
wisdom,” but on the whole his assessment remains wanting (35-36). See Singh, A Survey of Anglo-Indian Fiction; 
Ramamurti, Rise of the Indian Novel in English; Raizada, The Lotus and the Rose: Indian Fiction in English. 
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enabled him to offer a seductive portrayal of Hindu heroism and triumphant masculinity for 
both metropolitan audiences and his own Bengali community.       
Indian Nights’ Entertainment is, I suggest, what Vinay Dharwadker theorizes as a 
“countertext” in Indian English literature, deserving of critical attention on two counts. First, 
in the British milieu in which Ghosh was circulating, the story challenged prevalent negative 
opinions regarding India, its people, and Hinduism. Hailed in Pearson’s as “the only Hindu 
writer of English fiction,” Ghosh was conspicuously promoted as one who could describe 
“Indian life” with authority, a characterization that undoubtedly facilitated his attempts to 
mitigate the hostile and degrading depictions of India and Indians by British writers such as 
Flora Annie Steel and Rudyard Kipling, presently obsessed with portraying the macabre 
violence of the 1857 Rebellion and the bumbling Bengali “babu” figure respectively.12 But 
even more importantly, Ghosh’s rousing story about Narayan Lal’s exploits may be regarded 
as a response to the cultural crisis over masculinity afflicting Hindu men and Ghosh’s native 
Bengali community in particular. By providing a stirring account of a Hindu kshatriya who 
repeatedly overcomes almost certain death, Ghosh provided a hero for Hindus at a time they 
needed it most, a model of masculinity who embodied numerous desirable traits thought to 
be missing from the community at large. Valorous, strong, and intelligent, Narayan Lal also 
proves to be a paragon of loyalty, dignity, and, piety, a supreme champion in all senses. Far 
more than an unremarkable “Indian” imitation of the Arabian Nights, then, Ghosh’s text is a 
contemporary Indian epic, one that pointedly draws upon the pervasive myth of India as 
Bharat and presents exemplars of Hindu masculinity and femininity for both Indian and 
British readers to admire. Through such a lens, Ghosh appears less as a cavalier self-
																																																						
12 Flora Annie Steel’s novel On the Face of the Waters (1896) was a popular novel about the rebellion; see Benita 
Parry, Delusions and Discoveries, 104-105. See also Thomas R. Metcalf, Ideologies of the Raj, 160-214.  
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promoter and more so like an influential Scheherazade, who, like the mythically enchanting 
raconteur, attempts to instruct, challenge, and win the sympathies of his many audiences. 
 
The Pursuit of Heroes  
Derogatory characterizations of Hindu masculinity were not new for the British in 
India. As discussed in Chapter One, the belief that India’s originary Hindu inhabitants had 
either degenerated from a once-glorious state or had always been in a pitiable condition had 
long informed Britons’ racist, positivist assessments about the community. In 1793 William 
Jones asserted that the natives of India were a “placid and submissive people” whose 
“religion, manners, and laws…preclude even the idea of political freedom.”13 In a similar 
vein, Jones’s contemporary, the historian Robert Orme, cited factors such as Hindu 
pacifism, a largely vegetarian diet, and an inhospitable climate as responsible for “render[ing] 
the Indian the most enervated inhabitant of the globe,” one whose “manners are gentle” and 
whose “happiness consists in the solaces of a domestic life…”14 As such assessments 
indicate, whether attributed to external conditions such as diet, climate, lack of physical 
activity, or simply innate bodily constitution, the idea that India’s “Hindu” natives—and 
Bengalis in particular—were highly effete and effeminate had long been axiomatic among 
the British. Indian Muslims were necessarily outside of this narrative given their apparent 
status as foreigners to the polity; as those who had conquered and ruled India prior to the 
British, Muslims were a demonstrably hardier and robust community. 
																																																						
13 Jones, “The Tenth Anniversary Discourse, delivered 28 February, 1793, By The President on Asiatick 
History, Civil and Natural,” 150. 
14 Orme, A History of the Military Transactions of the British Nation in Indostan, 5-6. 
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The cataclysmic rebellion of 1857 compelled the British to revise their understanding 
of the masculinity of particular Hindu groups, but their view of Bengali effeminacy remained 
fixed. The passivity of Bengalis during the uprising was interpreted less as “loyalty” to the 
Raj and more so as confirmation of their constitutional weakness in both body and 
character.15 For British officials like Macaulay, passive Bengalis who had largely acted out of 
self-interest—and whose revolt would likely have been unimpressive if it were even 
attempted—stood in dramatic contrast to the insurrection of other communities, such as the 
Marathas in central India. In the aftermath of the Rebellion, docile Bengalis proved an easy 
foil to Sikhs, Jats, Rajputs, and other groups whom the British strategically categorized as 
“martial races” and targeted for military service due to the belief that they possessed “innate 
physical and moral characteristics which made them the best fighters.”16 As Thomas Metcalf 
observes, “…one might argue [that] the ‘extraordinary effeminacy’ of the Bengali, whom ‘no 
necessity would induce to fight’, alone gave meaning to the notion of ‘martial races’. They 
were what the Bengali was not.”17   
The emerging conception that India’s genuine identity was the glorious Hindu space 
Bharat—and the suggestion that its past majesty could be reclaimed—was an important 
resource in challenging the broader charge of Hindu male effeminacy among upper-caste 
and upper-class Hindu communities not just in Bengal but across India. While imaginings of 
																																																						
15 Metcalf and Metcalf, A Concise History of Modern India, 103-106. Bengal remained quiet during the Rebellion 
while regions of north and central India erupted in violence. As discussed in Chapter One, the rationale behind 
revolting against the British was often complex and very rarely straightforward as individuals could be 
persuaded to rebel or remain passive due to bribery or other incentives. For the Western-educated Bengali 
bhadralok, the decision to remain “loyal” stemmed in large part from their understanding that their prosperity 
was bound up with British rule and beneficial policies such as the Permanent Settlement. 
16 Ibid., 105-106. This classification was indeed ironic considering that many of these groups had not revolted 
during the Rebellion.  
17 Metcalf, Ideologies of the Raj, 127. Here Metcalf cites the observations of British general and scholar George 
MacMunn (1869-1952), who in 1911 published an influential study of the Indian army, The Armies of India.  
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Bharat endowed Hindus with a wondrous past, contemporary ideas about the mythical 
Aryan race offered them heroes to emulate. This theory had its roots in William Jones’s 
famous pronouncement regarding a common linguistic origin of modern Indian and 
European languages.18 A diffusionist, Jones speculated that the speakers of this ur-language 
must have shared a common geographical origin but importantly he made no attempt to cast 
them in racial terms.19 It was only in the mid-nineteenth century through the influence of the 
German Indologist Max Müller that the term “Aryan” gained traction as a racial and ethnic 
category.20 Appropriating the word from the Rg-Veda, Müller claimed that “Aryans” were 
sophisticated tribes of light-skinned warriors hailing from southern Russia who had 
conquered broad swathes of land from northern India to western Europe.21 For Müller, the 
Aryans were the speakers of Jones’s ur-language, and, as such, the indisputable ancestors of 
both Europeans and Indians.22 As Joan Leopold writes, “Müller used [the Aryan theory of 
race] to praise the literature and philosophy of ancient India, to emphasize ‘the common 
descent and…legitimate relationship between Hindu, Greek, and Teuton’ and the blood tie 
between the Englishman and Bengali, and to reveal the providential nature of British rule in 
India.”23 
																																																						
18 Ibid., 82. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. See also Chakravarti, “Whatever Happened to the Vedic Dasi?” 40. 
21 Metcalf, Ideologies of the Raj, 82. See also van der Veer, Imperial Encounters, 142. The Rg-Veda is a Hindu 
religious text composed between 1500-1000 B.C. As van der Veer points out, as described in the Rg-Veda, the 
Aryans were tribes of “horse-mounted fighters who worshipped sky-gods….” (142). The word “Arya” itself 
denotes nobility in Sanskrit and is found in many Hindu religious texts. 
22 Chakravarti, “Whatever Happened to the Vedic Dasi?” 40. See also Metcalf, Ideologies of the Raj, 82 and van 
der Veer, Imperial Encounters, 142. 
23 Leopold, “The Aryan Theory of Race,” 272. 
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Not surprisingly, for many Britons the claim that they were racially identical to their 
Indian subjects was anathema.24 In order to convince his European colleagues of this shared 
racial heritage Müller was compelled to emphasize the prodigious achievements of the 
Aryans as well as the relevance of India to Europe more broadly: 
India is not, as you may imagine, a distant, strange, or, at the very utmost, a curious 
country. India for the future belongs to Europe, it has its place in the Indo-European 
world, it has its place in our own history, and in what is the very life of history, the 
history of the human mind… 
 
And while thus trying to explain to those whose lot will soon be cast in India the true 
position which that wonderful country holds or ought to hold in universal history, I 
may perhaps be able at the same time to appeal to the sympathies of other members 
of this University, by showing them how imperfect our knowledge of universal 
history, our insight into the development of the human intellect, must always remain, 
if we….leave out of sight our nearest intellectual relatives, the Aryas of India, the framers of the 
most wonderful language, the Sanskrit, the fellow-workers in the construction of our fundamental 
concepts, the fathers of the most natural of natural religions, the makers of the most transparent of 
mythologies, the inventors of the most subtle philosophy, and the givers of the most elaborate laws.25 
 
Müller’s hyperbolic language and use of superlatives is remarkable as he mythologizes the 
hypothesized Aryan people and their advanced civilization in highly romantic, quixotic 
terms. Since many of his European interlocutors considered themselves the cultural heirs of 
ancient Greece and Rome, such a grand portrayal of Aryan accomplishments helped render 
the claim of a common racial origin with Indians more palatable. Contemporary evolutionary 
discourse and Social Darwinist thought further helped reconcile the perceived differences 
between Europe and India by allowing for the supposition that only certain descendants of 
the Aryans had been able to flourish while others had suffered from racial degeneration.26 
																																																						
24 Metcalf, Ideologies of the Raj, 82. See also Chakravarti, “Whatever Happened to the Vedic Dasi?” 40.  
25 Müller, India, What Can It Teach Us?: A Course of Lectures Delivered Before the University of Cambridge, 14-15. See 
also Chakravarti, “Whatever Happened to the Vedic Dasi?” 40-41.  
26 In the European context, the Aryans were distinguished from the Semitic and Turanian races in particular 
(Chakravarti 40). In India, British Orientalists identified the Turanian as well as the Dravidian peoples as foils 
to the triumphant Aryan conquerors of north India (Metcalf, Ideologies of the Raj, 83-84). While Turanian 
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Not surprisingly, the British put themselves in the former category and Indians in the latter, 
their “pure” Aryan ancestry having waned due to factors such as a brutal climate and 
miscegenation with the autochthonous inhabitants.27    
Such ideas were momentous for subjugated Hindu elites across India as they made 
available a desirable category of identity to which to lay claim. As indicated in Müller’s 
description, far more than a mere racial identity, the overdetermined category “Aryan” was 
also a cultural signifier, a marker of supreme civilizational triumph. Like the idea of Bharat, it 
offered educated Hindus in Bengal, Maharashtra, and other parts of India a critical 
intellectual tool with which to rally the community and to combat British charges of 
inferiority. The suggestion of a racial equivalence between colonizer and colonized in 
particular allowed the possibility that Hindus—as one cohesive community—could 
overcome the various factors that had led to their ostensible decline; reclaim the glory of 
their ancient Aryan ancestors; and come to rival the apparent superiority of their British 
rulers. This reclamation could be undertaken through numerous methods: learning from 
their superior, technologically advanced English “brothers”; emulating native exemplars of 
Hindu valor and vigor; and, crucially, shunning any and all aspects of ostensible “Muslim” 
influence upon the Hindu samaj.28 As with the term Bharat, Hindus across India gravitated 
towards “Aryavarta” and “Aryans” as apposite identifiers of the polity and their progenitors 
respectively. In contrast to the labels “India” and “Hindus” which were problematic because 
																																																																																																																																																																	
encompassed speakers of non-Aryan and non-Semitic languages, Dravidian referred to the speakers of south 
Indian languages (Metcalf, Ideologies of the Raj, 83).   
27 As van der Veer notes, the theory that ancient Aryan conquerors had subjugated the autochthonous 
inhabitants of (mostly south) India still retains political valence. While proponents of the theory claim that their 
Aryan heritage renders them superior to the Dravidian speakers of south India and native tribal groups, the 
latter posits their ascendance precisely on the basis of their autochthony. See Imperial Encounters, 142. 
28 Leopold, “The Aryan Theory of Race,” 273. Leopold quotes from Krishna Bihar Sen’s 1876 essay, “The 
Romance of Languages,” in which the comparative philologist proudly proclaims “Hindu” and “English” 
fraternity and encourages England to help its “elder” Aryan brother progress.  
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of their haphazard origin as geographical referents issued by foreigners, the term “Arya” in 
all of its manifestations was embraced precisely because it was a “supranational” category, 
one thought to more fittingly signify the essence of India and its legitimate Hindu 
nationals.29 As Goswami explains, “….the category Arya signified the transcendental ground 
of collective identity, and it signaled a self-same original and pure originary space.”30 
Alongside Bharat, the nationalization of such terms in newspapers, novels, songs, and other 
cultural works helped strengthen the imagining of a timeless, unified community among elite, 
educated Hindus across India.31    
For Bengalis in particular an Aryan identity held special import due to their ongoing 
struggle against charges of innate weakness.32 Indira Chowdhury-Sengupta has argued that in 
late nineteenth-century Bengal the term jatiya, which conventionally denoted race, tribe, or 
caste identity, increasingly assumed a new, broader meaning: an exclusive Hindu 
“nationality” that proudly claimed the revered Aryans as its progenitors.33 Having thoroughly 
internalized the stereotype of effeteness, Bengalis themselves participated in the broader 
production of cultural works that praised Aryan qualities exemplified by other Indians, such 
as the Rajputs, Sikhs, and Marathas. While the British hailed these groups as “martial races,” 
Bengalis and other Indians celebrated them as models of virility because they were thought 
																																																						
29 “Supranational” is Goswami’s term (180). As Thapar has explained, the label “Hindu” was indeed geographic 
in origin, referring to the inhabitants of the land across the Sindhu or Indus River (1989, 222-223). 
30 Goswami, Producing India, 180. 
31 Goswami observes that these terms were rife in public discourse in this period, remarking on the titles of 
many leading newspapers (i.e. Bharat Bandhu, Bharat Jiwan, Arya Darpan, Bharat-Dipak, and Arya Patrika) as well 
as novels such as Bharatendu Harischandra’s Bharat Durdarsa and Bharat Janani (197-198). 
32 As Sinha has explained, accusations about inherent Bengali effeminacy formed the basis of several famous 
controversies between British and Bengali men in the late nineteenth century, most famously, reformist 
legislation that proposed raising the age of consent of Hindu girls. The three other British-Indian disputes in 
which the discriminatory logic of colonial masculinity was apparent included the British backlash against the 
passage of the Ilbert Bill in 1883; the colonial state’s response to the Native Volunteer Movement in 1885; and 
the proposals of the Public Service Commission of 1886. See Sinha, Colonial Masculinity, 1. 
33 Chowdhury-Sengupta, “The Effeminate and the Masculine,” 288.  
 	
138 
to have retained critical aspects of a revered Aryan lineage as evidenced in their courage in 
resisting foreign (Muslim) Mughal invaders long ago. 
As discussed in Chapters One and Two, histories and historical romances were 
especially popular in this period as they enabled Indian literati across the colonial state to 
project acts of heroism and valor onto what many early nineteenth-century British 
Orientalists had posited as a stagnant, degenerate Hindu era.34 Whether fictional, 
nonfictional, or, as was often the case, a highly calculated hybrid of the two, these works 
suggested that the magnificent legacy of the ancient Aryans remained extant to varying 
degrees within certain Hindu communities and could be harnessed for the present. A 
particularly well-known history was R.K. Gupta’s Arya-Kirti [The Glorious Deeds of the Aryans] 
(1879), which was published in fifteen editions and served as a textbook as late as 1919.35 
This work juxtaposed admiring portrayals of the Rajputs, Sikhs, and Marathas with 
commentary about the relative lack of Bengali patriotism.36 The superlative nature of a 
Hindu/Aryan identity was a pervasive theme, as seen in Gupta’s parsing of ancient Aryan 
courage in terms of both physical strength as well as adherence to sacred Hindu principles.37 
Other such Bengali histories were H. Mukherjee’s Rajasthaner Itihas (1884), G.C. Mukherjee’s 
Rajasthana (1885), and B.K. Maitra’s Sikh-Yuddher Itihasa O Maharaja Dilip Sinha (1893).38 
Fictional works included Michael Madhusudan Dutt’s Meghnavadh Kavya [The Saga of Meghnad’s 
																																																						
34 A.R. Mallick has broadly characterized the period from 1875-1925 as that of “inquiry” for Bengali 
historiography, a time when writers diverged from mostly imitating British histories of India to actively 
critiquing them. See A.R. Mallick, “Modern Historical Writing in Bengali,” 448. 
35 Ibid., 449. Mallick notes that Calcutta University put out this textbook for “schools” but does not indicate 
the precise nature of these institutions, i.e., primary, secondary, etc.  
36 Chowdhury-Sengupta, “The Effeminate and the Masculine,” 290.   
37 Ibid., 291. These two principles were nyaya [justice/ethics] and dharma [one’s specific moral duty]. Notably, 
Gupta had explored such ideas earlier in a voluminous treatise on the Rebellion—over seven hundred pages 
long—which condemned British aggression and celebrated the bravery of figures like the Rani of Jhansi and 
Nana Sahib (Mallick 449). 
38 Mallick, “Modern Historical Writing in Bengali,” 451.  
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Killing] (1861) and Romesh Chunder Dutt’s Rajput Jivan Sandhya [Pratap Singh: The Last of the 
Rajputs] (1879).39 In a similar vein, Bankim Chandra Chattopadhyay’s meditation on the deity 
Krishna, Krishnacharitra [The Biography of Krishna] (1892), upheld the god as a paragon of 
martial valor, just governance, and morality, dismissing popular notions of his mischievous 
and prurient nature as patently false.40    
The widespread commemoration of past instances of valor and virility contributed to 
the developing idea that authentic Indianness was the exclusive purview of Hindus, who 
were now additionally understood to be the descendants of the highly esteemed and 
culturally sophisticated Aryans. The new understanding of revered Aryan belonging relied 
crucially on the Hindu kshatriya caste which was composed of rulers and soldiers; individuals 
belonging to this caste were thus thought to bear the closest and most direct connection to 
India’s Aryan forebears.41 In his Arya Kirti, for example, R.K. Gupta claimed that modern 
Rajputs—many of whom belonged to the kshatriya caste—were the true inheritors of 
esteemed Aryan qualities.42 Similarly, in his History of Civilization in Ancient India (1889), 
Romesh Chunder Dutt linked modern Rajputs with legendary kshatriya dynasties, kingdoms 
which were themselves the progeny of the mythical Aryan “settlers” to India.43 Dutt’s 
																																																						
39 M.M. Dutt’s Meghnavadh Kayva was a striking reinterpretation of the traditional Ramayana story in which the 
writer glorified the virility and courage of the demon king Ravana and decried the cowardice of the traditional 
heroes, the Hindu deities Rama and Laksmana. See Ashis Nandy, The Intimate Enemy, 19-21.  
40 As Bankim writes, “To ascertain what has been the actual account of Sri Krsna’s character narrated in the 
Puranas and the epics, I have researched, to the best of my ability, the ancient records. The fruit of it is that I 
have found out that all the sinful tales about Krsna current among people are baseless: and that on eliminating 
the romantic fiction about Krsna created by the romancers what remains is utterly unalloyed, wholly pure, 
exceedingly sublime. I have realized that such an ideal character filled with all qualities, free from the touch of 
all sin, exists nowhere else: not in the history of any country, not in any nation’s literature.” See Bankim 
Chandra Chatterjee, Krishna-Charitra, 21-22. 
41As Nandy writes, “Many nineteenth-century Indian movements of social, religious and political reform—and 
many literary and art movements as well—tried to make Ksatriyahood the ‘true’ interface between the rulers 
and ruled as a new, nearly exclusive indicator of authentic Indianness” (7). 
42 Chowdhury-Sengupta, “The Effeminate and the Masculine,” 291. 
43 Chakravarti, “Whatever Happened to the Vedic Dasi?” 48-49.  
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exuberant praise of kshatriya culture during what he calls the “Epic Period” lasting from 
1400-1200 B.C. is worth quoting at length:   
…centuries had elapsed since the Aryans had first settled on the banks of the Indus, 
and the centuries had done their work in progress and civilization. The Kurus and 
the Panchalas were no longer like the warrior-cultivators who battled against the 
black aborigines and won the banks of the Indus and its tributaries. Manners had 
changed, society had become more refined and polished, learning and arts had made 
considerable progress. Kings invited wise men in their polished courts, held learned 
controversies with their priests, performed elaborate sacrifices according to the 
dictates of religion, led respectable and trained armies to the field, appointed duly 
qualified men to collect taxes and to administer justice, and performed all the duties 
of civilized administrators. The relations and friends of the king and all the warriors 
of the nation learnt archery and riding and driving the war chariot from their early 
youth, and also learned the Vedas and all the holy learning that was handed down 
from generation to generation…Women had their legitimate influence in society, and 
moved without restriction or restraint. Society in India, fourteen hundred years before Christ, 
was more polished and refined than that of the preceding Vedic Age, and had more of healthy life 
and vigour than Hindu society has had in succeeding ages.44  
 
Dutt’s romanticization of ancient Aryan culture during the Epic Period very strikingly 
evokes the singularity of Bharat—never before had “Hindu society” been so “polished” and 
“refined” nor would it ever again exude such health and “vigour.” Though Dutt does not go 
so far as to claim that Hindu society was superior to that of the West, he makes overtures in 
this direction as noted in the reference to the Epic Period having occurred “fourteen 
hundred years before Christ.” According to Dutt, the Aryans’ impact upon the native 
“warrior-cultivators” in north India led to a flourishing Hindu civilization, one in which the 
men were enlightened, disciplined, and hardy warriors while women were appropriately 
liberated and able to exert “legitimate influence” outside of domestic spaces. Although Dutt 
later avers that the heroes of the Mahabharata and the Ramayana “are myths, pure and 
																																																						
44 Romesh Chunder Dutt, A History of Civilization in Ancient India, Based on Sanscrit Literature, 182-183. Emphasis 
added. Likewise, glorifying the Rajputs, Dutt acclaimed: “In India, too, the power of ancient races and dynasties 
was silently swept away during the period of darkness; and when light breaks in again, we see a new race of 
Hindu Feudal barons as the masters of India—the modern Rajputs!” (29).  
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simple,” his mythologizing of the “Kuru” and “Panchala” kingdoms in this particular 
passage is unmistakable.45 Here kshatriya culture as demonstrated by and through these well-
known Hindu dynasties functions as a synecdoche for an amorphous “Hindu society,” the 
very core of India/Bharat/Aryavarta itself.    
Dutt’s comments here and elsewhere signal a wider belief on the part of Bengali 
intellectuals that members of the kshatriya caste—as the righteous descendants of the 
Aryans— encapsulated the very best of a profoundly overdetermined Indian/Hindu/Aryan 
identity. As Chakravarti and others have explained, the newfound preoccupation with a 
perceived bygone Hindu/Aryan era contributed to the formation of new gender roles for 
Hindu men and women modeled after their mythical counterparts.46 In this schema, 
Hindu/Aryan men were considered to be “free, brave, vigorous, fearless, themselves 
civilized and civilizing others, noble, and deeply spiritual,” while Hindu/Aryan women were 
likewise “learned, free, and highly cultured.”47 Perfect counterparts, together they were 
properly religious and “represented the best examples of conjugal love, offering the supreme 
sacrifice of their lives as a demonstration of their feeling for their partners in the brief 
journey of life.” 48 Though there were certainly other gender roles available to Hindu men 
and women in late nineteenth-century Bengal and elsewhere in India, the twin images of the 
triumphant kshatriya and kshatriyani were particularly powerful as the celebration of such 
																																																						
45 Ibid., 211. The feuding protagonists of the Mahabharata belonged to the Kuru dynasty. 
46 Chakravarti, “Whatever Happened to the Vedic Dasi?” 28, 47.   
47 Ibid., 46. 
48 Ibid.  
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courageous figures could help vivify what was understood to be a once splendid but now 
dishonored Hindu samaj.49    
 
Seeking Indian Interpreters to the West  
In July 1904, The Mahratta, an English-language newspaper founded by the 
provocative Hindu ideologue and nationalist leader Bal Gangadhar Tilak, published a 
provocative, unsigned editorial entitled “What Our Literary Men Should Do.”50 Reflecting 
Tilak’s belief in the urgent need for a Hindu cultural revival, the writer of the Mahratta article 
lamented the tendency of recent Indian university graduates to resign themselves to banal 
careers, inciting them to pursue instead opportunities in which they could further Hindu 
interests while earning a better living. Sympathizing somewhat with the majority of graduates 
who “condescend[ed] to accept…unattractive jobs” with the colonial state for the sake of 
long-term stability and financial security, the Mahratta author specifically chides those 
educated elites who took up professions for which they were indeed qualified but who 
practiced them with no inspiration or ingenuity whatsoever.51 He complains that these 
individuals were solely concerned with “…somehow ek[ing] out a decent living 
and…leav[ing] all ambitious and original work to be done by Europeans.”52 For example, 
																																																						
49 Other gender roles promoted during this period included the pure, sacrificing mother for women and the 
celibate, abstemious ascetic for men. See Jasodhara Bagchi, “Representing Nationalism” (1990) and Chandrima 
Chakraborty, Masculinity, Asceticism, Hinduism (2011) respectively. Chakraborty makes the important point that 
the dominance of the kshatriya model for emasculated Hindus was at least partially informed and enhanced by 
“brahmanical ascetic practices” (24).  
50 Tilak famously began two festivals that rallied Hindus on a grand scale in Maharashtra, actions that reflected 
his stated belief that “hero worship” was integral to “nationality, social order, and religion.” Qtd. in Wolpert, A 
New History of India, 260. In 1893, Tilak turned what were primarily familial and private celebrations of the 
Hindu deity Ganesha into a large public spectacle in an effort to promote Hindu unity. In 1895 Tilak launched 
another festival celebrating Shivaji, the seventeenth-century Maratha ruler who famously defied Mughal rule. 
See Metcalf and Metcalf, A Concise History of Modern India, 151-152 and Bhatt, Hindu Nationalism, 32. 
51 Mahratta, “What Our Literary Men Should Do,” 337.  
52 Ibid. 
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rather than importing “the commonest drugs and even the crudest and simplest 
preparations” from Europe and America, Indian physicians should consider producing 
pharmaceuticals domestically.53 Likewise, Indian lawyers should pursue advanced study in 
their field instead of foolishly competing for poorly paying positions in a crowded 
profession. The resulting legal scholarship, the Mahratta author argued, could helpfully 
challenge the denigrating assessments of Hindu law issued by the likes of eminent British 
jurist Henry Maine: “…nobody makes the attempt to assail and subvert the specious fabric 
of plausible theories on which Mr. Mayne bases his outspoken criticism of many Hindu 
customs and usages which though repugnant to the foreigner are always dear to the Hindu 
heart.”54 Echoing Macaulay’s disgust with the effete Bengali “babu” who was incapable of 
backing up his bombast with action, the Mahratta author makes a similar condemnation: 
“But our eminent lawyers will be voluble social reformers and faddists and with all their tall 
talk of moral courage, will not have the temerity to break a lance in defence of our cherished 
ideals which are often openly questioned and sometimes traduced by foreign writers and 
foreign critics who pretend to do so under a thin garb of impartiality and outspokenness.”55 
After pummeling Indian doctors and lawyers, the Mahratta writer turns to Indian 
graduates with a “purely literary training” whom he censures as “equal sinners in the utter 
want of originality, imagination and creative genius.”56 Like their passive counterparts, such 
“literary men” were content to sit idly by as British authors like Philip Meadows Taylor and 
Rudyard Kipling published degrading works about India. The Mahratta’s commentary about 
the present state of literature on India is worth quoting at length: 
																																																						
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid., 337-338. 
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English readers still gather their ideas of Indian life from Medows [sic] Taylor’s Tara 
and Seeta. There is no Indian writer who has yet tried to interpret the East to 
Western people and recently Englishmen have come to regard Mr. Rudyard Kipling’s 
fantastic yarns as truly representing the inexplicable character of all oriental life. With 
Mr. Kipling’s special qualifications to become a self-constituted interpreter between 
the East and West we are as yet unacquainted. He may have minutely observed the 
life of the British soldier in India. But judging from the dubious worthies he is fond of depicting 
in his weired [sic] stories, we entertain a shrewd suspicion that the author perhaps never went a mile 
beyond the slums of English cantonments in search of really Indian character.  
 
In his novels women with questionable characters and men with questionable 
antecedents and missions jostle one another promiscuously and if these caricatures 
drawn by Rudy Kipling are to pass for genuine studies of Eastern characters all we have to say is 
that literature in England must have recently fallen on very evil times indeed. If the slang of the 
barrack room is to take the place of wit and humour, it is time we should cease to read newly 
published novels altogether. Writers in English periodicals went into hysterics over the 
merits of Kipling’s ‘Kim.’ We once tried to read that supposed epoch-making tale of 
Indian life. Imagine our horror and disgust when we stumbled on representatives of the Indian 
proltariot [sic], the very riffraff of our bazars and bathing ghats, doing the duty of heroes and 
heroines. The woman from Amritsar and the sepoy from Mooltan or somewhere else may be very 
good people in their own proper spheres, but when they are marshalled forth as being the typical 
characters which are to enlighten the blissful Englishmen about the reality of Indian or Oriental 
Society, it is certainly time that somebody should call out ‘halt.’ 
 
All the Indian characters figuring in Mr. Kipling’s novels are quite unreal and are mere figments of 
his fertile imagination. It is not people who move in the wake of regiments and armies who will really 
care to have tales of Indian life [;] these will be furnished to them not by Kiplings and 
Taylors but they will have to come direct from the pen of Indian writers. And here at 
least the Indians have before them an almost unbounded and very promising field of 
literary endeavour. Some capable and ambitious writers have only to make the 
attempt and in no time they will be in the unchallenged occupation of the whole 
field.57 
 
According to this article, British writers like Taylor and Kipling were inflicting great harm to 
India through their derogatory, misleading portrayals of the polity and its people. Focusing 
on Kipling as a case-in-point, the Mahratta writer denounces the recently published Kim, in 
which “the very riffraff of our bazars and bathing ghats [were] doing the duty of heroes and 
heroines.” Such lowly characters, while sympathetic to a degree, were fundamentally 
unworthy of literary representation and best confined to “their own proper spheres.” The 
																																																						
57 Ibid., 338. Emphasis and paragraph breaks added. 
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danger of Taylor and Kipling’s works, the writer argued, was that naïve Western readers 
perceived such characters as truly representative of the “inexplicable character of all oriental 
life” when in fact their portrayals only heightened extant distortions about India. Rather than 
privileging members of the hoi polloi as protagonists, the author suggests, fiction about 
India needed heroes and heroines who were Hindu, upper-caste, and well-born. Literature 
depicting such characters would counter the prevailing misrepresentations issued by British 
writers with positive images of India and Indians for Western readers. These stories would 
additionally boast greater verisimilitude since they would be created by Indians themselves, 
who were naturally more familiar with, and knowledgeable of, the breadth of Indian society 
beyond “the slums of [Kipling’s] English cantonments.”58  Eschewing Kipling’s Indian 
characters as “quite unreal and…mere figments of his fertile imagination,” the writer argues 
that truly meaningful literature about India could only “come direct from the pen of Indian 
writers,” thus opening “an almost bounded and very promising field of literary endeavor” in 
which success was all but assured. 
Despite alleging that there existed “no Indian writer who has yet tried to interpret 
the East to Western people,” the author of the Mahratta piece did, in fact, identify two 
individuals producing precisely the kind of literature about India that he prescribed. Not 
surprisingly, both were Bengali and one was Sarath Kumar Ghosh.59 Alongside the famous 
historian, poet, and novelist Romesh Chunder Dutt (whose superlative praise of Hindu 
society during the Epic Period I have already discussed), the Mahratta praised Ghosh’s recent 
																																																						
58 The author of the Mahratta editorial notably makes a very similar point when addressing the problems of 
British historiography about India: “[Englishmen] are not fitted by traditions, and education to deal 
sympathetically with Indian events. They cannot appreciate the true significance of the historical evidence 
which they assiduously accumulate. This province of literary work ought also to be pre-eminently a close 
preserve of the Indian intellect.”  
59 Both Dutt and Ghosh are cited as the only two Indian authors of which the Mahratta author knew to “have 
written tales of Indian life in English.” 
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publication of romantic stories about Indian princes and princesses in British periodicals: 
“…Mr. Sarat Kumar Ghose…has made his name famous by writing sensational and thrilling 
tales of Indian romance in various monthly periodicals in England.”60 The author argued that 
it was imperative for other Indian literati to take up their pens and join Dutt and Ghosh’s 
endeavor so that the prevalent negative perceptions Western readers held about India and 
Indians might begin to abate. Not only would such works help rejuvenate Hindu cultural 
identity, their creation also promised financial reward and fame as demonstrated by Ghosh’s 
success abroad. 
Entitled “Wanted: An Interpreter,” a responding editorial in The Times of India, almost 
certainly penned by a British writer, begged to differ.61 While the author admitted that the 
recommendation advanced in the Mahratta article was theoretically “not without its merits,” 
and even conceded that “no doubt much of [Kipling’s] Indian colouring must appear untrue 
to the native eye,” he balked at the proposed “canons of romantic literature” that the 
Mahratta advocated in its stead. After describing the kind of sensational melodrama typical of 
Ghosh’s romances—a male lover miraculously appears to rescue his beloved from a lusting 
kidnapper whereupon he kisses her in “one passionate outburst of love”—the Times 
editorialist lambasts the Mahratta’s approval of such work: 
This, we are told, is the way to interpret the East to the West, these are true native 
characters! We are much mistaken if we have not often met them before in the pages 
of the Family Herald and the penny novelette. With Mr. Ghose we have no quarrel. His 
story is no better and no worse than much of the cheap trash which floods our railway book-stalls, 
and when it brought in its guinea its object was no doubt accomplished. But even in the 
materialised West we have higher literary ideals than this. In such a story there is no 
																																																						
60 Ibid. “Ghose” was a common variation of the author’s last name. 
61 See “Wanted: An Interpreter,” Times of India 67, no. 210 (September 2, 1904): 4. While the editorial itself was 
unsigned, it was very likely written by a British individual considering its references to “we Englishmen” and 
“our great English novelists.” In addition, the primary shareholders of the Times of India at this time were of 
British origin, Thomas Bennett and Frank Morris Coleman.  
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question of literature, no question of interpreting anything to anybody. No: the novel 
of character is very different from this; and he who would be worthy to touch the 
hem of the garments of our great English novelists must follow very different 
models…62 
 
Here the Times author argues that the kinds of Indian characters that Ghosh proffers are by 
no means aesthetically superior to, or more desirable than, those created by British writers. 
Rather than providing valuable renderings of Indians, Ghosh offers nothing beyond the 
mindless “cheap trash” already widely available for mass consumption. A self-serving 
opportunist, Ghosh was merely a savvy exploiter of the Western appetite for the Orient. 
Though the editorialist goes on to avow that he has “no wish to recommend realism in 
preference to idealism,” this is exactly the kind of incisive and informative “interpretation” 
of the East that he desired, one that would be provided by an “Indian Dickens” who does 
not yet exist. Positing a polarity between Dickensian social realism and high-quality historical 
fiction in the vein of Walter Scott, the Times makes clear that Ghosh fails to provide either.63 
Instead of following Ghosh’s example as the Mahratta urges, the Times editorialist invites 
novice Indian writers to explore the “vast field…in between these two extremes” and, above 
all, urges them not to shy away from portraying commoners like the “simply pious” Lama of 
Kipling’s Kim or the obscure yet noble Mrs. Todgers of Dickens’s Martin Chuzzlewit.  
The debate between the two authors of these papers betrays key issues confronting 
the Hindu literati at the turn of the twentieth century. What did it mean to be an “Indian” or 
“Hindu” writer at this moment and what were his or her responsibilities? Who was worth 
representing in fiction? What constituted the ideal “interpretation” of Indian life—one that 
																																																						
62 Ibid. Emphasis added. 
63 The precise insult leveled at Ghosh in the Times is worth noting. While it is clear that Ghosh is no social 
realist in the vein of Dickens, the editorialist emphasizes that Ghosh’s attempted foray in historical romance 
leaves much to be desired: “…the efforts of Mr. Sarat Ghose do not lead us to anticipate the early advent of an 
Indian Sir Walter Scott.” 
 	
148 
was rooted in realism or laced with romance? And according to whose standards? Although 
the Times editorialist attributes the “horror and disgust” felt by the Mahratta author to high-
caste Hindu prejudice against members of the “Indian proletariat,” there was certainly far 
more to the latter’s argument regarding the type of characters urgently needed in Indian 
fiction. Much like the historical romances and histories popular in Bengal in this period, the 
Mahratta’s advocacy of stirring portrayals of Hindu heroes and heroines spoke to the needs 
of its sociocultural milieu, one in which Hindus far and wide were chafing from allegations 
of effeminacy and cowardice. As I noted in relation to Anandamath in Chapter Two, it was 
not realism but romance that provided the apposite literary register for the kinds of 
melodramatic, predictable depictions of stock characters accomplishing noble feats for 
which the Hindu community was so desperate.   
Ghosh himself intervened in this debate taking place in the pages of the Mahratta and 
the Times. In a shrewd letter to the editor of the Times, he took the position expressed in the 
Mahratta one step further. Not only were Indian writers necessarily better positioned than 
foreigners to represent Indian life, he further suggested that only Indian opinions about such 
literature mattered. While he does not attempt to rival Dickens or Scott, Kipling—a fellow 
writer of India—was fair game: 
With regard to Mr. Kipling, however, the case is essentially different. India is vast 
enough for Mr. Kipling and I not to clash with, or poach upon, each other. Our true 
mission is to supplement, not neutralize, each other. But if accidentally, without 
malice aforethought, the question is raised as to which of us gives a truer 
representation of Indian life, permit me to point out, Sir, with due deference, that the 
final decision must lie, not with you, but with those most intimately concerned—
namely, my countrymen themselves, among others, your contemporary, the 
‘Mahratta.’ And if that decision is, as you imply, more favourable to me than to Mr. Kipling, you 
may indeed question its literary taste, but scarcely its justice.64  
																																																						
64 A. Sarath Kumar Ghosh, “An Indian Novelist: To the Editor of The Times of India,” Times of India (October 
10, 1904): 7. Emphasis added. 
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In this falsely deferential and insincere reply, Ghosh defends his fiction by appealing to the 
“justice” of Indians’ preference for flattering, positive portrayals over disparaging ones and a 
perceived advantage of Indian writers held in crafting such “truer” depictions. Despite 
charitable and gracious references to a shared “mission” between himself and Kipling, 
Ghosh in fact regards the latter as a competing “interpreter” of India whose denigration in 
the Mahratta was warranted. His fellow Indians’ preference for his romances was a matter of 
“justice” in that Indian readers would naturally favor positive portrayals of themselves over 
the denigrating depictions offered by Kipling. Echoing the Mahratta writer, Ghosh suggests 
that as a (Hindu) Indian his illustrations of Indian life were necessarily richer, fuller, and 
more genuine than what foreign writers could offer. Negative opinions such as those of the 
Englishmen at the Times are ultimately immaterial compared to what his fellow 
“countrymen” think, since they—as both the portrayed subjects and targeted audience of 
such literature—were the “most intimately concerned” with such work.   
 Ghosh’s claim that he was mainly “interpreting” India for Indians was disingenuous 
to say the least. A Bengali author based in London whose literature was published in 
periodicals with broad readerships, Ghosh was well aware that non-Indians formed a 
significant part, if not the majority, of his readers. It was none other than his fantastic 
representations of the East for naïve Western audiences that so annoyed the Times, a critique 
that he cleverly evades in his reply. Such prevarication is consistent with Ghosh’s apparent 
tendency to present himself in a very calculated manner to non-Indians. As Meenakshi 
Mukherjee and Alex Tickell have pointed out, reliable biographical information on Ghosh is 
rather scarce and what little is known about him must be pieced together from various 
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articles and pamphlets issued in Britain and America in the early twentieth century.65 While it 
seems likely that Ghosh invented much of what he claimed about himself, his ostentatious 
self-presentation as an emblematic Oriental/Eastern/Indian to receptive and perhaps naïve 
Western audiences remains undeniable.66 This projection is evidenced not just in his fantastic 
fiction about India and his frequent donning of ceremonial Indian garb at public events, but 
also in the various lectures he delivered about his homeland, the titles of which ranged from 
“The Marvels of India,” “The Romance of India,” “Hindu Occultism,” “Hindu Women 
From the Inside,” and “Hindu Ideals of Happiness.”67   
Though his response to the Times would suggest otherwise, Ghosh mediated 
between an intrigued West and highly overdetermined notions of an Indian/Hindu culture. 
Yet, importantly, he did so to a large extent on his own terms, as the “India” that he 
represented—in his very persona as well as his fictional and nonfictional works—frequently 
																																																						
65 See Mukherjee, The Perishable Empire, 63, and Tickell, Terrorism, Insurgency and Indian-English Literature, 1830-
1947, 170. The basic facts about Ghosh appear to be that he was born in 1883, hailed from Bengal, and left for 
Britain sometime in the 1890s, never to return to India. In Britain he began publishing fiction about India, 
ranging from the sensational short stories that so annoyed the Times of India to the more thoughtful 
bildungsroman The Prince of Destiny published in 1909. Oddly enough, in 1898 he also, apparently, filed a patent 
with the European Patent Office for a new kind of boot. In 1912, Ghosh came to America, where he began 
giving a series of lectures about various “Indian” topics, posing as a veritable expert on all things 
Indian/Hindu. He died of influenza in Manhattan in 1920, most likely a victim of the 1918 Spanish flu 
pandemic.  
66 Interestingly enough, the most insightful piece about Ghosh’s extremely sketchy life that I have encountered 
thus far is a blog post from August 2012 by a pulp fiction aficionado, Sai Shankar, who rightly suggests that 
much of what Ghosh said about himself was likely apocryphal. Ghosh’s more incredulous claims stem from his 
central assertion that he was an Indian prince, the nephew of the raja of Ghoshpara, an area northwest of 
Kolkata. At various moments Ghosh claimed that he desired to escape parental pressure to marry a princess 
back in India; that it was at his suggestion that King George and Queen Mary attended the Delhi Durbar in 
1911; and that his purpose for coming to America in 1912 was to gain ideas for development for India and to 
marry an American woman of his choosing. As Shankar remarks, “at the time, newspaper reporters seem to 
have believed his stories, or at least printed them without looking too deeply into the matter. What did it matter 
what they believed as long as people were interested enough to pick up and read the paper?” See Sai Shankar, 
“Prince Sarath Kumar Ghosh,” http://pulpflakes.blogspot.com/2012/08/prince-sarath-kumar-ghosh-indian-
writer.html. The striking resonances between Ghosh’s biographical claims and the story of Prince Barath, the 
hero of The Prince of Destiny: The New Krishna, will be discussed in the subsequent chapter. 
67 See undated pamphlet, “Sarath Kumar Ghosh (Prince Sarath Ghosh of Ghoshpara).” I surmise that the year 
of publication was approximately 1919. 
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attempted to counter the disparaging perceptions prevalent among Britons and Americans.68 
Ghosh’s calculated participation in the project of orientalizing India typifies the strategies of 
“culturally ambidextrous” Indian literati during the colonial period. As Vinay Dharwadker 
has explained, a culturally ambidextrous individual was one who 
is likely to be ambivalent about each of the cultures he inhabits, but his ambivalence 
is subsumed by his cultural ambidexterity, an equal or commensurate facility in two or 
more cultural systems concurrently. If the resister acts out of a subaltern culture 
against a dominant other culture, and the collaborator acts in a subaltern culture for a 
dominant culture, then the ambidextrous subject acts simultaneously in two or more 
cultures without making unmixed, unilateral choices or commitments…if the 
resisting subject sacrifices a dominant culture in favor of a subaltern one, and the 
complicitous subject sacrifices a subaltern culture in favor of a dominant one, then 
the ambidextrous subject tries to maintain a critical distance toward two cultures so 
that he can act in both without sacrificing either.69 
 
Dharwadker’s culturally ambidextrous subject-position is one of four postures that Indian 
intellectuals assumed in order to challenge—either directly or subtly—unilateral, positivist 
derisions of India frequently issued by the British.70 Unlike the resister or the collaborator 
whose loyalties are usually more straightforward, the culturally ambidextrous subject’s dual 
entrenchment within his native subaltern culture and oppressing foreign culture yields 
fraught feelings towards both. Most often manifesting as the “bilateral cosmopolitan,” the 
culturally ambidextrous subject endeavors to “translate Indian and Western cultures into 
																																																						
68 See Amit Chaudhuri, “The East as a Career” (2006): “…the Orient, in modernity, is not only a European 
invention but also an Oriental one, an invention that has arguably created and occupied an intellectual, cultural 
and political space far larger and more important than its European counterpart” (117). 
69 Vinay Dharwadker, “Print Culture and Literary Markets in Colonial India,” 123-124. This essay provides a 
fuller elaboration of the culturally ambidextrous subject-position than does Dharwadker’s later piece on Indian 
literature in English, “The Historical Formation of Indian-English Literature” (2003). 
70 Dharwadker identifies three other subject-positions: those of resistance, collaboration, and revivalism; see 
“Print Culture and Literary Markets in Colonial India,” 114-124. In “The Historical Formation of Indian-
English Literature,” Dharwadker retains the four but recharacterizes “resistance” as “nationalism or proto-
nationalism” (2003, 241-242). While he notes that these subject-positions focused on the “mutually 
constitutive, conflictual interpretations between empire, nation, village, and city,” Dharwadker rightly affirms that 
India itself nevertheless “remained a constant master referent” (2003, 241).  
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each other, reforming and modernizing both.”71 As Dharwadker explains with reference to 
Indian Anglophone writers, the culturally ambidextrous persona was integral to a 
“comprehensive counterdiscourse in English on the Indian understanding of India, which 
attempt[ed] to share, deny, diffuse, arrogate, or redistribute” the British power to represent 
the polity and its people.72 Certainly the Mahratta’s praise of Ghosh arose in no small part 
from his Hindu princes and princesses’ butting heads with Kipling’s lowly Lama and other 
such middling characters within a perceived “Indian” literary arena—a hallowed cultural 
space wherein only respectable, well-born characters were welcome.   
Ghosh’s serialization of the adventures of Narayan Lal in Pearson’s Magazine in 1902 
was a particularly significant countertext in this vein.73 Billed as Indian Nights’ Entertainment it 
tells the story of a disguised Hindu kshatriya named Narayan Lal who is compelled to 
undergo six mortal challenges in order to prove his caste identity and worthiness to marry a 
beautiful Hindu princess.74 In both content and form Ghosh very plainly imitated the style 
and structure of the Arabian Nights in the apparent attempt to capitalize upon the 
contemporary European fascination with the exotic Orient that this text came to 
																																																						
71 Certainly this phenomenon was not peculiar to colonial India as it had much older histories across the world 
(e.g., the sixteenth-century adventurer and scholar Leo Africanus) and persists to this day. For a relatively 
recent discussion about how contemporary diasporic South Asian women writers engage in this practice, see 
Lisa Lau, “Re-Orientalism: The Perpetration and Development of Orientalism by Orientals” (2009). 
72 Dharwadker, “The Historical Formation of Indian-English Literature,” 206. These subject-positions are of 
course not exclusive to Indian authors writing in English. 
73 Ibid., 205. As suggested by Dharwadker, countertexts were works by Indian authors that were driven by “the 
desire to question, correct, or displace British representations of India.” Here Dharwadker fleshes out a term 
posited by A.K. Ramanujan in his 1989 essay, “Where Mirrors are Windows,” 189. 
74 On the beginning page of each monthly episode, the heading Indian Nights’ Entertainment appeared in large, 
exaggerated font, after which followed a brief synopsis of the current/previous episode for readers. The 
subtitle of the serialization was The Trials of Narayan Lal, followed by the name of the specific adventure at 
hand: “I. On the Tower of Victory” (January); “II. The Well of Ten Thousand Sighs” (February); “III. Tongues 
of Fire” (March); “IV. The Temple of the Manik” (April); V. The Poisoned Cup” (May); VI. The Verdict of 
Parameshwar” (June). In 1904, Ghosh revised the Pearson’s serialization as 1001 Indian Nights: The Trials of 
Narayan Lal, which kept the same number of adventures but expanded the number of “nights” over which they 
were told from six to twenty-one. In 1905 it was released as The Verdict of the Gods. All versions included various 
illustrations of the depicted events, with the 1902 edition containing the most. 
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symbolize.75 The editors of Pearson’s were complicit in this endeavor as they trumpeted 
Ghosh as a singularly Hindu/Indian writer in the magazine’s paratextual material. In a 
biographical sketch that preceded the first installment of the series, Ghosh is pointedly 
introduced as the “only Hindu writer of English fiction,” an Indian Scheherazade who “is 
confident that he has material for 2002 stories.”76 As if to prove Ghosh’s identity as an 
Indian, the editors even included a picture of the author wearing regal Indian attire.77 In 
addition to such pointed references to the Arabian Nights, Ghosh’s serialization appropriated 
elements of the Indian epic tradition, thereby manifesting a remarkable and highly 
incestuous intertextuality when considering the likely influence of Indian epics on the 
Arabian Nights itself.78 Notwithstanding (and to a limited extent, because of) its connection 
																																																						
75 As well-documented in the scholarship, the collection of stories that formed the core of the Arabian Nights 
derived from an oral folkloric tradition predominant in India, Persia, Iraq, Syria, and Egypt (Kabbani 48). 
These stories circulated throughout these regions and likely reached Europe as early as the fifteenth century 
(Makdisi and Nussbaum 2; Kabbani 50). In the early eighteenth century, French Orientalist Antoine Galland’s 
edition Les Mille et une nuits provided some stability to what was an inherently dynamic and constantly evolving 
corpus of oral folklore. Paralleling the work of British Orientalists in India, Galland’s endeavor was marked by 
profound bias. As Rana Kabbani remarks, Galland was no mere conveyer or translator but rather the “inventor 
of a Western phenomenon,” a Scheherazade himself who captivated Europe with seductive tales about an 
exotic Other, stories which in turn inspired numerous emulative accounts about the East by other writers (49). 
Saree Makdisi and Felicity Nussbaum helpfully point out that the Arabian Nights might best be considered a 
palimpsest due its existence within and across numerous editions, translations, amendments, rewritings, and 
overwritings in both oral and written form over the centuries, and against a backdrop of global imperialism (3).  
76 “Sarath Kumar Ghosh: An Introduction,” 75. 
77 Ibid. Anticipating the future debate between the Maratha and the Times of India regarding the nature and 
purpose of “Indian” literature, Pearson’s editors notably evince a distorted critical perspective wherein the 
literature of Indian authors are held to be necessarily superior to that of non-Indians and Kipling in particular is 
advanced as Ghosh’s foil: “Kumar Ghosh keenly appreciates the genius of Rudyard Kipling. That he does not 
lack confidence in his own skill (though the most modest of men) is clear from his ambition to rival Kipling in 
the field of Indian stories; and that he has succeeded in catching the full spirit of Indian in a way that no 
English-born author could attempt, these stories bear forcible witness.” While non-Indian writers could only 
“write of Indian life as they have studied it” the editors argue that Ghosh’s stories are more authentic because 
their creator was “Indian to the core, was brought up in India, and can write of Indian life as he has lived it.” 
Relatedly, the editors suggest that “purely Indian” stories are those in which “no Westerns figure.”  
78 The extent to which the Indian epic tradition influenced the Arabian Nights is a highly complex matter and 
beyond the scope of this chapter, but nevertheless a few key points are worth mentioning. Based on John 
Brockington’s claim that the literary technique of framing (what he calls “emboxing”) cannot be traced further 
back than the Mahabharata (18), it appears to be the case that the Nights’ deployment of the frame narrative very 
likely derived from the Indian oral storytelling tradition. This supposition is further supported by Brockington’s 
observation that “it is in all probability as a result of the influence from the [Mahabharata] that [this hierarchical 
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with the Arabian Nights, I suggest that Ghosh’s Indian Nights’ Entertainment is most usefully 
characterized as a romantic epic that addressed the concerns of Ghosh’s native Bengali 
milieu while simultaneously catering to Western appetites for a fantastic East.79  
My argument rests on an understanding of the epic as a dynamic genre that fulfills 
particular social functions within cultures in addition to (often arbitrary and variable) 
strictures of literary form. As Paul Innes suggests, “If we think of epic as function, in 
addition to its existence as form, then we begin to glimpse its multiple potentialities.”80 
Despite seeming unfamiliar and perhaps even defunct, and varying widely across the world 
in its features, the epic continues to mark a rich and capacious “generic space” for 
communities to establish or promote desired cultural memories and conceptions of self.81 In 
the Indian context, Edward Dimock, Stuart Blackburn, Joyce Flueckiger, and others advance 
similar postulations of the epic, a form that variously evidences, depending on the period 
and context, what a particular community or culture thinks about itself.82 In addition to 
																																																																																																																																																																	
emboxing of one narrative within another] became such a regular technique not only in the Puranas but also in 
storytelling literature, most famously, the Pancatantra, from which it may well have spread worldwide” (ibid). 
See John Brockington, The Sanskrit Epics (1998). The Panchatantra, an ancient collection of moral fables 
featuring animal characters, is critical here considering that its frame narrative and that of the Nights are quite 
similar and that both contain multiple layers of emboxing: characters within stories narrate stories to others and 
so on. If the Mahabharata’s use of the frame tale influenced the Panchatantra, which in turn bears striking 
structural similarities to the Nights, then it stands to reason that the Nights’ deployment of this narrative 
technique likely derived from the Indian epic tradition. Though Sadhana Naithani notes that the supposed 
influence of the Panchatantra upon the Nights is not clear, she does confirm that their frame narratives are 
“strikingly similar” (119, 122). Both are highly didactic in nature as two outsiders, Scheherazade and the 
Brahmin Vishnu Sharma, embrace the challenging task of educating wayward rulers in dire need of moral 
instruction and ultimately triumph in their endeavor. Through their instruction, both the murderous King 
Shahriyar of the Nights and the three young foolish princes of the Panchatantra are successfully transformed into 
wise and just kings. See Sadhana Naithani, “The Teacher and the Taught,” 119-133. 
79 Most famously epitomized in the Ramayana, this particular brand of Indian epic demonstrates a primary 
structuring conflict of a quest for romantic love. See Blackburn and Flueckiger, “Introduction,” 5.  
80 Innes, Epic, 108, 7-8. See also Martin, “Epic as Genre,” 9-11. 
81 “Generic space” is Innes’s term, 108. 
82 See Dimock et al., “The Indian Epic,” 79. Likewise, Blackburn and Flueckiger observe that “Epics stand 
apart from other ‘songs’ and ‘stories’ in the extent and intensity of a folklore community’s identification with 
them; they help to shape a community’s self-identity” (6).  
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existing as textual or performative works, then, Indian epics stand as cultural artifacts that 
reflect particular groups’ sociocultural beliefs or aspirations.83  
Much like the historical romances and novels about Hindu valor that were popular in 
India in this period, the romantic epic occupied a middle ground between fantasy and fact in 
and through which authors could reify the myth of India as Bharat, a Hindu utopia rich with 
inspiring heroes and heroines. In the Indian context, Blackburn and Flueckiger identify three 
main types of epic: martial, sacrificial, and romantic.84 Though Indian Nights’ Entertainment 
certainly demonstrates aspects of martial and sacrificial epics, such as a concern with power, 
social obligation, the restoration of lost rights, and group solidarity, I suggest the text may be 
best considered a romantic epic, in which the main structuring conflict is that of a quest for 
love. Ghosh’s deft appropriation of the mutually imbricated legacies of the Indian epic and 
Arabian Nights’ romances allowed for a rousing account of Hindu heroism for his multiple 
audiences. While his Hindu readers likely relished in the familiar and recognizable features of 
the Indian epic tradition—not to mention allusions to the Mahabharata and the Ramayana—
Britons and Americans delighted in this “Indian” rendering of the classic romance paradigm 
of parted lovers overcoming obstacles such as tyrannical fathers, cryptic riddles, and 
ferocious serpents.85 I offer the following description of the romantic epic as it manifests in 
Ghosh’s serialization of Narayan Lal’s adventures: the heroic pursuit of honor as balanced 
																																																						
83 Blackburn and Flueckiger, “Introduction,” 11. See also Dimock, et al., 79-80.  
84 Blackburn and Flueckiger, “Introduction,” 4-5. 
85 In its review of the first installment, a Scottish newspaper, The Arbroath Herald, cited Ghosh as a “strong rival 
to Kipling [who] furnishes a wonderful tale of Eastern life, on the lines of the ‘Arabian Nights,’ which is full of 
insight and literary ability.” Likewise, The Bucks Herald of Aylesbury, England noted that Ghosh “has certainly 
caught the full spirit of Indian life.” See also the New York Times review, “The Orient: Sarath Kumar Ghosh’s 
Lively Tale of Love and Adventure in the East,” in praise of Ghosh’s Verdict of the Gods. 
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between the demands of love and social propriety, all within the context of a divinely 
ordained Destiny or daiva.86   
Adhering to the formal conventions of epic, a frame narrative structures Indian 
Nights’ Entertainment and shapes readers’ interpretation of the emboxed story.87 Like the 
Arabian Nights, a powerful monarch stands in dire need of transformation: here an unnamed 
“Great King” of divine Hindu lineage has fallen gravely ill and requires inspiration to 
marshal his will to live. The royal physician summons an old storyteller who, it is hoped, will 
be able to enchant the king with “a tale of human danger” that might invigorate him.88 The 
narrator of Indian Nights’ Entertainment, however, is not the storyteller but the Great King’s 
chronicler who overhears the tale. Like the frame narrative, the setting of the emboxed story 
evokes the myth of Bharat as it transpires in a Hindu kingdom located at “the thrice-blessed 
land that lies between the sacred waters of the Jumna and the Ganges.”89 The ruler of this 
kingdom is not given a name but is referred to simply as “the king,” suggestive of the 
frequently flat nature of characters in the epic genre.   
The emboxed tale of “human danger” the storyteller relates is that of Narayan Lal’s 
repeated triumphs over death in order to prove his worthiness to marry the beautiful 
Princess Devala, the daughter of the unnamed king. The storyteller reveals that he witnessed 
																																																						
86 My description here is heavily indebted to Peter Heath’s incisive discussion of romance in many Arabian 
Nights stories in his essay, “Romance as Genre in The Thousand and One Nights” (1987). Using Tzvetan 
Todorov’s theorization of literary analysis into the semantic, the syntactic, and the verbal, Heath posits the 
following definition of romance as it appears in the Nights: “On the semantic level, the primary theme of 
romance, a fundamental aspect of the genre’s ‘informing drive,’ investigates the concerns of honor as balanced between 
the demands of love and social propriety, within the context of Fate…” (178; emphasis in original). For an excellent 
discussion of the role of daiva in Indian epics see John Smith’s 1989 essay, “Scapegoats of the Gods: The 
Ideology of the Indian Epics.”  
87 Brockington, The Sanskrit Epics, 18.  
88 Ghosh, “On the Tower of Victory,” Pearson’s Magazine, January 1902, 76. In the 1904 edition, a story of 
“human peril” is requested, 2. 
89 Ibid. In the 1904 edition, see 3.  
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this saga unfold as a young man; each episode of the six-part serial constitutes one “night” 
and his telling of one particular challenge.90 The question of Narayan’s kshatriya identity 
emerges quickly as the king catches Narayan staring at his daughter, whom the king had 
secluded precisely out of the fear that unworthy men would desire her. Evoking the balcony 
scene of Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet, both Narayan Lal and Princess Devala become 
entranced with one another at first sight, a fortuitous meeting that drips with melodrama: 
[The king] looked up and saw. There stood Princess Devala at her unbarred 
window—alone—unveiled. There was a smile upon her lips and a love-light in her 
eyes. 
 
Beneath the window stood a young man, his eyes uplifted, his hands upon his breast. 
Eyes calling to eyes, heart yearning for heart. Enough! 
 
The cry of anguish that broke from the king made the princess turn. She threw up 
her hands suddenly, as if to avert some impending doom—then fell back fainting.  
 
The young man came and knelt by the king. He thrust out his neck and awaited the 
blow. But the king still played with the hilt of his sword.91  
Narayan’s act constitutes a grave infraction: as the court juggler and ostensibly a man of low 
caste he is profoundly unworthy of demonstrating romantic interest in the princess. 
However, like other epic heroes—and as his name itself insinuates—Narayan is an 
exceptional human being, one who straddles the boundary between human and divine.92 
After miraculously warding off the royal guards’ attacks by means of a mysterious “charm,” 
Narayan announces himself as a kshatriya to the king and demands the opportunity to prove 
this claim: “Put me to the ordeal…it is a Rajput’s right. If I die, I have lied. If I escape 
																																																						
90 Ibid. In the 1904 edition, Ghosh increases the number of “nights” to twenty-one, interspersing them 
throughout the narrative in random places (i.e. “The First Night,” “The Second Night,” and so on). 
91 Ibid., 77. In the 1904 edition, see 4. 
92 In its proper form, “Narayan” is the name of the supreme godhead in Hinduism; it can also function as a 
more generic referent, meaning deity or god. For more on the demagogic nature of Indian epic heroes, see 
Smith (1989, 183-185) and Blackburn and Flueckiger: “Epic heroism in India, as elsewhere, touches on both 
the human and the supernatural, and on gradations in between. Since any sharp division between the human 
and the divine is alien to Hinduism and to Indian culture generally, a major theme of many Indian oral epics is 
precisely this relation between gods and humans” (4). 
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unscathed, I am innocent of thy charge. And may Parameshwar decide between me and my 
king.”93 Further enhancing Narayan’s stature as an epic hero is his very pointed resemblance 
to the hero Karna of the Mahabharata, who was similarly thought to be of low caste though 
he was actually a kshatriya.94 Narayan’s goading of the king evokes a pivotal scene of the 
Mahabharata in which Karna demands an opportunity to best Arjuna in a public 
demonstration showcasing the martial skills of the royal Kuru princes: “Son of Kunti, 
whatever you have done, I shall outdo it before the eyes of all these men; so do not indulge 
in self-admiration!”95  
Narayan’s invocation of Parameshwar [Supreme or Highest God] signals the primacy 
of daiva in Indian Nights’ Entertainment. Though no Hindu deities materialize or appear, they 
are nevertheless represented through this terrific supra-human force, which, much as Peter 
Heath observes about Fate in Arabian Nights romances, may in some sense be considered the 
“real hero” of such works: “It is Fate that leads characters on, tests them, and, depending on 
their performance, rewards or punishes them.”96 As in other Indian epics, the gods are 
powerful agents operating in the background who have predetermined the course of events 
for all and for whom human beings largely function as scapegoats or pawns within a much 
larger celestial drama.97 Not only do characters constantly invoke “Bhugwan” or 
“Parameshwar,” any and all events are (correctly) interpreted as manifesting divine will. 
																																																						
93 Ghosh, “On the Tower of Victory,” January 1902, 77-78. In the 1904 edition, see 5-7.  
94 See John Smith’s 2009 edition of The Mahabharata, in which he remarks that it is unclear as to when exactly 
Karna first discovers his kshatriya identity. Although it appears as though Karna first learns this truth from his 
birth mother Kunti right before the monumental war between the Kuru and Pandava dynasties, his flat reaction 
in an earlier scene with Krishna suggests that he already knew that he was her son and thus the eldest of the 
Pandava brothers (339, see fn). However, as Smith notes, precisely when Karna realizes this fact is ultimately 
immaterial because “even before discovering who he truly is, he is clearly aware that he is no ordinary man” 
(xxviii, see fn).  
95 The Mahabharata, 55. 
96 Heath, “Romance as Genre,” 196-197. 
97 Smith, “Scapegoats of the Gods,” 176-194. 
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Although it would seem that the king has the power to deny Narayan’s demand, and that the 
outcome of the trials could go either way, this is not the case. The king’s begrudging 
acceptance of Narayan’s call for an “ordeal”—as well as the outcome of the ensuing trials 
themselves—are all revelatory of a predetermined divine plan. As the chronicler relates to 
the reader, the king must grant Narayan’s request because divine will trumps even the 
designs of monarchs: “The laws of caste were above royal caprice. They were the hall-mark 
of fate, the destiny of the gods.”98 Much like the nature of curses in the Indian epic tradition, 
which, once uttered, cannot be rescinded but only modified, Narayan’s request for an 
“ordeal” represents a pronouncement of daiva that must be allowed to unfold.99 The best the 
king can do to enact his malice towards Narayan is to add conditions to the trials by 
increasing its number from one to six and placing exceedingly dangerous and even 
impossible tasks before him, both of which conveniently heighten narrative suspense. As the 
storyteller later explains to the Great King in the frame narrative, the number and nature of 
the challenges that Narayan is compelled to undergo stages a confrontation of sorts between 
the king and daiva:  
In an ordeal dependent upon divine judgment, we mortals may make any stipulation 
we choose. If Parameshwar accepts the terms, he will fulfill them in their entirety. So, 
if five times Narayan Lal escaped, but at the sixth succumbed, then indeed would the 
verdict of the Deity have been against him from the beginning. The race is at the 
finish, not at the start.100 
 
According to such logic, the king can impose any conditions he desires on the trials but in 
the end “the verdict of the Deity” will necessarily be revealed. If Narayan’s claim regarding 
																																																						
98 Ghosh, “On the Tower of Victory,” Pearson’s Magazine, January 1902, 78. In the 1904 edition, see 7. 
99 As Smith explains, “The uttering of a curse or vow and the granting of a wish (in the conventional jargon of 
Sanskritists, a ‘boon’) require a certain personal stature and a certain deliberate commitment; but, granted these 
conditions, they preordain the future with absolute certainty.” Qtd. in Smith, “Old Indian (The Two Sanskrit 
Epics),” 70.  
100 Ghosh, “The Temple of the Manik,” Pearson’s Magazine, April 1902, 368. In the 1904 edition, see 181-182. 
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his kshatriya birth is true, he will naturally succeed and fulfill his preordained destiny 
determined by the gods.101 For the purposes of the romantic epic, he will also have proven 
his worthiness to marry Princess Devala. If Narayan fails, he will have been proven a liar and 
deserving of the death meted to him. As a matter of course, this defeat would also manifest 
daiva because it would have preserved the integrity of the caste system (only “true” kshatriyas 
could survive repeated confrontations with death). Consequently, no matter if Narayan 
succeeds or fails, daiva—and the implicit primacy of Hinduism itself—remains central to 
Indian Nights’ Entertainment. The very nature of daiva as portrayed here intersects fittingly with 
the story’s setting in the utopia of Bharat: both are highly overdetermined in nature and 
approximate mythic forces that defy any sense of logic. As Northrop Frye observes with 
regard to myth, “The world of mythical imagery is usually represented by the conception of 
heaven or Paradise in religion, and it is apocalyptic, in the sense of that word already 
explained, a world of total metaphor, in which everything is potentially identical with 
everything else, as though it were all inside a single infinite body.”102  
With such fluid parameters in place, Ghosh stages a triumphant celebration of Hindu 
masculinity as Narayan overcomes one mortal challenge after another. From a narratological 
perspective, the trials demonstrate an adherence to the basic plot structure of ‘safety—
challenge—return to safety’ typical of both the Indian epic tradition and Arabian Nights 
romances.103 Daiva continues to play a significant role in this second stage—what Joseph 
																																																						
101 Along these lines, Narayan’s jubilant cry after surviving the first trial is telling: “The will of Parameshwar is 
done!”  See Ghosh, “On the Tower of Victory,” Pearson’s Magazine, January 1902, 83. In the 1904 edition, see 
39.  
102 Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism, 136. 
103 Diverging from Northrop Frye’s theorization of character development in romance as a simple progression 
from innocence—experience—return to innocence, Heath observes that in Arabian Nights romances, the 
characters undergo a significant developmental progression: “They move from innocence, to experience, to a 
renewed state of innocence that encompasses experience” (185). In the case of Indian Nights’ Entertainment, 
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Campbell terms the “call to adventure”—because Narayan survives these trials as an 
unparalleled champion deserving of success.104 No matter the circumstances or how 
impossible the trial, Daiva/Fate/Destiny favors Narayan and assists him, often by means of 
sympathetic allies. However, these interventions—whether in the form of helpful 
“coincidences” or the willful assistance of other individuals—do not diminish Narayan’s 
overall heroic stature. He notably embodies both the “immense and impetuous” and the 
“warrior prince” heroic personas prevalent in the Indian epic tradition: it is precisely due to 
his great passion or tejas [ardor] that Narayan falls in love with Princess Devala and demands 
the opportunity to showcase his talents and establish himself as her rightful suitor.105  
The various mortal challenges that Narayan undergoes allow him to demonstrate 
traits considered intrinsic to Aryan/Hindu heroes: intelligence, religiosity, strength, courage, 
and the like. A review of the trials and his manner of survival illustrates Ghosh’s ready 
deployment of magical, fantastic elements that frequently defy logic or reason. While for 
Indians these aspects likely underscored the singular nature of Bharat, for Western audiences 
they helped render India an alluring land worthy of awe and respect: 
First Trial: The king demands that Narayan climb a leaning tower with the hope that 
his ascent would cause it to topple, thus killing him. Narayan survives by means of a 
secret tunnel discovered by the mysterious “pundit-philosopher” Rama Krishna. 
Narayan distracts the crowd of spectators as if by magic as he escapes through the 
tunnel.  
 
																																																																																																																																																																	
Frye’s schema holds more for the emboxed narrative and Heath’s schema for the frame narrative. The only 
character that undergoes any significant transformation is the Great King, who emerges revitalized after 
hearing the story of Narayan’s repeated triumphs over death. 
104 Joseph Campbell, The Hero with a Thousand Faces, 58. 
105 See Smith 1980 for a discussion of three different types of Indian epic heroic personas (56-67). He identifies 
the monkey deity Hanuman from the Ramayana as an example of the “immense and impetuous”; Arjuna, the 
hero of the Mahabharata, as a “warrior prince”; and the dignified, passive Yudhisthira of the Mahabharata as the 
third heroic type, the “quiescent king.” See also Kevin McGrath on tejas as the defining characteristic of epic 
kshatriya heroes in his monograph The Sanskrit Hero, 6. 
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Second Trial: Narayan survives entombment in an abandoned well for nine days 
without food or water. This is made possible through the miraculous intervention of 
a group of Hindu sannyasis [ascetics] who secretly lull him into a trance beforehand. 
In later editions, Ghosh additionally portrays the sannyasis’ joining forces to cause 
Narayan’s entranced body to levitate in mid-air. The chronicler directly addresses 
Western readers in his explanation of this feat, citing India’s possession of advanced 
scientific knowledge that the West has only recently realized, i.e., x-rays. 
 
Third Trial: The king demands that Narayan literally perform acts of magic: “Make us 
see and feel something that is not before us now…but not all alike. Some of us to 
see one thing, some another, others a third…” It is implied that if Narayan is unable 
to do so he will be put to death. Though the king himself admits that this trial is 
“beyond human power,” Narayan successfully transmutes various items into others 
as if by magic. The king then orders Narayan to place burning straw on his head. He 
survives by surreptitiously applying an anti-inflammatory balm on his head 
beforehand. In the later editions, the king further demands that Narayan walk across 
fire. 
 
Fourth Trial: Narayan is sent on a dangerous quest to recover a rare and precious 
gem, the manik, which lies deep in a secluded cave in a distant forest; it is the 
embedded jeweled eye of a large idol. This lengthy and arduous challenge not only 
showcases Narayan’s courage, strength, and quick thinking, but also his superior 
moral character, because the manik is protected by a curse such that only a truly 
gracious and worthy individual would be able to dislodge it. Rama Krishna provides 
information as to when would be the optimal time to recover the jewel and avoid 
certain death. Narayan succeeds in attaining the manik, slaying the enormous serpent 
that guards it.106 Later editions increase the dangers Narayan faces and enhance the 
role of Rama Krishna and others who help Narayan survive. 
 
Fifth Trial: The king again demands that Narayan transmute objects; again it is 
implied that he will be put to death if he proves incapable. After Narayan 
successfully transforms the objects as commanded, the king orders that he ingest 
poison. Narayan survives by means of furtively swallowing a countervailing 
substance, which has been covertly brought to him in a scheme concocted by Rama 
Krishna. In the later editions the king gives Narayan the option of choosing between 
the poison and being crushed by an elephant. 
  
Sixth Trial: Narayan is tied to a pole in a crowded arena and left as bait for an angry 
tigress to devour. Princess Devala arrives in the nick of time and boldly unties him, 
																																																						
106 Narayan’s slaying of a giant serpent that guards the manik is demonstrative of a widespread motif in many 
literary and poetic traditions. As Calvert Watkins observes in How to Kill a Dragon: “The ‘signature’ formula for 
the myth of the divine hero who slays the serpent recurs in the same linguistic form…in texts from the Rig 
Veda…through Old and Middle Iranian holy books, Hittite myth, Greek epic and lyric, Celtic and Germanic 
epic and saga down to Armenian oral folk epic of the last century. This formula shapes the narration of ‘heroic’ 
killing or overcoming of adversaries over the Indo-European world for millennia” (viii; italics in original).  
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facing certain death herself. The tigress mistakes the pair for her recently deceased 
cubs and suddenly becomes docile. 
 
These trials are notably of three distinct types: ones in which death is not certain but 
Narayan’s survival relies on the paranormal (first, third); ones in which death is certain and 
his survival relies on the paranormal (second, fifth); and ones in which death is probable but 
externalities that are not necessarily paranormal (i.e., coincidence) lead to his survival (fourth, 
sixth). Tzvetan Todorov’s theorization of the “fantastic” is helpful when examining the 
paranormal elements of Narayan’s mortal tests: 
The fantastic requires the fulfillment of three conditions. First, the text must oblige 
the reader to consider the world of the characters as a world of living persons and to 
hesitate between a natural and a supernatural explanation of the events described. 
Second, this hesitation may also be experienced by a character; thus the reader’s role 
is so to speak entrusted to a character, and at the same time the hesitation is 
represented, it becomes one of the themes of the work—in the case of naive reading, 
the actual reader identifies himself with the character. Third, the reader must adopt a 
certain attitude with regard to the text: he will reject allegorical as well as ‘poetic’ 
interpretations.107 
 
Occupying a critical middle ground between the uncanny and the marvelous, Todorov’s 
fantastic elucidates those texts in which events occur that cannot be explained by rational 
causes. The reader must express doubt as to whether such events have natural, logical 
explanations (the uncanny) or result from supernatural forces lurking in the world (the 
marvelous).108 The hesitation or confusion of the reader, the key criterion of the fantastic, 
must be represented in the text, either directly—such as through epos—or indirectly through 
a character’s puzzlement about the strange events.109 Indian Nights’ Entertainment very 
pointedly evinces the fantastic not just in Narayan’s astonishing survival of the six trials but 
																																																						
107 Tzvetan Todorov, The Fantastic, 33. Todorov goes on to note that the first and third criteria “actually 
constitute” the genre while the second may not always be fulfilled.  
108 See Roberta Reeder’s extremely helpful review of Todorov’s work, 187. 
109 See Frye on epos, direct address between storyteller/poet and audience (250). See also Heath, “Romance as 
Genre,” 179-180. 
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also in the strikingly bizarre explanations advanced regarding how he survives them. These 
accounts are put forth on multiple levels as the emboxed spectators of Narayan’s trials 
frequently exchange theories about what they have just witnessed; the Great King of the 
frame narrative demands explanations of the storyteller; and the chronicler himself glosses 
over these elucidations for the reader, verifying some and eschewing others. Perhaps the 
most striking of these is that which follows Narayan Lal’s second trial in the 1904 edition. 
Evoking the wondrous nature of Bharat, the chronicler suggests that certain fantastic 
elements of the trial—such as the sannyasis’ causing Narayan’s body to levitate off the 
ground—were due to the existence of advanced scientific knowledge that the West had only 
recently discovered, but which “in India [had been] known to sages a thousand years 
ago…”110 
 Indian Nights’ Entertainment met with success in Britain and America because it 
provided audiences in those milieus what they desired and expected: an entertaining, escapist 
tale about India. In 1904, Ghosh revised and expanded the Pearson’s serialization as 1001 
Indian Nights: The Trials of Narayan Lal, an edition that evidences his effort to enhance the 
suspense and melodrama of the original. In addition to heightening the danger of certain 
trials, Ghosh introduced a mysterious assassin who attempts to kill Narayan, thus 
endangering the hero’s life on another level. He also included a subplot in which Princess 
Devala recruits her maidservant Leila to assist Narayan; Leila in turn often enlists the help of 
her lover Harnam Das, the captain of the king’s guards.111 The added development of 
Princess Devala’s character in the later editions is particularly noteworthy as it enhances the 
romantic register of the epic, proffering an admirable Hindu heroine for audiences. Much 
																																																						
110 Ghosh, 1001 Indian Nights: The Trials of Narayan Lal (London: William Heinemann, 1904), 75.  
111 Ibid., 16, 20-21. 
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like the coeval histories and historical romances showcasing legendary instances of Hindu 
bravery, Princess Devala is the perfect feminine counterpart to Narayan. She is similarly 
exceptional, described as a “wondrous beauty, a houri of paradise, a peri of Indra’s court” 
who had been blessed by the Hindu goddesses Parvati, Saraswati, and Lakshmi at her 
birth.112 As the chronicler relates to the reader, the princess herself is being tested as much as 
Narayan because she had dared to reciprocate his amorous attention. Even though he was all 
but a stranger to her, Princess Devala devotes herself to him entirely: 
Who he was by the right of his birth she knew not—yet felt with dumb instinct that 
there was something within him, something that had revealed itself outwardly in 
response to her love, that must needs be of royal heritage. Was he but a juggler to 
the world? Verily to her he was a prince. Was he not a prince? Who but a prince 
would have sought death when he had seen the hopelessness of his love—and death 
from the hand of the king himself?113  
 
Princess Devala’s intuition about Narayan is of course correct, keeping with Indian epics’ 
portrayal of kshatriyani women as the perfect balance between delicacy and strength, 
extraordinarily noble beings who merited similarly exceptional male partners. For Princess 
Devala, Narayan has proven himself worthy of her love not only through his courageous 
invitation of death at her father’s hand, but also by his promise to fulfill her own destiny:  
Her destiny? What was that? For three long years had she prayed to Lakshmi to reveal 
to her that destiny; for three long years since the dawn of her womanhood had she 
prayed the benign goddess to tell her what joy, what glory, awaited her on this earth. 
At her birth had she not been promised a life of perpetual happiness with her heart’s 
beloved? … But instead what was in store for her? What was to be the end of all her 
hopes and fears? …Was it to be—death? Death for her love? Death for having dared 
to love? … But lo, that would also be Fate. It would, at least, be death with her loved 
one. (She made that vow within her heart at that moment.) Then so let it be. 
Mingling their hearts’ blood together, they would die. What finer death could she 
have than that? … 114 
 
																																																						
112 Ghosh, “On the Tower of Victory,” Pearson’s Magazine, January 1902, 76. In the 1904 edition, see 3. 
113 Ghosh, 1001 Indian Nights: The Trials of Narayan Lal (1904), 12.  
114 Ibid., 14-15. Ellipses in original.  
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For three long years since the dawn of her womanhood—the years that had seemed 
to her the sweetest part of her life—she too had rocked herself to sleep each night, 
dreaming of a hero that would dare all things for the love of her; would imperil his life, would fight 
the world in arms—yea, brave the anger of the gods themselves—for the love of her. Thus in that 
hour her heart was full of joy. For she had found her hero at last! 115 
 
Would he fulfill her promise—the promise that she had vowed within her own heart? Would he 
dare these things, to prove his love—or die in the strife? (Less than that she would not have; 
more than that was beyond human ambition.) She doubted not he would; doubted 
not that if ever man could prove his love for woman, heaven and earth not 
withstanding, her beloved would. And thus in her own heart she vowed to aid him, succour 
him, comfort him—or die with him.116  
 
These excerpts illustrate the ways in which Ghosh portrays heroic Hindu masculinity and 
femininity as complementary. It is not only Narayan who is being tested but also Princess 
Devala as both struggle to fulfill their mutually intertwined fortunes. While Narayan publicly 
confronts Herculean challenges in order to prove his kshatriya birth, Princess Devala 
privately supports his endeavors and strives to prove herself worthy of his quest.  
Like other Hindu heroines, Princess Devala’s virtue relies heavily upon her chastity 
and devotion to her hero. Ghosh revealingly describes her as a “belted” woman, defined as a 
“maiden whose duty it was to wear a belt from her childhood in symbol alike of her birth 
and her virtue; a girdle that no man might touch, save her wedded spouse.”117 In keeping 
with the Indian epic tradition, Ghosh’s portrayal of sexually modest women signals the 
patriarchal belief that female sexuality was a powerful force to be contained because it posed 
a “direct threat to men’s source of strength.”118 In a similar vein, Indian epic heroines are 
liable to become dangerous, unpredictable figures if they are denied their marital rights or 
																																																						
115 Ibid., 11. Emphasis added. 
116 Ibid., 11-12. Emphasis added. 
117 Ibid., 17-18, 122. Princess Devala’s servant Leila is similarly characterized as a “belted woman.”  
118 Smith, “Scapegoats of the Gods,” 188. Additional examples of the attempted limitations on female sexuality 
are the king’s seclusion of his daughter during her childhood out of the belief that “no prince was yet born 
worthy to mate with her” (January 1902, 76) and placing her under house arrest during Narayan’s trials. In the 
1904 edition, see 13-14.  
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choice of spouse, which is exactly what happens with Princess Devala. Much like her “noble 
ancestress that had done battle for her lover with sword and lance,” Princess Devala’s desire 
for Narayan functions as a potent weapon in his favor, as demonstrated in her persistent 
efforts to help him no matter the cost to herself. 119 Accordingly, even though her father has 
forbidden her union with Narayan and has even confined her during the trials, she still 
manages to support him. Princess Devala bids her maidservant Leila to act as her proxy and, 
in classic melodramatic fashion, she somehow escapes her confinement during the final 
challenge, steals into the arena where Narayan is bound, and frees him. If this were not 
enough, Princess Devala further welcomes death alongside him, declaring, “Let this be my 
suttee.”120   
Such grand portrayals of gender relations constitute inspirational and prescriptive 
norms to Hindu men and women as they are invited to match the example put forth by the 
hero and heroine. While women are inculcated in “proper” femininity and sacrifice through 
Princess Devala’s example, men are invited to emulate the brave and virile Narayan in order 
to merit such fine womanly devotion. Daiva/Fate naturally rewards these proffered models 
of masculinity and femininity at the conclusion of the epic. As a result of Princess Devala’s 
intervention, Narayan survives the sixth trial, thus proving his kshatriya caste and satisfying 
her father’s conditions. In a climactic ending that demonstrates what A.T. Hatto terms an 
“epic moment,” the eerie Rama Krishna—who has been helping Narayan throughout the 
trials—ceremoniously confirms Narayan’s kshatriya identity by revealing that he had been 
																																																						
119 Ghosh, 1001 Indian Nights: The Trials of Narayan Lal (1904), 17-18. 
120 Ghosh, “The Verdict of Parameshwar,” Pearson’s Magazine, June 1902, 637. In the 1904 edition, see 236. 
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born a prince named Pertab Sinhji.121 Bringing Narayan’s resemblance to Karna full circle, 
Rama Krishna divulges that Narayan’s birth mother had set him afloat on the Ganges as an 
infant out of fear for his life, circumstances that evoke Kunti’s abandonment of Karna.122 He 
goes on to explain that he had been the dewan [Prime Minister] of Narayan’s deceased royal 
father and had assumed the disguise of a pundit in order to watch over the abandoned child. 
Despite his earlier antagonism towards Narayan, the king easily accepts Rama Krishna’s 
revelation, proclaims Narayan a prince, and sanctions his marriage to his daughter; the 
subsequent editions additionally portray the marriage of Leila and Harnam Das to make for a 
“double bridal.”123 The king’s averred “adoption” of Narayan further evokes the story of 
Karna, for just as the king’s pronouncement of Narayan as “Yuvoraj Kumar Prithiraj” 
dissolves his past identity as the low-caste court juggler, in the Mahabharata, Duryodhana’s 
bestowal of the kingdom of Anga to Karna mitigated his ostensible low-caste status, 
enabling him to challenge Arjuna as more of an equal. The location of this trial in a revered 
amphitheater that had witnessed such sacred events of the Ramayana and the Mahabharata 
“five-and-twenty centuries ago” further underscores the majesty and wonder of these 
momentous proceedings.124 Joyous events continue as the Great King of the frame narrative 
recovers from his deadly illness as a result of hearing Narayan’s inspiring story, the romantic 
epic having succeeded in its aim of reviving him.125 
																																																						
121 See A.T. Hatto’s introductory essay to his edited collection Traditions of Heroic and Epic Poetry: “Epic poetry is 
apt to condense long-drawn tensions into brief scenes of dramatic power enhanced by visual magnificence, that 
is, ‘epic moments’” (4). 
122 While it suggested that Narayan’s birth mother abandoned him for his own sake, one could argue that in the 
Mahabharata Kunti abandoned Karna primarily for selfish reasons. The similarity of Narayan’s birth story to 
that of Moses is also remarkable and would likely have resonated with Western audiences. See Ghosh, “The 
Verdict of Parameshwar,” Pearson’s Magazine, June 1902, 639. In the 1904 edition, see 246. 
123 Ghosh, 1001 Indian Nights: The Trials of Narayan Lal (1904), 248. 
124 Ghosh, “The Verdict of Parameshwar,” Pearson’s Magazine, June 1902, 629. In the 1904 edition, see 216. 
125 Ibid., 639. In the 1904 edition, see 248. 
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Conclusion  
Like his protagonist Narayan Lal, Sarath Kumar Ghosh can in many senses be 
considered a juggler, a culturally ambidextrous “interpreter” balancing competing and 
seemingly inconsistent demands. I have argued that in its various iterations Ghosh’s Indian 
Nights’ Entertainment is best characterized as a modern romantic epic, a provocative 
countertext that disrupted unilateral, disparaging perceptions held by the British towards the 
Indian colony and its people. At the same time, from his unique vantage point in the 
metropole, Ghosh provided a rousing portrayal of Hindu valor for Indian (Hindu) readers 
located both at home and in the diaspora. Reminiscent of Scheherazade herself who cleverly 
transformed her murderous husband by regaling him with her enchanting stories, Ghosh 
was didactic in his storytelling efforts, attempting to influence both his metropolitan and 
Hindu readers while entertaining them in the manner they desired.  
Narayan Lal’s ultimate triumph in the six deadly challenges demonstrated his 
possession of many superlative qualities intrinsic to the Hindu heroes that populated the 
histories and historical romances of the day, including great physical stamina and strength, 
intelligence and quick-thinking, and moral righteousness and piety. But most important for 
any romantic lead, he demonstrates fidelity and passion in love. Adhering to the conventions 
of the Indian epic tradition, Narayan does not succeed in his call to adventure single-
handedly, as the help he receives facilitated the complementary depictions of a splendid 
Hindu heroine who merited the existence of such a champion, Princess Devala, as well as a 
pious Brahmin figure who serves as his guru, well-wisher, and advocate, Rama Krishna. As 
the Mahratta’s enthusiasm for Ghosh’s stories suggests, the popularity of his sensational 
fiction among Hindu readers in India was due in no small part to its colorful contribution to 
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the evolving idea of India as a righteously Hindu space filled with marvelous men and 
women. 
It was precisely in its reification of this particular cultural imagining that Indian Nights’ 
Entertainment reflected a broader desire on the part of Hindu elites for greater understanding 
and regard from their rulers at the turn of the century. While many continued to perceive the 
Raj as a necessary stage of development for India—and especially as a welcome bulwark 
against the evils of the previous “Muslim” era—others were becoming increasingly unsettled 
by the British regime’s growing arrogance and contempt for its subjects. As will be discussed 
in Chapter Four, the colonial government’s plans to partition the province of Bengal—a 
grievous injustice directed at the Bengali bhadralok that in turn launched a widespread 
movement for swadeshi—were already in the making. Unlike Shahriyar who becomes a 
gracious and enlightened sovereign as a result of hearing Scheherazade’s enchanting tales, 
British colonial rulers continued to remain aloof, if not outrightly disdainful, of the mounting 
concerns of educated Hindu elites about the nature and direction of India’s relationship with 
Britain. 
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CHAPTER 4 
“A GRAND ASIATIC EMPIRE”: THE EXPANSE OF BHARAT IN HINDUPORE: A 
PEEP BEHIND THE INDIAN UNREST: AN ANGLO-INDIAN ROMANCE AND 
THE PRINCE OF DESTINY: THE NEW KRISHNA 
 
“…I am a child of Asia; her sorrows are my sorrows, her joys are my joys…As an Asiatic, 
representing a vast constituency, I feel as I never did feel, never can feel as a mere Indian. 
From one end of Asia to the other, I boast of a vast home, a wide nationality, an extended 
kinship. Nay, I not only stand upon higher and larger ground, but I stand upon sacred 
ground…To me the dust of Asia is far more precious than gold and silver.”  
– Keshab Chandra Sen1 
 
“You cannot awaken and appeal to the spirit of nationality in India and at the same time 
profess loyal acceptance of British rule.” – George Nathaniel Curzon2  
 
In September 1890, a short story called “The Enlightenments of Pagett, M.P.” 
appeared in The Contemporary Review. It was written by the up-and-coming British author, 
Rudyard Kipling, whose imperialist literature would eventually earn him the moniker “Bard 
of Empire.”3 Kipling, born in India and having returned to London just a year before the 
story’s publication, exploited his position as an insider of the Raj to address British curiosity 
about the recent emergence of the Indian National Congress in 1885. As suggested by its 
title, “Enlightenments” centers on the many lessons learned by a British member of 
Parliament named Pagett who, weary from several years of empty politicking and paper-
pushing at the seat of colonial power, travels to India in order to “address himself to the 
problems of Imperial administration with a firmer hand.”4 This is his first trip outside of 
England and Pagett visits his old schoolmate Orde, a Deputy Commissioner with the Raj, 
who is stationed in north India. The narrator suggests that while Orde and Pagett may have 
once been close friends, all that they have in common now is a shared past. While the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Keshab Chandra Sen, “Asia’s Message to Europe,” 52-53. See also Birendra Prasad, “Keshab Chandra Sen: 
Prophet of Pan-Asianism,” 123.  
2 Qtd. in Jonathan Schneer, London 1900, 188. 
3 Robert Thurston Hopkins, Rudyard Kipling: A Literary Appreciation, 8. 
4 Rudyard Kipling, “The Enlightenments of Pagett, M.P.,” Contemporary Review 58 (September): 334. 
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wealthier Pagett had the good fortune to become an M.P. at home, Orde had quit college in 
order to “become a cog-wheel in the machinery of the great Indian Government.”5 Though 
the men are approximately the same age, Orde’s lengthy residence in India has clearly taken a 
toll on him, as his appearance is “harder and more square” and his face is “worn and 
wrinkled about the eyes.”6 The disparate paths of the two are affirmed as the narrator 
remarks that Orde looks “with something like envy at the comfortable outlines of Pagett’s 
blandly receptive countenance, the clear skin, the untroubled eye, and the mobile, clean-
shaven lips.”7  
“Enlightenments” contains little action but plenty of discussion as Pagett asks Orde 
and numerous other individuals, Indians and Britons alike, for their thoughts on India and 
the Indian National Congress in particular. Over the course of a morning, Pagett is steadily 
disabused of his many erroneous impressions about the state of affairs in the British Crown 
Jewel. The primary exchange between Pagett and Orde regarding “what popular feeling in 
India is really like y’know, now that it has wakened into political life” is interspersed with 
several short yet equally pointed conversations that Pagett strikes up with the various people 
who come to see the Deputy Commissioner.8 The native Indians Pagett encounters include 
Bishen Singh (a carpenter), Rasul Ali Khan (a Muslim landowner), “old Jelloo” (a respected 
villager and farmer), and Dina Nath (a young English-educated college student). Pagett also 
has the opportunity to speak with fellow Britons including Mr. Edwards (a mechanic and 
master of the Orde’s lodge), Reginald Burke (a manager of a local bank), and Dr. Eva 
McCreery Lathrop (the chief of a new women’s hospital). As a result of his exchanges with 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Ibid., 333. 
6 Ibid., 334. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid., 335. 
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all of these figures, most importantly Orde himself, Pagett is steadily “enlightened” that the 
rise of the Indian National Congress, despite what he may have heard or surmised back in 
London, has not been a positive development. Not only does the organization overlook the 
wishes and desires of the vast majority of Indians, it stymies the progressive operations of 
the colonial government.9   
Through both direct conversation and translation, Pagett’s exchanges with the 
Indians substantiate Orde’s assertion that the Congress has in no way inspired any “great 
excitement among the masses.”10 The M.P. is dismayed to learn that Singh, Khan, and Jelloo 
have never heard of the Congress, and even when they come to learn about it from the 
conversation at hand, they are unmoved. Only the English-educated student Dina Nath is 
aware of the organization but Pagett’s encounter with him also proves disappointing. 
Despite his education, Nath is unable to articulate clearly the Congress platform or explain 
satisfactorily the few examples of its goals that he is able to muster, such as repealing the 
Arms Act or shrinking the Indian Army. A gross caricature of the privileged Indian members 
of the Congress, Nath comes across as woefully naïve if not presumptuous in his parroting 
of its lofty aims: “…we should at once gain the same position [as England] in scale of nations. 
Sir, we wish to have the sciences, the arts, the manufactures, the industrial factories, with 
steam engines, and other motive powers, and public meetings, and debates….”11 When 
pressed by Pagett, Nath awkwardly confirms what the M.P. himself has only recently 
learned: the Congress is indeed an exclusive organization composed solely of Indian elites, 
one that is directed to “the educated young-man” and in which Muslims, Christians, the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Ibid., 347, 351. 
10 Ibid., 335. 
11 Ibid., 346. Emphasis in original. 
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working classes, peasants, and the poor have no place.12 After Nath leaves, Pagett admits to 
Orde that he is disenchanted with the youth’s “crudity of views,” finding the blind ambition 
of this particular cadre to be “curious, very curious—and callow.”13 In a story in which all 
“natives” come across in an unflattering light, it is no irony that once Pagett finally meets an 
English-educated, worldly Indian who is familiar with the Congress—and with whom he can 
speak directly without a translator—the youth succeeds only in confirming negative opinions 
about the body and its leaders.   
If Pagett’s encounters with ignorant, unsophisticated Indians reveal that the 
Congress has in no way inspired a spontaneous groundswell among the masses, his 
interactions with Orde and the other Britons illuminate why. Orde explains that the vast 
majority of the Indian population is illiterate and poor, a people whose primary concern is 
eking out a “mere existence,” which is only then followed by “a series of interests, pleasures, 
rituals, superstitions, and the like, based on centuries of tradition and usage.”14 As Singh and 
Jelloo had indicated, as poor men, they had never heard of the Congress and have no 
concern with politics whatsoever.15 Above all, Pagett learns, the ill-conceived venture that is 
the Congress is doomed to fail since there is no Indian nation that it could ever hope to 
represent or lead. As Orde impresses upon his guest, “pride of race, which also means race-
hatred, is the plague and curse of India and it spreads far,” an assessment that is 
substantiated by the Punjabi Singh’s scorn of Bengali Babus, Jelloo’s feud with his 
neighboring village, and Khan’s disenchantment with politics after the election of “a menial 
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12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid., 347. 
14 Ibid., 342. 
15 Ibid., 339, 344. 
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servant, an orderly” to a local post.16 Kipling further reinforces the widespread belief of a 
deep-seated animosity between Hindus and Muslims when he explains to Pagett that Khan’s 
hatred of “the elective system” is rational given his position as a Muslim.17 Belonging to “the 
most masterful and powerful minority in the country,” Khan is understandably loath to 
participate in a process that is sure to marginalize him.18  
As the story draws to a close, it seems that Pagett has been successfully disabused of 
his starting assumption that the rise of the Congress is a notable or positive development for 
India. Through the naïve M.P.’s many “enlightenments” about the real state of affairs in the 
country, Kipling recommends that Britons at home moderate any optimistic impressions 
they might have of the Congress because such views rely upon mistaken beliefs. 19 Despite all 
of its bombast and the word “National” in its title, Pagett and the reader discover that the 
Congress is fundamentally misguided because its lofty initiatives centered on equity and 
representation could never take root in a land whose peoples are so ignorant, so backward, 
and so divided. As Orde tells Pagett, “…if, in short, India were a Utopia of the debating-
room, and not a real land, this kind of talk might be worth listening to, but it is all based on 
false analogy and ignorance of the facts.”20 Kipling adds insult to injury by indicating that the 
Indian men of the Congress are, moreover, not even worthy of the liberal ideals that they 
champion given the deplorable condition of Indian women. For Dr. Eva Lathrop, the last 
person whom Pagett encounters and the only woman in the story, the very idea of the 
Congress is ridiculous when considering that India is plagued by “an all round entanglement 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 Ibid., 339, 344, 341. 
17 Ibid., 341. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Among several other damning revelations, Orde informs Pagett that Congress leaders are not Indian at all 
but Britons like Allan Octavian Hume and Charles Bradlaugh. For Orde, Congress supporters like Hume and 
Bradlaugh are arrogant and foolish men who are incapable of distinguishing between “the ambitions of a new 
oligarchy and the real wants of the people of whom [they] know nothing” (354). 
20 Ibid., 347. 
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of physical, social, and moral evils and corruptions, all more or less due to the unnatural 
treatment of women.”21 Far more than frivolous elections, India is in dire need of medical 
services for women, basic infrastructure such as hospitals, and numerous social reforms to 
uplift a population of which half is “morally dead.”22 Turning the inquisition upon Pagett 
himself, Dr. Lathrop poses the following question in a manner that is at once accusatory and 
exasperated: “You are a member of the English Parliament. Can you do nothing?”23 
Published at a moment in which the colonial government had solidified its base of 
power in India but whose officials were becoming increasingly aggravated by the grievance-
filled petitions and pleas from the actual Indian National Congress, Kipling’s “didactic fable” 
is illustrative on a number of fronts.24 A long-time resident of India, Kipling’s father, John 
Lockwood Kipling, had collaborated with his son on “Enlightenments,” a story that 
reflected the views of the broader “Anglo-Indian” community of which they were a part.25 
As indicated by Kipling’s unfavorable portrayal of the simple Pagett who presumes a great 
deal about the Congress and India but in truth knows absolutely nothing, Anglo-Indians 
were scornful of meddlesome “instant experts” whose overconfident inquiries and veiled 
critiques of the Raj were neither welcome nor appreciated.26 Such disdain resulted from the 
community’s perception that Britain’s ostensibly “honorable” endeavors in India—not to 
mention the overarching mission of the colonial regime—were being questioned by those 
least qualified to level judgment. As Steven Patterson observes, this defensive, contemptuous 
posture towards outsiders betrayed “an ideological blindness on the part of the Anglo-Indian 
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21 Ibid., 352. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid., 353. 
24 “Didactic fable” is Peter Havholm’s term; see Politics and Awe in Rudyard Kipling’s Fiction, 84. 
25 Kipling would remark later in life that “[the story] has a certain amount of perfectly good fact in it,” though, 
of course, the difference between “fact and “belief” is key here. See Rudyard Kipling, The Letters of Rudyard 
Kipling, 127. 
26 Steven Patterson, The Cult of Imperial Honor in British India, 123. 
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community… an unwillingness to face up to the consequences of imperial exploitation.”27 
Such purposeful blindness was, of course, part and parcel of British imperialism, which 
justified its existence in India and elsewhere as a laudable “civilizing mission” that necessarily 
benefitted the lives of its subject populations. Kipling’s propaganda piece about a 
presumptuous M.P.’s endless epiphanies about the true nature of India—over and against 
the emergence of the first indigenous political body that claimed to represent all Indians—
was among many works in this period that reified the perception of a providential, beneficial 
British Empire for all. 
 Yet this falsehood would not be sustained for much longer as those of the “literary 
caste” that Kipling so derided began to respond to these one-sided, disparaging portrayals 
about India and its inhabitants.28 This chapter examines how Siddha Mohana Mitra and 
Sarath Kumar Ghosh punctured the myth of benevolent British rule and offered their own 
perspectives on the relationship between Britain and India in their novels Hindupore: A Peep 
Behind the Indian Unrest: An Anglo-Indian Romance and The Prince of Destiny: The New Krishna, 
both of which were published in London in 1909. Writing at the heart of empire towards the 
end of a tumultuous decade that witnessed profound upheavals not just in India but in 
broader geopolitics, both Mitra and Ghosh proffered diagnoses, explanations, and 
recommendations regarding the ever-worsening state of “unrest” in India. The cultural 
imagining of India as Bharat, I will demonstrate, was central to their highly nuanced, 
complex advocacy for increased “sympathy” between colonizer and colonized at a moment 
in which the connection between the two polities was being scrutinized on all sides.  
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28 Kipling, “The Enlightenments of Pagett, M.P.,” 348. 
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Both Hindupore and Prince are set in the fictional Indian princely states Hindupore and 
Barathpur, microcosms of a fundamentally Hindu India. In these highly autonomous, 
otherworldly Hindu kingdoms, idealized British (and Irish) characters learn meaningful 
lessons from their equally romanticized Indian counterparts, misconceptions about 
Hinduism and its practices are clarified, and numerous cross-cultural bonds and alliances 
(e.g., kinship, friendship, and marriage) are forged or fortified. Jacques Derrida’s theories on 
hospitality and cosmopolitanism, I will suggest, elucidate the way in which these excessively 
saccharine exchanges between travelling Hindu heroes and their gracious foreign hosts 
epitomize the benevolence with which these authors thought that Britain ought to treat 
India. A clear riposte to Kipling’s “Enlightenments,” Mitra’s Hindupore centers on the all-too-
pleasant experiences of the gracious Irish M.P. Lord Tara in the eponymous Hindu kingdom 
and its surrounding regions. Through his various interactions with his Indian hosts and his 
metropolitan peers, Lord Tara comes away with a deep understanding of the “true” causes 
of the Indian unrest. In my reading, I will emphasize the way in which Lord Tara’s instant 
affinity and appreciation for all things Indian/Hindu culminate in his quite literal 
transformation into a bona fide Hindu hero and symbolic marriage with the equally splendid 
princess of Hindupore, Kamala. In Ghosh’s more solemn text, the singular Prince Barath—
prophesized from birth to be the divine liberator of Barathpur from the colonial yoke—
ultimately decides not to lead a major armed revolution against the British authorities in his 
kingdom. This decision results from his immense respect for his surrogate British parents, 
his passion for a British woman, and, most importantly, his ardent love of Britannia herself. 
As Britain’s professed “sincerest friend” and champion of its cause in India, Barath is 
shocked to discover an imminent revolt against the British brewing in Barathpur and 
adamantly refuses to serve as its leader; this apparent rejection of his “destiny” is deemed a 
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profound betrayal and results in his banishment from the kingdom.29 The prince’s decision 
to side with Britain rather than Barathpur/India at the critical moment is cast as a significant 
sacrifice, an incredibly generous gift to Britain that enables colonial rule to continue. 
Building upon recent scholarship about civis Britannicus [British subjecthood] or imperial 
citizenship, I will argue that Mitra and Ghosh’s advocacy of greater understanding and amity 
between colonizer and colonized reflected a much broader desire on the part of Indian elites 
that Britain fulfill its promises of liberal governance towards the country.30 
Hindupore and Prince’s portrayal of exemplary affective ties between colonizer and 
colonized has led critics to view these works as indicative of the early Indian English novel’s 
treatment of the “East-West” encounter.31 Though this is certainly the case, I seek to 
complicate the rather summary manner in which these two texts have been categorized and 
discussed in Indian, British, and American literary scholarship. Mitra and Ghosh’s 
appropriation of the idea of India as Bharat, I argue, resulted in a persuasive if not somewhat 
ironic case for greater “sympathy” to a targeted readership made up of Britons and their 
fellow Indian elites. In my reading, I point out how Mitra and Ghosh’s overarching appeals 
for greater harmony between colonizer and colonized coexist uneasily alongside a 
provocative concluding message in both novels: not only is improving relations with India a 
morally appropriate action for Britain, it is also a strategically wise move. As I will show at 
greater length, while on one level Mitra and Ghosh’s depiction of transcendent Hindu 
kingdoms and their remarkable inhabitants suggested that India’s earlier condition as Bharat 
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29 Sarath Kumar Ghosh, The Prince of Destiny: The New Krishna (London: Rebman), 538. 
30 Civis Britannicus may described as the emerging ideal at the turn of the twentieth century that all subjects of 
the British Crown, no matter their birth, color, or creed, were both entitled to, and deserved, equal recognition 
and treatment. See Mrinalini Sinha, “The Strange Death of an Imperial Ideal: The Case of Civis Britannicus,” 
(2011) and Sukanya Banerjee, Becoming Imperial Citizens: Indians in the Late-Victorian Empire (2010).  
31 Meenakshi Mukherjee, The Twice-Born Fiction, 64. 
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warranted British respect, the authors also departed from this logic in a striking way. Laying 
claim to the stunning victory of Japan in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, both Hindupore 
and Prince posit the existence of a potent Pan-Asian bloc of countries composed of India, 
Japan, and sometimes China that stands ready to overtake Western hegemony. The idea of 
India as a fundamentally Hindu space powerfully informs this geopolitical configuration as 
its member nations are united by a shared “Hindu” cultural heritage and India/Bharat is 
celebrated as the source of its animating energies. The nuanced message of both texts, I 
argue, may therefore be characterized as one of cautious conciliation, in which improved 
alliances and relationships between colonizer and colonized are prioritized but remain highly 
guarded and provisional. Powerfully countering the pathetic image of India circulating in 
works like Kipling’s “Enlightenments,” Hindupore and Prince offer visions of a nation that is 
united, strong, and deserving of the utmost respect not just because of its past history but 
also, more importantly, because of its present potential.   
 
“Unrest” in India and the Desire for Civis Britannicus   
What was the Indian “unrest”? And how could the idea of Bharat, typically 
understood to be coextensive with the borders and boundaries of the British colonial state, 
lay claim to Japan and China as well? Mitra and Ghosh’s provocative meditations on the 
nature of the colonial relationship in Hindupore and Prince provide compelling answers to 
these questions. The works are revelatory of a precarious moment at the turn of the 
twentieth century in which the ever-increasing fault lines of colonial rule were giving rise to 
different compelling visions about India’s essence, its “true” belonging and place in the 
global landscape, and what its future might hold. While Ghosh and Mitra’s overt appeals for 
greater harmony between Britain and India have been analyzed primarily with reference to 
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the contemporaneous swadeshi movement that embroiled the subcontinent after 1905, 
insufficient attention has been paid to the way in which their highly guarded message of 
friendship both intersected with, and was informed by, important geopolitical developments 
and debates occurring outside of the immediate colonizer-colonized dyad. That both Mitra 
and Ghosh were migrant authors located in London who used literature to grapple with the 
state of “unrest” back at home obliges us to consider the ways in which disparate ideas about 
how best to agitate against the Raj—and just who might really have India’s true interests at 
heart—were uniting and dividing Indian elites across a vast imperial web. The next section 
provides an overview of the material historical events and discussions that characterized the 
dynamic first decade of the twentieth century, an atmosphere in which Indian writers and 
thinkers could readily imagine an expansive, all-encompassing Bharat extending well beyond 
the contours of the colonial state.  
 
“Moderate” Nationalism and the Indian National Congress 
The emerging ideal of civis Britannicus is crucially bound up with what is commonly 
known in Indian nationalist historiography as the period of “moderate” nationalism. An 
ostensible “stage” or “phase” spanning from approximately 1870-1905, moderate 
nationalism is characterized by the apparently modest goals of the newly formed Indian 
National Congress and the rather measured way in which they were expressed and pursued.32 
Highly deferential and often cloying declarations of loyalty to the Crown alongside avowals 
of the British regime’s innumerable benefits to India are regarded as typical features of the 
“moderate” approach. Sanjay Seth has rightly suggested that the frequent dismissal of the 
early Congress along these lines betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of Indian politics at 
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32 Seth, “Rewriting Histories of Nationalism: The Politics of ‘Moderate Nationalism’ in India, 1870-1905,” 98. 
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the turn of the century. This error arises in large part from a tendency in Indian nationalist 
historiography to begin the story of Indian nationalism proper with the establishment of the 
Congress in 1885 given its eventual importance in the movement led by M.K. Gandhi and 
Jawaharlal Nehru. Seth astutely argues that narrativizing the early Congress with an eye 
towards 1947 prompts a misreading of its initial activities as necessarily constituting a 
preliminary, immature, or deficient first “act” of a much larger drama.33 In this way, instead 
of approaching the early Congress on its own terms and within its own sociopolitical 
context, we adopt a skewed teleological perspective, one in which knowledge of later events 
informs understandings of the past. Through such a lens, the Congress’s so-called 
“moderation”—epitomized by the absence of the demand of complete Indian sovereignty—
has often been misinterpreted as a defect or lack.  
But if the early Congress is situated within a larger late-nineteenth and early-
twentieth century global landscape of Empire, its seemingly restrained or “moderate” vision 
and approach look quite different. As suggested by the recent scholarship of Mrinalini Sinha 
and Sukanya Banerjee, far from considering themselves “Indians” in the nationalist sense—
an understanding that would arise most powerfully under the direction of M.K. Gandhi 
much later—early Congress leaders agitated for change on the basis of their ostensible status 
as British subjects who were theoretically entitled to all accompanying rights and privileges 
therein.34 These individuals viewed themselves as enlightened citizens of Europe, rather than 
of India. Contrary to Kipling’s portrayal of a stagnant India in which genuine politics was 
not only absent but unnecessary, the establishment of the Indian National Congress in 
December 1885 was in fact an outgrowth of the dynamic environment that was late 
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34 Sinha, “The Strange Death of an Imperial Ideal,” 30. See also Banerjee, Becoming Imperial Citizens, 28-29. 
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nineteenth-century India.35 The very fact that an elite cadre of Indian men from Bengal, 
Bombay, and Madras purposefully came together to form the first all-India political body—
over and above several smaller local organizations that had surfaced in previous years—
testifies to the growing connections between the regions as well as the burgeoning cultural 
imagining of a cohesive Indian “nation” that such affiliation and interaction implied.36 Much 
as the young Dina Nath had relayed to Pagett, the Congress desired, among other changes, 
increased Indian participation in the legislative councils and local administration, reforms to 
the qualifying procedures for the Indian Civil Service, less expenditure on the military, and 
far greater material and financial investment within the polity.37 Resolutions and petitions 
were extremely measured in tone as leaders would “regret” (not “condemn”), “suggest” (not 
“demand”) and, at most, “urge” Britain to adopt one course of action or another.38 As 
historians have observed, a frequent strategy was to pepper petitions, resolutions, and 
speeches with direct quotes from formal decrees such as the Queen’s Proclamation of 1858 
and statements by prominent British officials. Doing so not only substantiated the 
Congress’s arguments but also tacitly rebuked the colonial government for neglecting its 
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35 In “Enlightenments,” the assertion of the mechanic and Master of the Lodge, Mr. Edwards, is particularly 
striking: “There are no politics, in a manner of speaking, in India. It’s all work” (337).  
36 As Bose and Jalal observe, “What was novel…about the late nineteenth century was the inter-connectedness, 
though not necessarily convergence, of social and political developments across regions on an unprecedented 
scale. In that general sense it was during this period that the idioms, and even the irascible idiosyncrasies, of 
communitarian identities and national ideologies were sought to be given a semblance of coherence and 
structure” (86). Relatedly, the proliferation of voluntary political and social associations across India, a surge in 
vernacular and English-language newspapers, growing cultural and artistic production, not to mention the 
connective infrastructure of the colonial state, all contributed to new levels of public life and engagement in 
this period, particularly among the middle- and upper- classes (Metcalf and Metcalf 123, Banerjee-Dube 204). 
Examples of such provincial organizations include the Poona Sarvajanik Sabha (PSS) founded by Mahadev 
Govind Ranade in Pune in 1870 and the Indian Association founded by Surendranath Banerjea in Calcutta in 
1876 (Wolpert 253, Metcalf and Metcalf 136). 
37 Kipling, “The Enlightenments of Pagett, M.P.,” 346. 
38 Seth, “Rewriting Histories of Nationalism,” 102. 
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enumerated duties and responsibilities towards India.39 Though Congress leaders expressed 
their “prayers” in a markedly deferential manner, the implicit suggestion that they were well 
within their rights to press for certain changes as worthy subjects of the British Empire was 
unmistakable. For example, in 1886 Congress president W.C. Bonnerjee proclaimed that 
Indians desired to be “governed according to the ideals of governments prevalent in 
Europe” and that in calling for certain changes the Congress was simply following the 
example set by John Bright and Richard Cobden, the two co-founders of the Anti-Corn Law 
League.40 Likewise, in his presidential address of 1895, Surendranath Banerjea reminded the 
Crown that “In this Congress from year to year we ask England to accomplish her glorious 
work.”41  
The unfulfilled promise that weighed most heavily on the Congress was the colonial 
government’s failure to develop India to the level enjoyed by European countries and Britain 
in particular.42 In Kipling’s “Enlightenments,” Dina Nath’s mention of the organization’s 
desire for “the manufactures, and industrial factories, with steam engines” was accurate in so 
far as Congress leaders believed that India’s path forward depended crucially on its 
technological and industrial advancement.43 This expectation was reinforced by British 
assurances and insinuations that the colonial state was indeed “preparing” Indians for 
eventual self-government and would thus prioritize investing within the country.44 
Congress’s vociferous critique of the “drain” of wealth from colony to metropole—
articulated primarily in terms of economic resources but also principled governance—
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39 Ibid., 101. Until 1908 all Congress reports included a prefatory document entitled “Some of England’s 
Pledges to India,” which contained quotations from these decrees and speeches. See Daniel Argov, Moderates 
and Extremists in the Indian Nationalist Movement, 38-39. 
40 Qtd. in Schneer, London 1900, 188. See also Harish P. Kaushik, The Indian National Congress in England, 11. 
41 Qtd. in Seth, “Rewriting Histories of Nationalism,” 103. 
42 Ibid., 106. 
43 Kipling, “The Enlightenments of Pagett, M.P.,” 346. Seth, “Rewriting Histories of Nationalism,” 105.  
44 Seth, “Rewriting Histories of Nationalism,” 101. 
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reflects the growing perception that Britain was brazenly flouting its most essential duties 
towards India. The revered “Grand Old Man of India,” Dadabhai Naoroji (1825-1917), 
made the following observations in 1880 and 1901 respectively:  
In this Memorandum I desire to submit for the kind and generous consideration of 
His Lordship the Secretary of State for India, that from the same cause of the 
deplorable drain, besides the material exhaustion of India, the moral loss to her is no 
less sad and lamentable. With the material wealth go also the wisdom and experience of the 
country. Europeans occupy almost all the higher places in every department of 
government…While in India they acquire India’s money, experience and wisdom, 
and when they go, they carry both away with them, leaving India so much poorer in 
material and moral wealth…All [Europeans] effectually do, is to eat the substance of India, 
material and moral, while living there, and when they go, they carry away all they have acquired…45 
 
My whole object in all my writings is to impress upon the British People, that instead 
of a disastrous explosion of the British Indian Empire, as must be the result of the 
present dishonourable un-British system of government, there is a great and glorious future for 
Britain and India to an extent unconceivable [sic] at present, if the British people will 
awaken to their duty, will be true to their British instincts of fair play and justice, and will insist 
upon the faithful and conscientious fulfilment of all their great and solemn promises and pledges.46 
 
Here Naoroji casts himself as a well-wisher of Britain, a humble envoy who makes a moral 
appeal to his rulers to recognize their wrongdoing and change course not just for the sake of 
their Indian subjects but also their own. The persistent “drain” of material and intellectual 
resources from colony to metropole, which leaves India impoverished on all counts and 
unable to progress, constitutes a profound injustice that the British nation cannot sanction. 
Taken from Naoroji’s magnum opus Poverty and Un-British Rule in India, the second excerpt 
pointedly refers to Britons’ perception of themselves as an enlightened and civilized people, 
a nation whose very sense of self was grounded in liberal ideals. By thus exposing the 
“dishonourable un-British” character of the Empire, Naoroji attempts to shame his 
metropolitan audience over their country’s glaring hypocrisy towards India. Strikingly 
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45 Dadabhai Naoroji, “The Moral Poverty of India, and Native Thoughts on the Present British Indian Policy,” 
465-466. Emphasis added. See also Metcalf and Metcalf, A Concise History of Modern India, 124. 
46 Qtd. in Seth, “Rewriting Histories of Nationalism,” 104, fn. 24. Emphasis added.  
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reminiscent of Edmund Burke’s charges of the wrongdoing by Warren Hastings and the 
East India Company over one hundred years earlier, Naoroji makes the case that if British 
claims to beneficence, civility, and nobility are not mere rhetorical flourishes, the colonial 
government must be held accountable for its malfeasance and fulfill all “great and solemn 
promises and pledges” made to India.47 Much as Mitra and Ghosh will do at the end of the 
decade in Hindupore and Prince, Naoroji offers both the carrot and the stick. Adopting a truly 
“British” course of action will redeem Britons in the eyes of their Indian subjects, restore the 
integrity of their rule, and inaugurate a “great and glorious future” for both countries. But 
should Britain continue on its immoral path, a “disastrous explosion” of its regime was 
imminent. 
Naoroji’s arguments reflect early Congress ideology that British rule on the whole 
was a positive development for India, one that could benefit the country immensely. While 
its officials and policies were often prejudiced, overbearing, and cruel, there remained great 
faith that these regrettable aspects could be remedied by “reminding,” “urging,” or 
“recommending” Britons near and far to live up to their liberal ideals and execute their noble 
mission in India in full measure. But it bears emphasis that in doing so Britain would merely 
be keeping promises already made or implied to Indians precisely as fellow subjects 
beholden to the Crown.48 That the early Congress earnestly believed that India’s 
advancement could occur only under British guidance was not a contradiction in terms. Seth 
explains this in an incisive passage: 
the moderation of Moderate Nationalism lay not in a failure to imagine the nation, in 
an insufficiency or lack of nationalism to be explained by an external cause, but 
rather in the face that its imagination was one in which the ‘nation’ included people 
unfitted for political rights, in which politics was identified with that domain of 
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47 Sumit Sarkar, The Swadeshi Movement in Bengal, 30-31. 
48 Sinha, “The Strange Death of an Imperial Ideal,” 36. Sarkar, The Swadeshi Movement in Bengal, 31. 
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public life created and made by possible by British rule, in which the inadequacies of 
‘the people’ were measured by their distance from this domain, in which the 
educated elites had to represent the poor, rough, and ignorant masses, and where the 
continuation of British rule was necessary for its eventual supersession.49 
 
Thus, while the Congress was national in the sense that its elite leaders viewed themselves, to 
use Naoroji’s own words, as the “true interpreters and mediators between the masses of our 
countrymen and our rulers,” the body hardly qualifies as nationalist in the way of demanding 
independence as an autonomous nation-state.50 Consonant with their quest for civis 
Britannicus and the attendant rights and privileges enjoyed by Britons around the world, early 
Congress leaders went no further than advocating Indian self-governance under the British 
aegis.51 As Surendranath Banerjea asserted in 1902, “We have no higher aspiration than that 
we should be admitted into the great confederacy of self-governing states of which England 
is the august mother.”52 With such a perspective in place, the so-called moderation or loyalty 
that is frequently cited as evidence of a limited, deficient, or immature Congress is more 
accurately understood as a “constituent element” or “structuring principle” of its ideology, 
“the very ground from which criticism [of British rule] became possible.”53   
 
Partition and the Indian “Unrest”  
The tenure of the arrogant and imperious Governor-General George Nathaniel 
Curzon from 1899-1905 proved cataclysmic for the early Congress and turn-of-the-century 
Indian politics. Contemptuous of the Congress’s political aspirations, Curzon imposed a 
number of draconian measures targeting its elite Bengali leadership. The most significant of 
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these was the 1905 partition of Bengal; the act carved up the province such that there was a 
Muslim Bengali-speaking majority in the east and a Hindu non-Bengali speaking majority in 
the west, thus rupturing the stronghold of the Bengali bhadralok.54 This calculated division of 
Bengal along sectarian lines, justified on the basis of administrative “efficiency,” deeply 
offended Bengalis and non-Bengalis alike, and demonstrated once again and in no uncertain 
terms that Britain neither considered nor cared for its Indian subjects.55 The stimulus of 
partition catalyzed the swadeshi movement, a vehement campaign of protest against the 
colonial state that spread rapidly from its origin in Bengal to Maharashtra, Punjab, Madras, 
and other regions.56 Frequently described as the Indian “unrest” by Britons and Indians alike, 
the swadeshi movement lasted from approximately 1904—when rumors of the impending 
partition produced the first wave of protests in Bengal—to 1912 when Bengali terrorists 
threw a bomb at the new Viceroy Charles Hardinge in Delhi.57  
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56 Metcalf and Metcalf, A Concise History of Modern India, 157. Banerjee-Dube, A History of Modern India, 227. 
57 Banerjee-Dube, A History of Modern India, 226. Metcalf and Metcalf, A Concise History of Modern India, 163. 
Given the great complexity of the swadeshi movement and the numerous ways in which it intersected with 
phenomena both before and after the immediate tumult in Bengal, there are differing views among historians 
regarding when the movement began and ended. As will be discussed, Sumit Sarkar’s theorization of the 
movement as spanning from 1903-1908 has been broadened in recent scholarship (Bate 42). The attempt on 
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As suggested by its name, a portmanteau of the Sanskrit words swa [self] and desh 
[country], a primary tenet of the swadeshi movement was self-reliance, which broadly 
advocated a repudiation of the Raj in all possible spheres and the privileging of indigenous 
goods, services, and institutions. Galvanized by the hostile act of partition, Bengalis and non-
Bengalis alike took up the swadeshi cause and in its first wave the movement transcended 
class, caste, and religious divides.58 Historians have noted that resistance manifested in 
numerous ways from mass meetings, lengthy petitions, printed materials, boycotts, bonfires 
of British goods, and, soon enough, violence. The Congress leader Surendranath Banerjea, 
whose inspiring commitment to swadeshi earned him the nickname “Surrender Not,” likened 
the furor surrounding swadeshi to that of a bona fide political revolution: 
I have not witnessed a revolution in my time, nor by an effort of the imagination can 
I conceive what it is like. But, amid the upheaval of the Swadeshi movement, I could, 
I think, obtain some idea of the transformation of public feeling and of the wild 
excitement which must precede a revolutionary movement. A strange atmosphere is 
created. Young and old, rich and poor, literate and illiterate, all breathe it, and all are 
swayed and moved and even transported by the invisible influence that is felt. 
Reason halts; judgement is held in suspense; it is one mighty impulse that moves the 
heart of the community and carries everything before it. An eminent doctor told me 
that in the height of the Swadeshi movement girl-patient of his, not more than six 
years old, cried out in her delirium that she would not take any foreign medicine.59 
 
While Curzon’s hostile policies had given the Congress a powerful raison d’etre and incited 
Indians on a wide scale, the overall cohesion that Surendranath had observed did not last. As 
the leading historian of the movement, Sumit Sarkar, has observed, the swadeshi cause rallied 
a number of political actors who had been agitating against the colonial state in various ways 
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both in and out of Bengal. They all had their own agendas and approaches regarding India’s 
subjugation yet held in common a rejection of the conservative Congress tack. Indeed, it is 
only when juxtaposed against these additional players that the early Congress may be deemed 
“moderate” in so far as it now found itself on the defensive in an ever-burgeoning political 
field. Sarkar’s influential four-fold classification of the major strands of swadeshi resistance is 
briefly summarized as follows: 
•! The Moderate Tradition. Here the main actor is the Indian National Congress and 
leaders like Surendranath Banerjea and Gopal Krishna Gokhale. Sarkar notes that the 
moderate strain was dominant before the partition was finalized, a period ranging 
from December 1903 to July 1905.60 Predictably, this coterie relied upon the 
established methods of organizing meetings, delivering speeches, drafting petitions, 
and disseminating printed material in which they advanced logical arguments against 
the partition, and almost always in English. They aimed to mobilize their fellow 
educated Indian elites and appealed directly to British officials.61 With the exception 
of Surendranath, most leaders only very reluctantly endorsed the boycott.62  
   
•! Constructive Swadeshi. This contingent advocated a program of self-reliance or 
atmashakti that essentially entailed ignoring the British regime by creating an 
autonomous cultural space informed by “traditional” Hindu practices and beliefs. 
Constructive swadeshi flourished from approximately 1905-1907 and Rabindranath 
Tagore was its main champion.63 The primary method of protest was the boycott of 
all foreign goods and privileging swadeshi products. This strand continued an ongoing 
practice of establishing independent shops, small-scale industries, educational 
institutions, presses, newspapers, and juridical bodies, all of which were to be 
patronized instead of their British counterparts. A program of national education 
was an especially important element of its platform.64 Constructive swadeshi appears 
to have petered out beginning in mid-1907 due to its overly ambitious agenda as well 
as Tagore’s shift in thinking on swadeshi and Indian nationalism more broadly.65  
 
•! Political Extremism. This strain diverged from both the moderate tradition and 
constructive swadeshi and was active from 1905-1907.66 Leaders such as Bipin 
Chandra Pal, Aurobindo Ghosh, and B.G. Tilak had long been turned off by the 
Congress, finding its obsequious manner both ineffective and insulting. They also 
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thought that constructive swadeshi was unrealistic—complete independence from 
Britain or swaraj [self-rule] would be necessary before any program of national 
regeneration could be legitimately assumed.67 Rather than appealing for change or 
withdrawing into an insular cultural space, the extremists held that British rule was 
fundamentally incompatible with India’s wellbeing and confrontation with the 
colonial state was unavoidable. In April 1907, Aurobindo Ghosh advocated adding 
methods of “passive resistance” and civil disobedience. They also sanctioned 
violence when repression became intolerable.68  
 
•! Terrorism. Beginning in 1908, Bengal and other parts of India witnessed increasingly 
frequent and effective assassinations of British officials, robberies, bomb blasts, and 
other acts of violence. Terrorists shared many of the same ideals as the political 
extremists, including a desire for immediate swaraj and the glorification of violence.69 
Their dominance from 1908-1911 may be attributed to the growing influence of 
ideas and persons from Maharashtra (where violence had been ongoing for some 
time); the arrest or exile of various extremist leaders; and the suppression of self-
improvement groups or samitis that had been active for a few decades.70 A 
particularly notorious terrorist act occurred at Muzaffarpur, Bihar in April 1908 
when a bomb intended for a British magistrate killed two British women instead; 
Tilak defended the attack in his Marathi-language newspaper Kesari and was 
subsequently arrested.71 Sarkar distinguishes this strand from “revolutionary” or 
“militant” nationalism because such acts of violence were carried out primarily by 
elite actors and did not constitute nor inspire a groundswell against the colonial 
state.72  
 
Sarkar’s schema elucidates the sheer dynamism of the swadeshi movement, in particular how a 
number of different actors consciously overlapped and collided with one another in terms of 
ideology, leadership, and method. The emergence and interaction of these four major strains 
of swadeshi resistance from 1904-1912 suggest that Curzon failed miserably at his goal of 
denuding Indian political aspirations, but when it came to “assist[ing] [the Congress] to a 
peaceful demise,” he may have been successful to an extent.73 The divergence of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
67 As Sarkar argues, for this legion the primary goal was “…political independence—complete and 
unadulterated swaraj, and not piecemeal constitutional reform or slow self-regeneration…” (ibid). 
68 Ibid., 55-58.  
69 Ibid., 64. Ramnath, “Reading Sumit Sarkar,” 66.  
70 Peter Heehs, “Revolutionary Terrorism in British Bengal,” 153-169. 
71 Wolpert, A New History of India, 282. 
72 Sarkar counters the tendency in Indian nationalist historiography to label this strand’s activities as indicative 
of “revolutionary” or “militant” nationalism (63). Ramnath argues that the colonial government’s tendency to 
label swadeshi militants as “anarchists” is similarly mistaken (64). 
73 Qtd. in Wolpert, A New History of India, 274.  
 192 
constructive swadeshi, political extremism, and terrorism from the established Congress tack 
and the organization’s relegation to the periphery during much of the decade evidences a 
shifting political climate in which new ways of dealing with Britain were increasingly 
desired.74 As Goswami observes, the swadeshi movement evidenced a meaningful expansion 
and redefinition of Indian politics at the turn of the century: “[The swadeshi movement] 
contested both narrow institutional understanding of politics and the formalistic conception 
of rights enshrined in classical liberalism and permanently deferred in a colonial state. What 
it rejected outright was the relegation of the political to the ‘speechifying’ sanctified precincts 
of the [Congress], what Tagore called the ‘book-learned…watch-and-chain-bedecked 
assembly.’ ”75 Indeed, the very fact that the partition of Bengal was finalized in October 1905 
despite the persistent protest of Congress leaders for well over a year crystallized its futility for 
many Indians.76 Mounting tensions within the organization regarding the efficacy of 
“constitutional methods” culminated in an ugly split—complete with the hurling of insults 
and shoes—between the moderate and extremist wings at Surat in 1907.77 The two factions 
would meet separately until 1916.78   
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In addition to revealing growing dissatisfaction with the Congress and the increasing 
volatility of Indian politics, the swadeshi movement crucially reinforced the idea of India as 
the Hindu space Bharat. As Goswami has shown, the swadeshi movement both relied upon 
and concretized the perception that India’s social body was righteously Hindu.79 With the 
exception of the moderates, swadeshi activism was overwhelmingly articulated, performed, 
and reinforced in a potent sociocultural idiom grounded in Hindu beliefs and practices.80 
These highly overdetermined rites included the tying of rakhis [sacred threads] to represent 
solidarity, taking collective vows in Hindu temples to abstain from foreign goods, wearing 
swadeshi clothes after bathing in the Ganges, and the condemnation of British goods by 
Hindu priests. The appropriation of Bankim’s “Bande Mataram” as the movement’s rallying 
cry is particularly telling given its manifest Hindu imagery and the virulent anti-Muslim 
prejudice of Anandamath from which it was drawn. By 1908 British officials had deemed the 
slogan subversive enough to outlaw its utterance in public spaces.81 “Bharat Mata” herself 
became ubiquitous in the form of songs, visual imagery, and other cultural works, an ever-
present reminder of an imperiled Hindu motherland that demanded unity and sacrifice from 
her “children.”82 As Rabindranath Tagore later explored in Ghare Baire [The Home and the 
World] (1916), the fetishization of swadeshi as a profoundly Hindu endeavor resulted in the 
alienation of Bengali Muslims and other marginalized groups, a bitter irony given swadeshi’s 
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initial claims of brotherhood and solidarity.83 Lower-class Muslims in east Bengal were also 
coerced into the expensive boycott effort through threats of social ostracism and violence, 
which in turn convinced Muslim leaders of the need for separate political representation 
from Hindus.84 Serious communal riots erupted in east Bengal from 1906-1907, evidencing 
the problematic elitism of the movement as well as its exclusionary Hindu bent.85   
 
Swadeshi Transnationalism  
 The rather insular story of swadeshi has received new attention in the past decade as  
historians have sought to broaden Sarkar’s model within a wider geopolitical frame. Kris 
Manjapra, Maia Ramnath, and Dilip Menon are among many scholars who in recent years 
have elucidated the ways in which the conventional story of swadeshi—one in which the 
region of Bengal and the strands of constructive swadeshi and political extremism 
predominate—overlooks its crucial transnational dimensions.86 On top of the partition of 
Bengal and the formal launch of swadeshi protest, 1905 must be considered an annus mirabilis 
due to the occurrence of several momentous events outside of India that influenced swadeshi 
resistance both on the ground and in the global Indian diaspora.87 While it may seem 
paradoxical to consider the transnational elements of a movement that so heavily 
emphasized indigeneity, it is only by situating swadeshi within a more expansive temporal and 
geopolitical context that the movement’s sheer complexity and dense entanglements far 
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beyond its immediate location of Bengal and the colonial state come into focus.88 With such 
a perspective in place, the apparently local strategies of resistance that Sarkar identifies 
emerge as demonstrably transnational in scope. This is particularly true when considering the 
wide-ranging movements of a small yet influential contingent of elite Indians who eagerly 
pursued various kinds of alliances with sympathetic actors around the world. Fanning out to 
Britain, France, the United States, Japan, and elsewhere, these Indians forged new 
connections with those who could provide the kinds of knowledge, ideological support, or 
material resources deemed necessary at this critical juncture. The intensification of Pan-
Asian discourse after Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War on the one hand and the 
establishment of various institutions by diasporic Indians on the other bolstered local 
swadeshi resistance by expanding its geopolitical configurations and imaginings beyond the 
colonial dyad. 
*       *       * 
  George Nathaniel Curzon is notorious for his brazen policies in India, but the fact 
that he considered himself an expert on East Asia and wrote a book entitled Problems of the 
Far East: Japan-China-Korea is less well known. First published in 1894, Problems was based on 
Curzon’s travels in the region and offered a typical positivist account of recent sociopolitical 
events and their significance for the world and especially the British Empire.89 That Curzon 
was quite taken with Japan is clear, but his prescience about the nation’s ascent onto the 
world stage is particularly striking:   
… [Japan] sets before herself the supreme ambition of becoming, on a smaller scale, the Britain of 
the Far East. By means of an army strong enough to defend our shores, and to render 
invasion unlikely, and still more of a navy sufficiently powerful to sweep the seas, she 
sees that England has retained that unique and commanding position in the West 
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which was won for us by the industry and force of character of our people, by the 
mineral wealth of these islands, by the stability of our Government, and by the 
colonising genius of our sons. By similar methods Japan hopes to arrive at a more modest 
edition of the same result in the East.90 
 
Curzon’s praise of Japan, arguably sincere yet inescapably paternalistic, must be read within 
the context of the evolving discourse of Yellow Peril, the xenophobic idea that the “yellow” 
nations, specifically China and Japan, posed a serious threat to Western white racial 
hegemony.91 While the discourse had thus far centered on a menacing yet dormant China, 
immense in population and resources, Curzon argued that it was in fact Japan that held the 
greatest potential and ambition to arise.92 Confident in his forecast, he even made the rather 
specific prediction that “in the course of the next quarter of a century she will take her place 
on a level of technical equality with the great Powers of the West.”93 Yet such assertions 
about Japan’s latency are undermined by Curzon’s arrogance that the country would act in 
predictable ways complimentary of the British. Far more than reflexively praising Britain for 
being Japan’s natural role model, Curzon’s characterization of the island nation as an 
incipient “Britain of the Far East” reveals an attempt to contain the nation’s ascent within 
desirable parameters. Dismissing the necessary corollary of his argument, Curzon maintains 
that though Japan’s star is on the rise, it would pose no danger to Western (and British) 
interests.94 Contrary to suggestions that a dominant Japan would challenge the “White ensign 
in the Asiatic tropics,” Curzon avers that “[The Japanese] are lacking in colonising (though 
certainly not in commercial) energy, and in the hereditary instinct for expansion.”95  
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Curzon’s clairvoyance was limited to his prediction of Japan’s ascent alone. Not only 
did the nation modernize far more quickly than he had reckoned, it did indeed have the 
“hereditary instinct for expansion” after all given that its conflict with Russia concerned 
holdings in Korea and Manchuria.96 Curzon’s decision to go forward with the partition of 
Bengal in order to suppress Indian political aspirations appears all the more calculated when 
considering that large portions of the Indian public were rapt with the Russo-Japanese War 
and later the Russian Revolution.97 The first major armed conflict of the twentieth century, 
the War captivated people worldwide as it pitted a newly modernized Asian nation against an 
established European power, symbolizing a veritable test of widely held notions about 
intrinsic Western supremacy and Eastern backwardness.98 By the time Curzon announced 
the partition of Bengal in July 1905, Japan had definitively routed Russia, and Indians joined 
oppressed peoples near and far in celebrating the victory and its significance for 
contemporary geopolitics.99  
Constituting what Cemil Aydin calls a “global moment,” Japan’s startling triumph 
over Russia was universally regarded as a watershed event because it upended entrenched 
beliefs about the world order held by Western and non-Western countries alike.100 While 
Japan’s victory reinforced growing fears of Yellow Peril and the decline of Western authority 
for European powers, countries in the global south were spellbound by a peer nation’s 
transformation into a commanding presence on the world stage. An excerpt from a Gujarati 
newspaper in January 1905 testifies not just to the depth of such awe but also the widespread 
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feeling that the Japanese victory was a collective “Eastern” achievement: “…the twentieth 
century could not have breathed a more…encouraging message of hope into the ears of the 
downtrodden nations of the East than that which it has whispered on the opening day of the 
present year through the surrender of Port Arthur by Russia to Japan.”101 Observing the 
events from South Africa, M.K. Gandhi similarly asserted that “So far and wide have the 
roots of Japanese victory spread that we cannot now visualize all the fruit it will put forth. 
The people of the East seem to be waking up from their lethargy.”102  
 The reverberation of such reactions around the world heralded the dawn of a new 
era. Among the most significant ideological effects of the Russo-Japanese War was its 
reinforcement of the overdetermined categories “East” and “West” but in entirely new ways 
as the ostensibly core qualities of each had been proven malleable.103 Japan’s impressive 
victory over a European power was widely commended in other Asian countries for its 
perceived success in synthesizing the best of East and West, that is, achieving rapid 
modernization in the manner of the “West” but while retaining its core “Eastern” or 
“Asian” identity.104 As long-held beliefs about Western superiority and Eastern inferiority 
dissolved, Asian countries increasingly looked to Japan as a shining example of a uniquely 
“Asian” modernity that could be replicated in their own countries.105 Departing from notions 
of complementary East/West identities advanced in recent years by Keshab Chandra Sen, 
Swami Vivekananda, and Kakuzo Okakura, countries in the global south were more 
interested in mimicking Japan’s “Western” progress than in bolstering ideas about a pacific, 
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unifying “East.”106 Demonstrating what Kris Manjapra calls “intellectual swadeshi,” in the 
aftermath of the War Tokyo grew in popularity as a destination for Indian students to gain 
the valuable knowledge that Japan had harnessed from the West, which was then to be 
applied domestically.107 In addition to pursuing such expertise, Indian students sought 
alliances with those who might to be sympathetic to their cause. Especially considering the 
derision that they frequently confronted in Japan, efforts to generate cross-cultural 
camaraderie along the lines of a shared “Asian” identity are remarkable.108 For example, in 
April 1907 a small contingent of Indian students in Tokyo came together to celebrate Tilak’s 
Shivaji festival, an event that was attended by Chinese activists as well as the former Japanese 
prime minister Okuma Shigenobu.109 The presence of the revered Japanese leader helped 
solidify perceptions of Pan-Asian unity though he did have certain provisos for Indian 
political aspirations.110 The Indian and Chinese participants subsequently formed the Asian 
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Solidarity Society, which was founded on a platform of diguo zhui [opposition to imperialism] 
and zibao qi bangzu [protection of solidarity].111 The political agitation of the pan-Islamist 
Maulavi Baraktullah, Professor of Urdu at the School of Foreign Languages at Tokyo 
University from 1909-1914, further contributed to perceptions of Pan-Asian solidarity in 
Japan.112   
 But undoubtedly the most significant Indian agitating abroad during these turbulent 
swadeshi years was Shyamji Krishnavarma, a highly influential revolutionary who brought the 
movement’s politics to the very seat of imperial power. His track from loyalist to firebrand 
was a familiar one for turn-of-the-century Indian elites, but in this case the consequences 
would prove grave for the Raj.113 It was in the cataclysmic year of 1905 that Krishnavarma 
established three key institutions that provided a platform for Indians both inside and 
outside of Britain to agitate and forge new alliances with sympathizers around the world. 
Through Krishnavarma’s efforts it was London that became, ironically enough, the most 
important node of swadeshi political agitation after Bengal.114   
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In February 1905 Krishnavarma founded the Indian Home Rule Society, a political 
association dedicated to mobilizing support for Indian self-government within the Empire.115 
A critical component of the Society was The Indian Sociologist, a monthly periodical that 
became a leading mouthpiece of revolutionary Indian politics worldwide.116 Presenting 
himself as a “genuine Indian interpreter” for the U.K. in the inaugural issue, Krishnavarma 
sharply indicted British imperialism as a profound hypocrisy: “The British people…can 
never succeed in being a nation of freemen and lovers of freedom so long as they continue 
to send out members of the dominating classes to exercise despotisms in Britain’s name 
upon the various conquered races that constitute Britain’s military Empire.”117 
Krishnavarma’s close colleague and ally, British socialist Henry Hyndman, addressed Indians 
in the manner of swadeshi political extremists and terrorists and implicitly criticized the 
moderate Congress position: “Indians must learn to rely upon themselves alone for their 
political salvation, that is, the forcible expulsion of the British rule from India and not hope 
for anything from the changes of governors and governments.”118  
Given the Indian Sociologist’s incendiary politics, it is not surprising that the British 
government banned its importation into India in 1907 or that its publisher was arrested for 
sedition in 1909.119 Testifying to Krishnavarma’s alliances with an array of prominent figures, 
the anarchist Guy Aldred took over publication of the Sociologist at his own press; he too was 
convicted of sedition and imprisoned for a year.120 Printing then shifted to the continental 
home of revolution, Paris, where Krishnavarma had relocated earlier under threat of arrest in 
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London.121 Here he reassumed editorship of his monthly, which in April 1909 offered a 
provocative assessment of ongoing Indian terrorism. In an unsigned article entitled “A 
Suggestion for a Panasian Union in Paris,” Pan-Asianism and swadeshi resistance were linked 
together in the following way: 
It is very sad to note such symptoms of terror. But they are not unnatural. Unless 
England can win the heartfelt love of the Indian masses; it is felt that [British legal] 
precautions are in vain. Deplorable, indeed, is the outlook. Perhaps the only 
consoling feature of public opinion at the present day is the marked improvement in 
English public morality as regards the doctrine of political assassination…It is felt 
that the use of Russian methods by the Indian malcontents is a proceeding which 
shows the proceeding [sic] in quite a new light to the English mind. 
 
Speaking as a friend of Asia, long oppressed and robbed by the European tyrannies, 
I cannot recommend too strongly the cultivation of a Panasian Union at Paris… 
There are educated Indians, Osmanlis, Egyptians, Japanese, Chinese, Arabs, 
Armenians, Parsis, Persians, Siamese, and others all to be found at Paris. A 
PANASIAN PARLIAMENT could be easily organized, which would co-ordinate 
the ambition and policy of an Emancipated East...Asia has sat too long in darkness 
and in the shadow of death. Let Asia arise in Unity, and Unity will bring Might. 
When the English Mlecha partitioned the Bengali Land, when they tore the Garment 
of Gunga, they did the last insult and the last outrage which were required in the 
decrees of destiny to herald the Freedom of the Glorious East.122 
 
Here the anonymous author makes the understated “suggestion” that various “Asian” 
peoples in Paris ought to come together to form what is ostensibly a sovereign political 
institution representing their home countries’ mutual interests. The French capital is cast as 
London’s foil, a city amenable to peoples of all backgrounds and creeds, and especially 
revolutionaries, where such a scheme could be “easily organized.” A major motivation 
behind the Union is the partition of Bengal, a local grievance that is cast as a collective 
injustice for all of Asia. Decried as “the last insult and the last outrage,” the partition 
constitutes an effective rupture or rape of the holy river Ganges, whose “Garment” has been 
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“tor[n].” This image is likely an allusion to the pivotal scene of the attempted disrobing of 
Queen Draupadi in the epic Mahabharata, a profound humiliation that her five husbands later 
avenged with a fury. Similarly, the grave injustice of the partition compels Asians worldwide 
to unite and herald a new era in which an “Emancipated East” would form a potent 
geopolitical bulwark against any future oppression by “European tyrannies.” Though the 
author proffers another solution to the ongoing conflict between Indian terrorists and 
British officials—England winning the “heartfelt” love of its Indian subjects—this proposal 
is not pursued. Instead, the author speculates on the possibility of eliciting British sympathy 
for Indian political terrorists, citing a favorable shift in “English public morality” with 
respect to the assassination of Russian officials by revolutionaries. 
 Krishnavarma’s third significant contribution to swadeshi transnationalism was the 
establishment of the India House hostel in July 1905, a converted mansion in north London 
that provided quarters for roughly twenty-four students.123 Hyndman delivered the inaugural 
address at the opening in which his echoed his earlier comments in the Indian Sociologist and 
reminded Indians that “loyalty to Britain would mean treachery to India.”124 Dadabhai 
Naoroji and the suffragist Charlotte Despard were also in attendance, and the Irish M.P. 
Frank O’Donnell, a long-standing supporter of Indian causes, similarly endorsed the 
venture.125 Krishnavarma additionally offered five fellowships for Indian students to pursue 
their education in England; in true swadeshi style the recipients had to “solemnly declare that 
after [their] return to India [they] shall not accept any post, office, emoluments, or service 
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under the British Government.”126 The most (in)famous fellowship recipient was 
undoubtedly Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, future Hindutva ideologue and godfather of the 
Hindu Right, who became a leading figure at the hostel soon after his arrival in London in 
1906.127 British fears that India House was “sinister and evil” were realized on July 1, 1909 
when Madan Lal Dhingra, a student closely associated with the hostel, shot and killed Sir 
William Curzon Wyllie at a social gathering. Dhingra was hanged shortly thereafter and 
hailed a martyr by his fellow radicals.128 In the wake of the event, India House was shut 
down, and increased British repression, on top of Krishnavarma and Savarkar’s departure to 
Paris, concluded swadeshi agitation at the heart of empire.129  
 
Hospitality and Cosmopolitanism in “East-West” Novels 
Dhingra’s assassination of Sir William Curzon Wyllie, political aide-de-camp to the 
Secretary of State for India, sent shockwaves across Britain. While terrorism had by now 
become increasingly common in India and particularly Bengal, the targeted killing of a high-
ranking British official by an Indian in London was unprecedented. Yet, as Alex Tickell has 
argued, the Wyllie assassination could not have been entirely unexpected given British 
suspicion about the incendiary activities of the India House and its leaders.130 Two years 
before his death Wyllie himself had been a part of the Lee Warner Committee, a 
governmental deputation that investigated the ongoing problem of Indian students’ 
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radicalization in Britain.131 The Committee’s primary recommendation was the formation of 
an advisory board that would serve as a resource for this group by providing information 
about lodging and writing letters of reference.132 But underlying such apparently hospitable 
endeavors were the ulterior motives of gathering intelligence and heading off potential risks. 
Such surveillance would have complemented ongoing British scrutiny of Indian political 
activity in the metropole.133 The Lee Warner Committee also considered the feasibility of 
starting a government-run hostel that would provide channels of approved guardianship and 
guidance to the Indian students in its charge; in the words of one Indian detractor who 
lambasted the idea, the hostel was obviously intended to function as a “sort of counterblast 
to India House.”134      
The Lee Warner Committee’s recommendation for an advisory board was 
implemented in 1909, but its avowed purpose of providing watchful assistance to Indian 
students had already been in effect for some time.135 As Antoinette Burton has shown, the 
British perception that Indian newcomers to the metropole required supervision was nothing 
new, and had already guided the establishment of a number of organizations since the mid-
nineteenth century.136 Much like the advisory board and government-run hostel proposed by 
the Lee Warner Committee, altruistic missions touting the welfare of itinerant Indian 
laborers, activists, and students masked more insidious aims of guiding and regulating their 
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behavior in particular ways. One such body was the National Indian Association (NIA), 
founded in 1870 by Elizabeth Manning with the espoused goals of “extend[ing] a knowledge 
of India” in Britain and “promot[ing] by voluntary effort the enlightenment and 
improvement of our Hindu fellow-subjects.”137 Anticipating the proposals of the Lee Warner 
Committee by approximately twenty years, the NIA steadily assumed more of a supervisory 
capacity in light of the growing number of Indians coming to Britain to pursue educational 
opportunities and professional training.138 The Association eventually formed a 
“Superintendence Committee” in order to dispense “friendly guidance” to the Indian 
student community that it regarded as highly impressionable and vulnerable to hostile 
influences; one way in which it disseminated its paternalistic advice was through a formal 
handbook with detailed recommendations, guidelines, and precautions.139 The NIA also 
hosted regular “At Home” meetings, soirees, and lectures, all of which were essentially 
socially sanctioned occasions for Indians and Britons to mix.140 Given the high-profile nature 
of such gatherings and the relative ease of access to British officials that they afforded, it 
should not be surprising that Dhingra killed Wyllie at such an event in July 1909. Notably, 
even the student’s noncompliance with the Association’s request that Indian guests wear 
“native costume” posed no obstacle to his entry.141 And unlike his recent attempt on the life 
of George Nathaniel Curzon outside of the Savoy Hotel, this time Dhingra succeeded in his 
reported aim of producing the maximum amount of “horrorism” among the British 
public.142 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
137 Qtd. in Burton, At the Heart of the Empire, 58. 
138 Ibid., 59. 
139 Ibid., 60-61. 
140 Ibid., 57. 
141 Alex Tickell, “Terrorism and the Informative Romance,” 73.  
142 Qtd. in Tickell, Terrorism, Insurgency, and Indian-English Literature, 136.  
 207 
Though the seeds of such discord had been sown much earlier, the Wyllie 
assassination was an unmistakable indicator of the extent to which British-Indian relations 
had deteriorated during the swadeshi years. Indeed, the shooting itself was far less shocking 
than the rather spectacular way in which British complacency about the metropole’s isolation 
from the Indian “unrest” had imploded from within. While at first glance it seems rather 
ironic that an event promoting India-British collegiality devolved into violence, the 
assassination is better understood as a forthright repudiation of the arrogant imperialist 
ideology that had underpinned such endeavors for decades. As Tickell notes, “if the National 
Indian Association meeting in South Kensington sought to promote [a] kind of friendly 
guardianship, the Curzon Wyllie killing…represents an act of anti-colonial terrorist violence 
staged both as voluntary martyrdom and as an almost Oedipal refusal of the colonial rhetoric 
of control.”143 At his trial, Dhingra defended the assassination as follows:  
If it is patriotic in an Englishman to fight against the Germans if they were to occupy 
this country, it is much more justifiable and patriotic in my case to fight against the 
English; I hold the English people responsible for the murder of the sons of my 
countrymen…and they are also responsible for taking away £100,000,000 every year 
from India to this country…In case this country is occupied by the Germans and an 
Englishman not bearing to see the Germans walking with the insolence of 
conquerors in the streets of London, goes and kills one or two of the Germans, then 
that Englishman is to be upheld as a patriot of his country, then certainly I am a 
patriot too, working for the emancipation of my motherland.144 
 
I make this statement, not because I wish to plead for mercy or anything of that 
kind. I wish that English people should sentence me to death, for in that case the 
vengeance of my countrymen will be all the more keen. I put forward this statement 
to show the justice of my cause to the outside world.145 
 
Here Dhingra rationalizes his murder of a high-ranking British official as an act of war fueled 
by patriotism, one that was no different than an Englishman defending his country from a 
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foreign intruder. Evoking Naoroji’s critique of British rule as an unconscionable drain of 
wealth and resources from India, Dhingra views British officials like Wyllie not as legitimate 
rulers but as virulent trespassers who must be expelled for the wellbeing of the nation. Just 
as Britons would be incensed by Germans walking cavalierly “with the insolence of 
conquerors in the streets of London,” so too Dhingra acted to rid his country of a poison 
and thereby “work for the emancipation of [his] motherland.” Dhingra was sentenced to 
death and became a political martyr as he desired, yet the irony remains that it was over four 
thousand miles away on British soil that this swadeshi terrorist achieved his “patriotic” aims.   
*       *       * 
Dhingra’s rationalization of his crime as a righteous eradication of a contagion from 
his homeland reveals the way in which a logic and ethics of hospitality had come to inform 
the thought of Indian revolutionaries, writers, and thinkers during the turbulent swadeshi 
years. What had become of the colonial relationship and what was its future? Were Britons 
fellow subjects, rulers, guardians, or intruders? Could Indians ever achieve an equal footing 
with them or would they remain perpetual pupils or wards of the state? What were the 
responsibilities and duties of Indians and Britons towards one another and how did these 
change depending on context and location? Disappointment surrounding civis Britannicus 
were at the heart of such reflections as injustices ranging from routine racist abuse to grand 
decrees such as the 1905 partition had steadily caused large numbers of Indians around the 
world to lose faith in Crown Rule and Britannia. While men like Surendranath Banerjea and 
Shyamji Krishnavarma had expressed their resistance through moderate and extremist 
methods respectively, swadeshi terrorists like Dhingra held that violence was the only 
recourse. Having arrived in London from South Africa shortly after the Wyllie assassination, 
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M.K. Gandhi witnessed firsthand how the incident had unsettled Indians and Britons alike 
and offered his own assessment of the events: 
The assassination of Sir Curzon Wyllie and Dr. Lalkaka was a terrible thing…On July 
2, there was a tea-meeting of the National Indian Association in the Jehangir Hall of 
the Imperial Institute. Such meetings are arranged with the object of bringing Indian students 
into contact with Englishmen, who therefore attend as the guests of Indians. Sir Curzon Wyllie was 
[thus] a guest of his assassin. From this point of view, Mr. Madanlal Dhingra murdered his guest 
in his own house… 
 
It is being said in defense of Sir Curzon Wyllie’s assassination that it is the British 
who are responsible for India’s ruin, and that, just as the British would kill every 
German if Germany invaded Britain, so too it is the right of any Indian to kill any 
Englishman. 
 
If I kill someone in my own house without a warning—someone who has done me no harm—I 
cannot but be called a coward. There is an ancient custom among the Arabs that they 
would not kill anyone in their own house, even if the person be their enemy. They 
would kill him after he had left the house and after he had been given time to arm 
himself. 
 
A man’s own courage consists in suffering deeply and over a long period. That alone is a brave 
act which is preceded by careful reflection. I must say that those who believe and 
argue that such murders may do good to India are ignorant men indeed. No act of 
treachery can ever profit a nation. Even should the British leave in consequence of such 
murderous acts, who will rule in their place? The only answer is: the murderers. Who will then be 
happy? Is the Englishman bad because he is an Englishmen? Is it that everyone with an Indian 
skin is good? […]146 
 
In this article published in the Indian Opinion just three days before Dhingra’s execution, 
Gandhi laid out in embryonic form provocative ideas that would soon form the basis of his 
masterpiece Hind Swaraj.147 That Gandhi would condemn the attack and censure Dhingra’s 
sympathizers is to be expected, but the logic by which he arrives at his conclusion is striking. 
Rather than making an overt appeal to religious norms, moral values, or even the law, he too 
deploys an ethics of hospitality to make his case. Upending conventional readings of the 
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affair, Gandhi understands Dhingra not as a guest of the NIA or British society who 
transgressed moral and legal codes, but rather as a host who violated his most sacred 
responsibilities of honoring and protecting his guests. Through such a lens, the killing was 
less courageous than cowardly as Dhingra wrongfully exploited his dominant position as a 
host to inflict violence upon an unassuming visitor in his charge.    
Gandhi goes on to eviscerate Dhingra’s rationale that Wyllie was an intruder who 
deserved to be killed for the welfare of India and that Britons themselves would surely have 
done the same. Ever the wily lawyer, Gandhi charges that such a defense is “fallacious” 
because “if the Germans were to invade [Britain], the British would kill only the invaders. 
They would not kill every German whom they met. Moreover, they would not kill an 
unsuspecting German, or Germans who are guests.” Gandhi thus urges Indians to make 
distinctions, to realize that not all English men are bad simply because they are Englishmen, 
much as all those with an “Indian skin”—Dhingra and other terrorists—are not necessarily 
good. Rather than enact senseless violence that only harms Indian interests, one should 
instead inspire one’s adversary to reform by “suffering deeply and over a long period.” 
Anticipating his arguments regarding satyagraha, Gandhi advances his own brand of swadeshi 
resistance: only morally upright toleration of abuse and injustice, however painful it may be, 
constitutes true courage and can engender meaningful change. 
Jacques Derrida’s theorizations on hospitality are helpful in understanding Gandhi’s 
prescription for satyagraha or patient suffering. In what scholars have called his “late” period, 
Derrida submitted to deconstructive analysis a range of concepts including cosmopolitanism, 
forgiveness, and friendship in light of contemporary politics. Hospitality in particular became 
a prevalent theme in these meditations as Derrida repeatedly pushed the idea to its limits and 
in so doing observed a productive aporia. Pure hospitality did not and could not exist 
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because the ostensible warmth or generosity offered by hosts to guests in any given situation 
was inescapably conditional and thus inhospitable. Since on some level guests must recognize 
and respect the dominance of their hosts and behave according to prescribed norms—and 
hosts too expect this—Derrida argued that conventional understandings of hospitality are 
troublingly limited, plagued by arbitrary parameters that undermine the very gesture itself. 
Such conditional hospitality, Derrida argued, was inseparable from an animating corollary of 
unconditional or absolute hospitality: 
…absolute hospitality requires that I open up my home and that give not only to the 
foreigner (provided with a family name, with the social status of being a foreigner, 
etc.), but to the absolute, unknown, anonymous other, and that I give place to them, 
that I let them come, that I let them arrive, and take place in the place I offer them, 
without asking of them either reciprocity (entering into a pact) or even their 
names…148 
 
For Derrida, any full comprehension of hospitality requires awareness of both the conditional 
and the absolute because the two guide and sustain one another. Just as the restrictions 
inherent within any act of hospitality undercut the generosity and warmth of the very 
concept, so too absolute hospitality constitutes an ever-present horizon that can never be 
reached. Yet knowledge of this aporia is empowering. By recognizing that absolute 
hospitality can never be achieved, and that conditional hospitality does violence to the very 
concept, one becomes better able to try to bridge the gap between the two. For Derrida, 
ethics itself “straddles” this gap between “the unconditional or hyperbolical on the one 
hand, and the conditional and jurido-political…on the other.”149 As he states elsewhere: 
Hospitality is culture itself and not simply one ethic amongst others. Insofar as it has 
to do with the ethos, that is, the residence, one’s home, the familiar place of dwelling, 
inasmuch as it is a manner of being there, the manner in which we relate to ourselves 
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and to others, to others as our own or as foreigners, ethics is hospitality; ethics is so 
thoroughly coextensive with the experience of hospitality…150 
 
In a similar way, Gayatri Spivak theorizes what she calls the “founding gap” between the 
ethical and historical-political: “…the ethical situation can only be figured in the ethical 
experience of the impossible…This is the founding gap in all act or talk, most especially in 
acts or talk that we understand to be closest to the ethical—the historical and the 
political…we must somehow attempt to supplement the gap.”151 For both theorists, it is 
precisely through academic analysis of the liminal space between the ideal/actual, the 
unconditional/conditional, and the ethical/political that social change can begin to occur.   
 This distinction between the ideal and the actual was at the core of Indian 
complaints surrounding civis Britannicus and forms a prevalent theme in numerous Indian 
works that explored the pitfalls and possibilities of the colonial relationship. In their 
respective novels Hindupore: A Peep Behind the Indian Unrest: An Anglo-Indian Romance and The 
Prince of Destiny: The New Krishna, S.M. Mitra and Sarath Kumar Ghosh offered a unique 
perspective on the ongoing swadeshi agitation from within the imperial capital itself. While it 
remains unclear if Mitra and Ghosh ever met one another in London, they had a good deal 
in common as they ran in similar circles and were regarded as prominent “experts” on India 
by the time their novels were published in 1909. Owing to their similarity in theme and 
publication history, Hindupore and Prince have long been discussed together in literary 
scholarship with greater attention and praise usually being bestowed upon the latter.152 In the 
past decade Alex Tickell has emerged as the most significant critic of both works, having 
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addressed matters of genre and theme in a number of essays as well as his 2012 monograph 
Terrorism, Insurgency, and Indian-English Literature, 1830-1947.  
Despite the fair amount of critical attention paid to these novels and to Prince in 
particular, there has been insufficient analysis about how their imagining of India as a 
fundamentally Hindu space was both informed by, and intersected with, the vast global 
dynamics of the swadeshi movement as well as the discourses of Pan-Asianism and Yellow 
Peril. Developing John Marx’s argument on the global orientation of many twentieth-century 
Anglophone novels—including Ghosh’s Prince—I examine how these works reflected a 
sociopolitical milieu in which Indians and other colonized peoples were thinking less in 
terms of nationalism and the nation-state and more in terms of broader geopolitical and 
regional alliances.153 Though a few critics have mentioned that both Mitra and Ghosh warn 
of the rise of a menacing Pan-Asian regional bloc, the way in which this cautionary message 
connected with the overall Hindu imagining within their novels has not been addressed. 
Misguided readings of Hindupore and Prince that have anachronistically projected nationalist 
desire onto the texts, stressed racial identity instead of religious belonging, or viewed the two 
as simply anticipating later sociocultural developments perform a disservice to the striking 
ways in which their authors intervened in the political debates of their specific historical 
moment.154 
Mitra and Ghosh’s portrayals of grand Hindu kingdoms, magnificent Hindu princes 
and princesses, and a rich Hindu cultural heritage not only urged the British to respect India 
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as a colonial possession worth cherishing, it also threatened the Raj with violent retaliation 
through powerful alliances. In these fictional worlds, the idea of India as Bharat is a given, 
but rather than being a condition that has long since passed, these novels suggest that an 
expansive bloc of nations united by a common Hindu identity is latent at the present 
moment. The ethical horizon intrinsic to Derrida’s notion of absolute hospitality is part and 
parcel of this two-pronged message as highly romanticized elite figures travel freely within 
and outside of the British imperial web where they cultivate different kinds of alliances and 
affiliations. While both Hindupore and Prince embrace the genres of romance and epic 
respectively, it is in their odd and clumsy denouements that they fail. The romance of 
Hindupore is undone by the stark warnings of a Japanese pilgrim, and Prince Barath’s refusal 
to lead a revolution is not certainly typical of an epic hero. It is precisely in this failure to 
achieve their formal aims of romance and epic that Hindupore and Prince emerge most vividly 
as provocative political allegories in which the many modes of swadeshi resistance active at 
this moment awkwardly competed, collided, and coalesced with one another. 
 
S.M. Mitra: Collaborator Turned Critic  
Biographical information on Siddha Mohana Mitra is strangely in short supply even 
though he was a well-known figure in India and Britain in the early twentieth century. A 
descendant of Raja Digambar Mitra, a former disciple of Henry Derozio, S.M. Mitra was a 
prominent collaborator with the colonial government. He was a journalist by trade and had 
been proprietor-editor of the Deccan Post in Hyderabad.155 Like his relative, Mitra was a 
staunch loyalist of the British regime. At the Delhi Durbar of 1903, he dined with a group of 
loyal Indian “veterans” of the 1857 rebellion who had just been honored by George 
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Nathaniel Curzon and other British officials; Mitra was notably described in the news 
coverage as “a generous and enlightened Indian gentleman, well known for his charitable 
and benevolent undertakings.” 156 Shortly thereafter Mitra travelled to London, where he 
became a member of the Royal Asiatic Society and joined Sarath Kumar Ghosh and other 
self-proclaimed Indian “experts” on a popular lecture circuit. Like his peers Mitra addressed 
a range of topics including Indian history, the Bengali language, and even “Persia in Indian 
Imperial Politics.” 157 He also continued his political journalism, contributing to the Asiatic 
Quarterly, the Nineteenth Century, and other periodicals. Considering Mitra’s loyalist bent, it is 
not surprising that British presses frequently published and republished his writings under 
titles such as British Rule in India (1905) and India and Imperial Preference (1907). The most well-
known of these was Indian Problems (1908), which amalgamated Mitra’s views on the Indian 
“unrest”; the text is rife with salacious statements as the writer freely heaps gratuitous praise 
upon the British while issuing biting criticisms of his fellow Indians.158 To give just one 
example, on the origin of the Indian “unrest,” Mitra held that “The Partition of Bengal was a 
grand move from the administrative as well as the commercial point of view. The name of 
Lord Curzon will go down to a grateful posterity as a promoter of civilization and benefactor 
of mankind.”159 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
156 The Graphic, “A Group of Indian Mutiny Veterans who were Entertained at the Delhi Durbar,” (May 9, 
1903), 622. 
157 See for example, The Daily News, “To-day,” (August 2, 1905), 9. The Nottingham Evening Post, “British Rule in 
India,” (August 3, 1905), 6. The Daily News, “To-day,” (November 8, 1905), 9. The Daily News, “English-Made 
Bengali,” (March 27, 1906), 4. 
158 S.M. Mitra, Indian Problems (London: John Murray, 1908). 
159 Ibid., 186. Mitra often parroted racist and paradoxical British opinions. For example, while on the one hand 
Mitra praised the English for giving Hindus “an idea of the real blood and bone of human heroism,” on the 
other he indicted the swadeshi terrorist as a thoughtless mimic who “can do nothing without mischievous 
guidance from English malcontents” (363, 72). He was also very critical of the Congress, dismissing the 
organization as pretentious and insignificant. Rather than simply gathering together to complain and dictate, 
Congress leaders were lacking “a sincere desire to discuss” policies. As Mitra warned, “It is better to be rational 
than national” (336-337; emphasis in original). 
 216 
But Mitra’s message was quite different with Hindupore. This was his only literary 
work, and as he claims in the preface, the novel might never have come about if his articles 
on the Indian unrest had not proved so popular that “[he] was asked to deal with the subject 
in a more popular form.”160 While literary critics are right to point out that Hindupore was by 
all accounts quite poor and inferior to Ghosh’s Prince, what remains unexplored is just how 
profound was Mitra’s shift from his earlier espoused loyalty to the Raj. In marked contrast to 
the pro-British, totalizing views about India that he put forth in his political journalism, 
fiction appears to have offered Mitra a new and flexible medium in which to nuance his 
beliefs and present a different perspective on the swadeshi agitation. The loyalist’s message 
had changed—Indian elites had a right to be disgruntled and it was imperative that the 
colonial government make certain adjustments in its policies and practices. 
Modeled after and in direct conversation with “Enlightenments,” Hindupore features 
a range of singular characters that stand in diametrical opposition to those offered by 
Kipling. For the imperious Pagett, Orde, and Dr. Eva Winthrop, Mitra gives us Lord Tara, 
Herbert Harvey, and Dr. Celitia Scott. Mitra introduces the reader to many of these 
exceptional metropolitan characters at the outset of the novel as they begin their journey to 
India aboard the Nur-Jehan. The exceptionality of the hero Lord Tara is made apparent on 
the first page, as the narrator describes him as “a young Irish Member of Parliament, full of 
ardour and enlightened zeal for the true welfare of the vast Indian Empire, which he was 
about to visit for the first time.”161 Tara travels to India to visit his friend Herbert Harvey, an 
exceptional ICS officer with a deep love for and knowledge of India. Tara’s fellow passenger 
Dr. Celitia Scott similarly looks forward to her visit to India; she is to become the 
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superintendent of a hospital and intends to care for women pilgrims at the upcoming Hindu 
festival celebrating the deity Jagannath. Tara and Celitia’s profound attraction to India is 
partially explained by their lineage. While Tara’s grandfather was a former Viceroy of India, 
Celitia inherited her enthusiasm from her mother, who was raised by a Hindu family after 
being rescued as a child during the 1857 rebellion. Having always harbored an affinity for 
India, Celitia effuses that this trip is the fulfillment of the “dream of [her] life.”162 Mr. Long, 
a missionary, joins them shortly thereafter; he is a rather unusual devotee of Christianity as 
he effusively praises Hinduism and states that he travels to India simply to “meet” Hindu 
pilgrims. A champion of Hindus, Long mentions that he may well travel to the upcoming 
Jagannath festival in order to correct erroneous views about sati held by the British public: 
“I…may possibly go…if only be able to contradict, from personal observation, the absurd 
reports concerning the self-immolation of human victims that are still often circulated in 
England.”163   
These singular metropolitan travelers are matched by their idealized Indian hosts. 
Raja Ram Singh, the ruler of the princely state of Hindupore, is the first Indian character to 
appear in Hindupore. Though the reader does not learn until later that Singh is a king, his 
stature is apparent from the narrator’s initial description: “At Suez the only passenger to 
come on board was an Indian gentleman of remarkably distinguished appearance, dressed in 
a light English travelling suit, and attended by a Hindu servant with the greatest 
deference.”164 The charming Singh impresses everyone on board; the narrator notes that he 
“spoke English perfectly and bore the inevitable désagréments of the Suez Canal with true 
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Oriental fortitude.”165 Both Tara and Celitia find Singh alluring and their acquaintance with 
him rapidly transforms into friendship, a relationship that is sustained and deepened by the 
king’s immense kindness and graciousness. Even before the Nur-Jehan arrives in Bombay 
Singh has fully assumed the position of gracious host to the two newcomers. Ever the 
chivalrous gentleman, Singh catches Celitia when she faints, cares for her while she recovers, 
and takes an avid interest in her medical mission, wishing to “interest her in everything 
connected with the manners and customs of India.”166 He reinforces Celitia and Tara’s 
positive impressions about India and Hinduism, explaining that ostensibly novel or 
innovative aspects of contemporary European medicine actually derive from ancient Hindu 
knowledge: “European medicine down to the seventeenth century was practically based 
upon the Hindu, and the name of Hindu physician Charaka repeatedly occurs in the Latin 
translations.”167 Singh further regales his new friends with the story of Nala and Damayanti; 
the tale is told in detail, inviting Mitra’s British readers to delight in Hindu folklore.  
 Such hospitality continues upon their arrival in India. Singh’s initial invitation that 
Tara spend a few nights at the Taj-Mahal Hotel as his guest leads to yet another request that 
Tara stay at Hindupore on his way to visit Herbert Harvey.168 A microcosm of a glorious 
Hindu India, the kingdom of Hindupore and all of its representatives are idyllic. Tara’s love 
interest, Princess Kamala, is a paragon of Hindu femininity. Demonstrating the profound 
overdetermination of “Hindu” as at once a religious, cultural, and national identity, the 
narrator notes that “Like most Hindu princesses, Kamala was a devout Hindu.”169 
Hindupore’s physical environs are majestic; soon after arriving Tara praises the kingdom in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
165 Ibid. 
166 Ibid., 18. 
167 Ibid.,14-15. 
168 Ibid., 53. 
169 Ibid., 60. 
 219 
superlative terms: “This is the most beautiful place I ever saw in my life…like the Vale of 
Cashmere. If there’s an Elysium on earth, it is this…I feel as if I were in an enchanted forest, 
and all the trees and flowers had something to say.”170 The narrator later fleshes out the 
elegant buildings and palaces of Hindupore. The armory is described as a “magnificent hall 
with marble columns of serpentine form, the ceiling painted in rich colours with stirring 
scenes from the warlike exploits of the Rajput Princes in defending Ajmere against the 
Mahomedan invaders.”171 Similarly, the ceilings of Princess Kamala’s boudoir display scenes 
from Hindu mythology and the Mahabharata; the narrator further comments that “Tradition 
said that the staircase was the work of the same hand that had designed the famous Taj at 
Agra.”172  
It is against this wondrous backdrop that Lord Tara increasingly becomes an 
intercultural ambassador between India and Britain. In sharp contrast to the conversations in 
Kipling’s “Enlightenments,” Tara’s endearing naiveté encourages the Indians he meets to 
express themselves candidly with him. Mitra’s portrayal of Tara as Irish is significant in this 
regard as he is seen as a natural ally, which he himself affirms: “There is, perhaps, something 
sympathetic in the temperament of Irishmen that appeals to the Hindu nature. I certainly 
feel as if I had found a new home here…”173 The first grievance that Tara hears comes from 
Hindupore’s prime minister Mohan Lal, who laments that the British do not understand and 
appreciate Singh’s loyalty:  
“The Raja seems very popular with his people,” said Tara. 
 
“So he ought to be; he is their friend, and they know it. Loyalty in India, if founded 
on sentiment, is a very real fact, but the Hindus are the most conservative people in 
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the world. They cling to their beliefs with incredible steadfastness, and next to God, 
they have faith in their native Rajas. That is why the manner of espionage in British 
India is so much to be regretted. It estranges the masses of the people when one of 
their Princes of ancient and honored descent, whose loyalty to the Sovereign Power 
has been proved in the willing submission of his followers for more than a century, is 
subjected to slight and indignity. For instance, just before the Raja Ram Singh went 
to Europe his name was actually entered in what is called the ‘Black Book’ of the 
Secret Branch of the Intelligence Department as a person not above suspicion…”174  
 
Part and parcel of the instructive “peep” that Mitra provides to his British readers, Lal is 
bitter that on top of denying Singh the respect that he deserves, colonial officials actually 
view him as an agitator. Rather than being honored, loyal rulers such as Singh are often 
disparaged by arrogant British administrators, an affront that in turn “estranges the masses 
of the people” from the regime. Lal goes on to explain that the demeaning treatment meted 
to undeserving Indians usually results from British arrogance and ignorance.175 Tara later 
meets a Muslim leader, the Nabob Shamshere Khan, described as a “descendant of the 
Great Mogul of Delhi, and a political pensioner of the British Government.”176 The Nabob 
complains to Tara that officials had insensitively scheduled the Delhi Durbar during 
Ramazan.177 Since many Muslim elites were compelled to participate in the festivities, they 
had to suffer through lengthy rehearsals outdoors while fasting. It is precisely through such 
callous acts that the British alienate their loyal supporters and sow the seeds of Indian 
discontent. Moved to tears as he describes his grief over such treatment, the Nabob points 
out the irony that “The rulers that come out to this country demand loyalty, but through 
sheer ignorance sometimes trample upon it when found.”178 
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 This representation of the Muslim perspective, however, does not undermine 
Hindupore’s privileging of Hindus as the righteous nationals of India. In addition to fielding 
complaints, Tara learns key lessons of Indian history, namely that the British took over 
governance of India not from the Mughals, but from India’s original Hindu inhabitants. Tara 
first hears this from Singh, who remarks that “all the Rajput Princes voluntarily placed 
themselves under the protection of England.”179 This idea is later fleshed out in an exchange 
between Tara and Radha Nath Sircar, a lawyer and journalist: 
[The Indian Empire] never could have been ours but by the will of the people,” said 
Tara thoughtfully. “I suppose they prefer English to Mahomedan rule; many of the 
Hindu Princes fought bravely to retain their ancient rights. 
 
It is an Anglo-Indian fallacy, Lord Tara, that the British won India from the Moguls. 
No doubt the Battle of Plassey was fought against the Mahomedans, but a quarter of 
a century after that memorable battle, when Burke moved the impeachment of 
Warren Hastings in the House of Commons, Hindu Sindhia occupied the Mogul 
capital, Delhi. The last Mahratta War dated as late as 1818, and the Sikh Durbar and 
army were not finally overcome until 1849. The British, therefore, won India from 
the Hindus, and perhaps Hindu sentiment may be worth some consideration. 
 
The so-called Mahomedan States contain a large number of Hindus; in fact, the 
majority are Hindus, and being an intelligent race, they always manage to exert a 
great deal of influence. It was a Hindu Prime Minister through whose influence, fifty 
years ago, the British succeeded in getting the premier Mahomedan Prince of India 
to assign to them the large province of Berar; and it was, again, a Hindu Prime 
Minister who was recently useful to Lord Curzon’s Government in the permanent 
leasing of that province—a province as large as Ireland.180  
 
Tara’s innocence and naiveté form the crux of such exchanges as they enable his 
interlocutors to enlighten him freely with beliefs, opinions, and wishes posing as facts. Here 
Tara’s mention of “Mahomedan rule” prompts Sircar to correct this widespread “Anglo-
Indian fallacy.” Much as Bankim did in Anandamath, Mitra attempts to minimize the 
significance and duration of the Mughal Empire by arguing that the British continued to 
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confront resistance from Hindus through the mid-nineteenth century. Disparate moments of 
conflict are reimagined as an organized campaign on the part of a cohesive Hindu bloc to 
ward off the British. And even though the British were the victors, Hindus have remained 
dominant as influential political leaders and advisors to them, including even George 
Nathaniel Curzon.  
Over the course of the narrative, Tara’s profound affinity with Hindupore and its 
people results in his literal transformation into a bona fide Hindu hero. On top of being 
honorable, kind, and sympathetic to his Hindu hosts, Tara evinces a genuine regard for 
Hindu beliefs and practices. He also proves his virility in an archery contest; it is no 
coincidence that he defeats a romantic rival for Princess Kamala in the challenge, catching 
her attention as he does so.181 Tara’s skin also noticeably darkens over the course of his stay, 
so much so that he actually begins to resemble a Hindu prince: “Tara looked remarkably well 
in his Hindu dress…it was not a state costume, but the ordinary dress worn by a Rajput 
gentleman when travelling. He had become much tanned during this Indian sojourn, and 
might easily have passed for a Rajput.”182 Tara welcomes the change when it is pointed out 
to him: “I never had a fair complexion; but you are right—I certainly am tanned by your 
Indian sun. I like it.”183 Tara’s evolution into a Hindu hero is crystallized in his marriage to 
Kamala, a match that has been anticipated throughout the narrative and represents the 
desired unity and affection between Britain and India. As Mohan Lal advises Singh, “I can 
see nothing but good in it…Lord Tara is a charming man, and a marriage like this would do 
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more than fifty treaties to bring the two races into closer touch with each other. It would be 
a truly patriotic and diplomatic alliance on both sides.”184  
But Hindupore’s happy conclusion—complete with three marriages including that of 
Tara and Kamala—is interrupted when distant swadeshi agitation rears its head in the 
antepenultimate chapter entitled “Hindu-Japanese Affinity.”185 While thus far incidents such 
as the proliferation of “Bandemataram flags” and the murder of hated colonial officials have 
been obliquely referenced and portrayed, the presence of a robust and menacing Pan-
Hinduism is now made apparent and acknowledged as such.186 Shortly after Tara and 
Kamala’s wedding, a Japanese pilgrim accosts Singh, Tara, Long, and the other main 
characters. After congratulating Tara on his recent marriage and affirming that the union 
“was more valuable to India and England than a dozen Royal Commissions,” in the next 
breath the pilgrim makes a number of bold statements that undermine these good wishes:  
It is a sense of nationality as well as religion that brings me here…[Buddhism] is only 
another name for the vast synthesis which in India is called Hinduism. The Brahman 
monk has Hinduized the Buddhism of Japan…Wandering monks have proved 
beyond doubt that Buddhism, as it exists in Japan to-day, is the Hinduism of 
Jagannath, and vice versa…187  
 
[The Himalayas] do not separate; they only accentuate the fact that, in spite of the 
Himalayas, China, Japan, and India form one mighty web. For mental convenience, 
different names are given to the same faith. Hinduism mirrors the beliefs of all three 
countries, with their seven hundred millions of inhabitants.188  
 
[Japan] is true to the land that civilized her. It was the Indian King Asoka who first 
sowed the seed of civilization by sending missionaries to preach Buddhism. The Gen 
dynasty in the fourteenth century introduced Bengal Tantrikism into China. At the 
dawn of our history we breathed Hindu mythology. Our respectable families say: ‘We 
come of Ama.’ What is Ama? ‘The land of Rama.’ 189  
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‘Our folk-story says: China, Japan, and the Sacred Land make a fan. China is the 
paper, India (the birthplace of Buddha) the radiating sticks, and Japan the handle.’ 
Folk-lore represents the national mind more than all foreign opinion. A day will yet 
come when this fan will cool the aggressive ardour of the West.190 
 
Japan loves India for the sake of the future, as well as the past. Without the Hindu, 
Japan cannot attempt the unification of a grand Asiatic empire. India, China, and 
Japan in one empire would be beyond the dreams of any Western Power. And such a 
day will come...191 
 
While the details of S.M. Mitra’s life remain a mystery, these excerpts illustrate that he was 
likely very familiar with Kakuzo Okakura’s 1903 treatise The Ideals the East.192 The second 
excerpt in particular echoes Okakura’s famous opening assertions: “Asia is one. The 
Himalayas divide, only to accentuate, two mighty civilizations, the Chinese with its 
communism of Confucius, and the Indian with its individualism of the Vedas. But not even 
the snowy barriers can interrupt for one moment that broad expanse of love for the 
Ultimate and Universal…”193 But while Okakura’s “single mighty web [of] Asiatic races” was 
peaceable, Mitra’s bloc strategically reinforces intensifying concerns of Yellow Peril: “India, 
China, and Japan in one empire would be beyond the dreams of any Western Power. And 
such a day will come.”194   
Relatedly, Mitra reworks extant Pan-Asian discourse such that Hindu India, not 
Japan, is posited as the crux of a latent “grand Asiatic empire.” Eschewing British 
perceptions of the Raj as an organized and knowledgeable enterprise as portrayed in 
Kipling’s Kim, the pilgrim’s warnings confirm earlier admonitory statements made by the 
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astute Herbert Harvey concerning the colonial state’s profound ignorance about the real 
state of affairs in India: “…we are absolutely in the dark. We cannot see the subtle but sure 
progress of Pan-Hinduism under our very noses. That giant is wide awake. He has never 
slept for three thousand years—only occasionally pretending to sleep.”195 Here the menace is 
not a sleeping China but an awakened India and its allies. Rather than India and other 
“Eastern” countries admiring Japan, it is the island nation that exalts Hindu India as the 
source of its power and pride. Anticipating the turn that Asianist discourse would eventually 
take in the hands of Romesh Chandra Majumdar and other thinkers, Mitra advances a potent 
“out of India” theory in which the ancient inhabitants of Bharat had spread Hinduism 
outside of the nation as they colonized surrounding regions.196 An implicit critique of British 
imperialism, the pilgrim indicates that these conquests were not at all militaristic but pacific 
and civilizing in nature. Yet the capacity for aggression exists, as is made explicit by the 
pilgrim’s provocative metaphorization of this Eastern bloc as a paper fan that will one day 
surely “cool the aggressive ardour of the West.”197 While initially taken aback by these 
statements, Singh, Tara, and the others quickly accept the pilgrim’s predictions as credible. 
The narrator himself confirms the clairvoyance of the pilgrim: “The political events of the 
last five years had proved that the ‘pilgrim’ was no ordinary man. He could unravel all the 
threads of the world’s politics. Five years ago he predicted the defeat of the Russians and the 
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intervention of President Roosevelt.”198 The pilgrim’s jarring interjection into the story ends 
with his departing rallying cry: “Rise of Asia at any cost!”199     
 That Hindupore has been panned by literary critics is understandable as it was unable 
to balance its competing aims of entertaining romance with political exposé. Yet the manner 
in which Mitra moderated his views on colonial rule so markedly in fiction deserves greater 
comment. In reply to Kipling’s presentation of a stagnant India with unimpressive 
commoners and pretentious elites in “Enlightenments,” Mitra portrayed a splendid Hindu 
kingdom complete with kings, princesses, and heroes that warranted understanding and 
respect. But as the awkward conclusion of this romance revealed, this was also an India with 
agency and autonomy, the nexus of a “grand Asiatic empire” that could readily arise to 
overtake Britain and the West. 
 
East and West Shall Meet: An Indian Prince in London 
 Critics have long regarded Prince as superior to Hindupore and Ghosh as a more 
accomplished novelist than Mitra, but this is true only to a negligible extent. A tome of over 
six hundred pages, Prince has been described by Alex Tickell as a “bildungsroman on an epic 
scale” and its pretentions in this regard are unmistakable.200 As in Hindupore, Kipling remains 
a specter in Prince as Ghosh endeavors to prove, contrary to the claims of the “banjo 
poet…the chest-thumping imperialist,” that East and West can in fact be reconciled.201 
Ghosh takes on this lofty task through the singular Prince Barath, hailed as an avatar of the 
Hindu deity Krishna, who is prophesized to liberate his kingdom from British rule. The titles 
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of the three books that comprise Prince reflect this trajectory: “Preparing for Destiny: In 
India”; “Preparing for Destiny: In England”; and “The Destiny.” Born either during or 
shortly after the Delhi Durbar of 1877, Prince Barath, whose name is an anglicized rendering 
of Bharat, was very likely the first character in modern Indian fiction to have been 
“handcuffed to history,” preceding Salman Rushdie’s Saleem Sinai by over seventy years.202 
However, as a result of his sensitive and thoughtful nature, and profuse love of Britain, 
Barath refuses to fulfill his destiny when the opportunity presents itself. A novel of 
unseasonable youth, Prince instantiates Jed Esty’s observations regarding the breakdown of 
the turn-of-the-century bildungsroman as broader geopolitical forces increasingly eclipsed 
the nation at this moment, obliterating the structuring “soul-nation” allegory observed in 
classic bildungsromanae.203 Indeed, far from a “bildungsroman on an epic scale,” Prince is 
perhaps best characterized as a negative allegory or what Esty calls the metabildungsroman, 
as Barath’s development and destiny are sacrificed so that India can exist in an uncertain 
geopolitical future, one in which the polity will either remain a part of the British Empire or 
join Japan to displace Western hegemony.204 
 The first book of Prince tracks Barath’s childhood and early education as both he and 
his family become increasingly aware that he is indeed quite different from other children. 
Barath’s exceptionality is apparent even prior to his birth as he is the long-desired male heir 
born to the ancient kingdom of Barathpur that stands as a microcosm of a glorious Hindu 
India: “When Rome was not built, when Tyre and Carthage were yet unbegotten, the house 
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of Barath reigned supreme over India.”205 Alluding to the glorious kingdom of the five 
Pandava brothers in the Mahabharata, the two revered Hindu leaders Viswa-mitra and 
Vashista have divined that Barath is the “New Krishna” who has come to “to rebuild the 
walls of Indraprastha where he had reigned as King in his first coming.”206 His lovely elder 
sister Delini—a woman who will ultimately fight her way to becoming a sati—provides his 
initial education: “She taught him the customs of their caste, the legends and traditions of 
their dynasty—aye, the memories and associations of Barath-barsha.”207 Vashista similarly 
regales Barath with stories from “the ancient classics [which contained] the religious and 
moral principles of the Hindu faith.”208 By the end of the first book, Barath’s exceptionality 
is clear but his future is uncertain. He realizes that he does not wish to succeed his father as 
king of Barathpur but to become a pacific agent of goodwill who will ease suffering and the 
“pain of the world” wherever it might manifest: “A voice in his ear bade him arise…and that 
henceforth his task must be to lessen pain…”209  
Having established Barath as a marvelous son, student, brother, and friend, Ghosh 
has his hero travel to the metropole where he continues his education and forges significant 
new bonds with others. His journey to Britain to study is itself reflective of a significant 
gesture of hospitality. Barath was just an infant when Colonel Wingate, a former official of 
the colonial government and friend of his father, requested that the young prince be sent to 
England for his higher education. Like nearly all the characters of Prince, Wingate finds 
himself strangely drawn to Barath and desires to be his “guide and guardian” when he 
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eventually comes to Britain.210 While Wingate is Barath’s surrogate father, the warm and 
maternal Ellen, Wingate’s daughter-like caretaker, is Barath’s adoptive mother.211 Through 
Barath Ellen achieves her long-held desire to be a mother; she dotes on him and gives him 
the loving nickname “Dilkhusha” [my heart’s delight].212 Wingate and Ellen’s loving embrace 
of Barath as a member of their family epitomizes the goodwill with which Britons ought to 
treat the many Indian students in their midst.213 Barath proves so comfortable in his new 
environment and family that he even admits to Wingate that he believes he might have been 
an Englishman in a former life.214 Again, the meddling narrator drives home this point: 
And you, my English reader, pause and consider. There are seven hundred young 
Indian students in London: guideless, friendless, knowing no Englishman in his 
home. Falling back upon their own resources in a strange country, they gather 
together in lodging-houses—and talk politics: for where two or more Indians are 
gathered together there is nothing else to talk about outside their studies save 
politics; and from politics comes discontent, from discontent sedition. These young 
men must come to England for their studies by the regulations governing public 
services in India, and the failure of the British nation lies in not providing one more Ellen and 
one more Wingate. For if there were one more Wingate, there might also be one more Barath.215  
 
Published in the same tense sociopolitical milieu that had radicalized Dhingra, Prince delivers 
a timely rebuke of the discrimination and hostility that Indian students usually met in the 
metropole. Rather than being naturally wayward or malevolent, Indians students who turn to 
“sedition” or violence are the natural products of a profoundly inhospitable environment. 
Far from home and often privy only to the stern public faces of Britons, Indians students 
could not but become alienated and susceptible to “discontent.” Evoking Derrida’s notions 
of absolute hospitality, Wingate and Ellen’s loving yet paternalistic acceptance of Barath as a 
long-lost cherished son provides an inspirational horizon for how Indian students ought to 
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be treated. In the wake of the Wyllie assassination, British readers are encouraged to 
consider alternative paths Dhingra may have taken. Perhaps he could have been “one more 
Barath” instead of an assassin? 
In addition to these ties of kinship, Barath cultivates other relationships that deepen 
his affection for Britain. Barath serendipitously meets and befriends the poet Francis 
Thompson, who was in fact a good friend of Ghosh.216 In one significant scene Barath and 
Thompson stay up all night to translate Kalidasa’s Shakuntala into English. Like Tara and 
Kamala’s marriage in Hindupore, the translation is hailed as a kind of elixir that will inspire 
true amity between Britons and Indians. As Barath states, “Let the British public read it, and 
thus understand our most cherished ideals. That will serve to remove a mountain of 
misconception between Great Britain and India.”217 He also falls in love with Nora, Ellen’s 
angelic niece, who much like Tara in Hindupore, is a vacuous figure who either parrots 
positive opinions about Hindu cultural practices or supplies affirmative re-interpretations 
whenever negative views about the religion are expressed.  
A consummate gentleman despite his youth and inexperience, Barath’s impeccable 
behavior consistently endears him to his British hosts and vice versa. He attends Queen 
Victoria’s Diamond Jubilee celebration in which he causes a “sensation”; as the most dashing 
and charismatic Indian prince in attendance, he is the “cynosure” of all attendees.218 
Increasingly perceiving himself to be an agent of goodwill, Barath continues to perform 
noble deeds, such as sabotaging his performance in an exam so that his more deserving rival 
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would win: “Yes, a thousand times yes! Robert’s need was greater than his!”219 The narrator 
confirms Barath’s boundless open-mindedness, respect, and affinity for Britain and its 
people: 
[Barath] wished to understand the English people, understand their joys and 
pleasures no less than their tribulations. Some day in the far future he might 
perchance have a larger mission, which would include not only India but in part 
England, perhaps in part Europe. The thought flashed through his mind as a vague 
possibility. He let it rest at that.220  
 
Yes, [Barath] might be intended for a larger scheme of fate, to be revealed to him in 
the distant future…The best way for a man of keen perception to know England 
objectively—that is, truthfully—is to be born outside, and then to come in and 
become an Englishman. By being born outside he will possess the eye for the 
objective vision—and by subsequently becoming an Englishman he will prove that 
after the objective vision of England he loves her still. This is a simple truth, but a 
great truth—even though it has been left to an Eastern to discover. I mean Barath, 
yea, Barath.221  
 
Here the narrator underscores Barath’s profound affinity for England and his aspiration to 
understand not just its “joys and pleasures” but also its “tribulations,” and in fact “all that 
was humanly possible.” Such a desire evokes imperialist attitudes about knowing India in all 
possible respects but with a crucial difference: Barath’s cause is noble and he will continue to 
love England even after the discovery of any flaws. In a highly melodramatic scene, on his 
deathbed Wingate exacts a promise from Barath along these lines: “I see England’s peril in 
India. Barath, Barath, promise me—in the hour of England’s peril you will judge her 
generously? Generously for the intention if you cannot for the deed? […]”222 Having 
thoroughly become an Anglophile, Barath naturally gives his word to Wingate. Prior to 
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returning to India Barath even takes some soil from Ellen’s garden as a “memento of the 
country he had visited and had found to be a second home.”223  
Having established Barath’s exceptionality and deep affection for Britain, Ghosh 
now turns to the matter of whether he will indeed emerge as the “New Krishna” and liberate 
Barathpur in the third and final book, “The Destiny,” which comprises just over half of the 
novel’s six hundred and thirty pages. Though similarly episodic in nature, the narrative picks 
up speed as Vashista mounts increasing pressure on Barath to claim his destiny and lead the 
prophesized revolution against the British. It is in Vashista and Barath’s confrontation that 
Prince’s allegorical nature manifests most clearly as numerous players representing various 
modes of swadeshi resistance come to the fore. Vashista embodies the political extremism and 
transnationalism strands as he urgently desires to eject the British from the kingdom and has 
cultivated technological expertise from other countries in order to bolster Barathpur and 
foment a revolution. While Barath has been away in Britain, Vashista has dispatched 
Barathpur’s brightest young men across the world to “study the best institutions of the West, 
especially the methods of material progress” so that they will bring this knowledge back to 
the kingdom.224 The motivations of these young men serve as a cautionary tale for Britain, as 
several of them harbor deep resentment against the Raj due to firsthand experience with its 
oppressive policies. One such figure is Vindara, who qualified for the Indian Civil Service 
but was denied an appointment on discriminatory grounds.225 Instead of using their talents 
for the benefit of the colonial government, the men travel to nations like Germany and 
Japan to learn and import the technologies necessary for building both infrastructure 
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(“cranes, steam-hammers, bridges, and locomotives”) and weaponry (“other big, big things 
of steel and iron”).226   
As a result of Vashista’s endeavors, Barath eventually learns that he sits on an army 
consisting of one hundred and twenty thousand men with the promise of many more across 
India, China, and Japan.227 Paralleling actual terrorist secret societies active at this moment, 
many of the disaffected men of Barathpur have formed an underground terrorist cell, the 
House of the Serpent Gem, where they prepare for the imminent revolution. The narrator 
matter-of-factly tells the reader that the insurgents are “misguided men” whose fervor has 
transformed an intended revolution of thought to one of violence. Blinded by resentment, 
the men do not realize that military aggression “could only end in failure [and] that it might 
even spoil their juster cause.”228 During a meeting of the brotherhood, one of its leaders 
affirms that violence is warranted in order to dispel false beliefs of Bengali cowardice spread 
by writers like Kipling: 
Comrades, to those of you, who, like me, belong to Bengal, I have something to say 
of this banjo-poet. For twenty years he and his hundred imitators in England who 
write of India by his inspiration, have abused us and insulted us most deeply. I have 
in mind a recent book deemed to be almost a standard work on India. Confirming 
the banjo-poet and the others, it calls the Bengalis cowards, despicable cowards, 
devoid of a redeeming virtue, nay, even beneath contempt. Why? Because for twenty 
years we have taken their abuse lying down…229 
 
Brothers, we have to correct another libel. These abusers, sitting in safety, tell the 
Government to crush us with an iron hand, saying that in the East clemency is 
mistaken for weakness. These men are fools: they confuse the near East, the 
Mohammetan East, with India, China, and Japan. The Mohammetan faith is a 
militant faith and advocates the strong arm. But in India a Hindu king says from his 
throne to the lowest criminal in the kingdom, ‘Brother, thou art forgiven’—and the 
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criminal does lifelong penance in expiation. It is not likewise in China and Japan 
wherever the teachings of Buddha and Confucius prevail? […]230  
 
Comrades, shall we show the banjo-poet and his hundred imitators that the Bengalis 
may be ‘the Japanese of India’?231 
 
Like Mitra, Ghosh suggests that India is part of a broader Eastern configuration that 
includes China and Japan. A shared religious heritage unites the countries, one in which 
Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism have been conflated with one another. The 
presence of Chinese and Japanese “comrades” at the House of the Serpent Gem reinforces 
this connection. Japan is particularly important in this regard because high-ranking Japanese 
military leaders have come to teach Barathpur’s revolutionaries jiu-jitsu: “Though a colonel, 
Kaneko is willing to teach us the wisdom of his country; for jiu-jitsu makes a man of the 
lowest wreck of humanity.”232 The speaker goes on to stress that they must use their 
newfound knowledge to prove Kipling and his ilk wrong. As “the Japanese of India,” the 
Bengalis are indeed a formidable enemy and capable of armed aggression.  
 Such tensions climax in heated exchanges between Vashista and Barath over the 
prince’s divided loyalties. Though Barath had attempted to shed his Western associations 
and predilections when he returned to his kingdom, the unexpected arrival of Nora distracts 
him and rekindles his ardent love for both her and Britain: “Since Nora’s coming his mind 
had unconsciously reverted to the West, and he saw again with English eyes.”233 Evoking the 
many marriages of Hindupore, with Nora as his intended bride Barath wishes to inaugurate a 
new era of friendship and goodwill between India and Britain: “….we shall arouse [Britain] 
to the memory of Beaconsfield; thus shall our alliance be but a symbol of the bond between 
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Britain and India.”234 In contrast to Vashista for whom violence is the only answer, Barath 
repeatedly voices the moderate swadeshi view, which informs his rationale for not leading the 
desired revolution: 
For the present it is essential that the East should be on terms of friendship with the 
West for its own sake. Are we fit as yet? Fit to govern ourselves in the best possible 
manner without Western aid? Fit intellectually and morally? Intellectually perhaps—
among the higher castes. But morally? For seven long centuries we have betrayed 
one another for a selfish gain. How many true patriots are there in India to-day? 
How many that could not be bought by the British Government with a high office, a 
high honor, a high dignity?235  
 
…[Britain] has given us internal peace. To a generation brought up in tranquility that 
may not seem much, nevertheless it is a priceless blessing and the beginning of all 
other blessings. Again, she has given us the possibility of adopting what is best in 
Western institutions. Japan has indeed done that for herself, but Japan was an 
independent country. We were not; at least we were independent of each other, but 
fighting each other. Thirdly, during the last fifty years the spirit of nationalism has 
first been begotten in India. That is due directly to the British by the work of 
consolidation…236 
  
…My people, I would plead with you to aid me in restoring India’s true mission. It 
is not to begin the invasion of Europe—for the westward movement, if begun in 
India, might spread through Asia. Alone, of all countries of the earth, no invasion 
has ever gone forth from India, except the invasion of a religion—a religion of 
universal brotherhood, universal peace, universal love. Would you seek a new 
Krishna, or instead a New Buddha?237  
 
My people, do not rage. There is no room for rage, but for love. Forgive the West. 
Though the West has crucified the East, yet forgive the West. Forgive all things that 
you may understand all things… 
 
Barath’s followers remain unmoved by his pleas and he is ousted from power. And even 
though the stage has been set for the revolution, it does not occur because, apparently, no 
one else can lead the uprising in his stead. The force of 120,000 men that stands ready for 
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attack grows tired of waiting for its desired leader and disbands after three days.238 The 
narrator affirms that it was indeed because of Barath’s refusal to lead the men that the 
uprising did not occur: “…the revolution at Barathpur, deprived of Barath’s sanction was 
deprived of its cause of existence. It failed because of Barath’s love for England.”239 Here 
Barath’s failure to act provides an opportunity for the colonial government to take up a truly 
“British” form of ruling that moderates like Dadabhai Naoroji had craved: “an era of 
prosperity, contentment, happiness—an era of goodwill and friendship and ardent affection 
for Britain, through whose guidance all [desired material progress] will come to pass.”240  
But in terms of genre, the prophesied revolution cannot occur in this non-epic and 
non-bildungsroman because Barath is a hero burdened by politics, one in which India’s 
future was an open question. Unable to reconcile all of the competing and conflicting forces 
acting upon him, Barath attempts suicide, is saved, and ultimately abandons his kingdom and 
embraces a path of renunciation. Prince concludes with the heavy-handed message from the 
narrator that Britain is obliged to make itself worthy of Barath’s sacrifice by following his 
example: “try moral influence alone of the best and noblest kind…try to turn the coming 
conflict of East and West into concord…”241 This directive resonates with Barath’s 
frequently expressed wish that was simultaneously an indictment: “I would rather see Britain 
just than Britain great, but much more would I see her great by being just.”242 This plea 
might yet come true as the British resident assigned to Barathpur is so moved by Barath’s 
sacrifice that he learns to “see Indian affairs not only with English eyes but also Indian.”243 
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But should Britain continue to treat India with disdain, the revolution that was just narrowly 
averted today could very well occur tomorrow.  
 
Conclusion 
As the vast global expanse of the swadeshi movement demonstrates, Indian writers 
and thinkers were readily exploring the pitfalls and possibilities of the colonial relationship 
not just in India but across the British imperial web. While on the one hand Hindupore and 
Prince perpetuated the message of their romantic predecessors that India deserved British 
respect because of its wondrous past as Bharat, the flexibility of this cultural imagining also 
enabled them to make bolder claims that reflected the profound changes occurring in the 
global landscape during the first decade of the twentieth century. In spite of the arrogance of 
Kipling, Curzon, and other imperialists, Mitra and Ghosh, among many other Indian elites in 
this period, remained optimistic that the colonial relationship was worth salvaging. This 
guarded optimism is reflected in the fictional worlds of Hindupore and Prince where 
exceptional British and Indian elites are able to freely meet with one another and form deep 
and meaningful bonds including marriage, friendship, and kinship (though other kinds of 
political formations were also possible). The rather lackluster quality of Hindupore and Prince 
may be attributed precisely to a paradoxical political message that could not be contained 
within their espoused and implied generic aims of romance and epic. As time went on and 
reality (and social realism) increasingly set in, it would become all the more difficult to 
sustain the myth that empire and benevolence could coexist.  
 238 
CONCLUSION 
CONTAINING BHARAT: TAGORE’S WARNING 
 
“Amongst the civilizations of the world Bharatvarsha stands as an ideal of the endeavour to 
unify the diverse. Her history will bear this out.” 
-Rabindranath Tagore, “The History of Bharatvarsha”1 
 
“There is only one history—the history of man.  
All national histories are merely chapters in the larger one.” 
-Rabindranath Tagore, Nationalism2 
 
 
  “Imagining Bharat” has argued that the turn of the twentieth century was a pivotal 
moment for contemporary Indian nationhood, endeavoring to elucidate the longer history 
behind the seemingly axiomatic idea held by many Hindus around the world that India’s 
genuine identity is a Hindu space called Bharat. M.K. Gandhi popularized visions of India as 
a “Ram Rajya” [Reign of Ram] in the 1930s and 1940s, but the literature examined here 
suggests such ideas had long been circulating among Hindu elites across the colonial state.3 
While these visions galvanized Hindus, they also excluded or marginalized Indian Muslims, 
women, and other minorities in profound ways. In the wake of an increasingly contentious 
nationalist movement and violent bifurcation of the subcontinent along religious lines, not 
one but two independent nation-states emerged: the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the 
Republic of India. The inflammatory rhetoric and divisive politics of religious nationalism 
have endured within both countries, with the idea of “Bharat” continuing to play a key role 
in the Hindu nationalist vision of India. The recent victory of the Bharatiya Janata Party in 
the 2014 national elections and the appointment of controversial Hindu nationalist Narendra 
Modi to the post of Prime Minister have been particularly devastating to the country’s 
avowed commitment to secularism. 																																																								
1 Rabindranath Tagore, “The History of Bharatavarsha (August 1903),” 34. 
2 Rabindranath Tagore, “Nationalism in India,” 65. 
3 Ayesha Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia, 207. 
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It is fitting to conclude with a discussion of Rabindranath Tagore (1861-1941), who 
was prescient in his wariness towards nation-states and the violent ideologies that led to their 
creation. Tagore’s thinking on such issues evolved over the course of his adulthood, and his 
eventual turn away from prevailing ideas of nationalism in the early twentieth century led to 
frequent disagreements with his contemporaries, in particular Gandhi. Given the troubling 
legacies of religious nationalism in the Indian subcontinent, we can appreciate how 
perceptive Tagore had been in his suspicion towards limited (and limiting) ideas about 
Indian nationhood and belonging. Having become a figure of global stature after winning 
the Nobel Prize for literature in 1913, Tagore was also shrewd in using his newfound 
platform to voice his concerns to generally unreceptive audiences at a time when, particularly 
after the Second World War, empires were on the decline and nationalist desire was on the 
rise. 
In his masterful novel Gora (1910), Tagore registered his growing misgivings about 
the exclusionary violence intrinsic to nation-making, offering an incisive critique of 
conflating religious belonging with national identity. As mentioned in Chapter Four, Tagore 
had been a leader in swadeshi agitation in the early phases of the movement but grew 
disillusioned after witnessing its initial promises of brotherhood and amity dissolve into 
communal riots and violence: “Having seen all this at first hand…I no longer feel any desire 
to idealize the Hindu samaj through delusions pleasant to the ear, but ultimately suicidal….”4 
Although Tagore explored such themes in what is perhaps his best-known novel, Ghare Baire 
[The Home and the World] (1916), here I focus on Gora, a bildungsroman full of dynamic male 
and female characters that was first serialized in the Bengali monthly Probasi from 1907-
																																																								
4 Qtd. in Tapati Dasgupta, Social Thought of Rabindranath Tagore, 140. 
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1909.5  A sharp rejoinder to Bankim’s Anandamath, and, to a lesser extent, Kipling’s Kim, 
Gora centers on the maturation of the eponymous protagonist, a charismatic young pillar of 
the Hindu samaj in Calcutta who equates conservative Hindu orthodoxy with authentic 
devotion to Bharat. Gora finds himself increasingly isolated and unhappy as he discovers 
that his lofty ideals for himself, others, and the nation cannot be reconciled with the harsh 
realities he confronts. Through Gora’s ultimate realization that even he would be excluded 
from the constrained vision of Bharat that he advances (he learns near the end of the novel 
that he is not Indian but Irish), Tagore argues for a more expansive vision of Indian 
belonging that does not discriminate on the basis of religion, gender, caste, or class. 
Set in Calcutta during the 1880s, Gora stages a sustained debate between both 
orthodox and liberal adherents of Hinduism and the Brahmo Samaj, a reformist religious 
movement founded by Ram Mohan Roy in 1828.6 Tagore’s caution against conflating Hindu 
identity with India manifests primarily through the evolution of Gora’s views, which 
transform as a result of his interactions with his best friend and fellow Hindu, Binoy, a local 
Brahmo family, and most crucially, less privileged and uneducated Hindus and Muslims in 
surrounding villages. Gora gradually comes to realize that the intolerance and exclusions 
embedded within his exclusionary religious orthodoxy runs counter to his professed love of 
Bharatvarsha. Tagore makes heavy use of irony in the novel as Gora’s edicts to himself and 
others to “know thyself” ring hollow since Gora is oblivious to the crucial fact that he was 
adopted as an infant by his Hindu parents and is thus neither Indian nor Hindu.7 Through 
																																																								
5 Sujit Mukherjee, “Translator’s Preface,” np. 
6 The Brahmo Samaj was a reformist movement that desired to eliminate what it deemed to be retrograde 
elements of Hinduism, such as sati and idolatry. The Brahmo Samaj had a strong following among the Bengali 
bhadralok, including the eminent Tagore family. Rabindranath Tagore’s father, Debendranath Tagore, was a 
close associate of Roy. See Metcalf and Metcalf, A Concise History of Modern India, 86-88. 
7 Rabindranath Tagore, Gora, 78. 
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Gora’s ultimate epiphany, when he learns of his adoption, and subsequent liberation from 
the confines of his suffocating orthodox Hindu patriotism, Tagore advocates an India in 
which peoples of diverse faiths and creeds are able to live together. 
As wealthy, urban elites whose exposure to the world has come largely from 
schoolbooks, Gora and Binoy are initially characterized as naïve yet ambitious young men. 
Binoy is effectively an adopted brother of Gora and is regarded as another son by Gora’s 
(adoptive) mother Anandamoyi. The narrator’s remarks about Binoy—“All he knew about 
the world had been gleaned entirely from books”—also describe Gora.8 Both are members 
of a Hindu welfare society and “had resolved to remain bachelors, devoting their lives to the 
service of the nation.”9 But while Binoy has begun to have his doubts about the abstract 
nationhood that commands their all, Gora is unwavering in his commitment:  
B: “Where is this Bharatvarsha of yours?” 
 
G: “Where the compass here points, day and night,” replied Gora, touching his 
heart, “not in your Marshman saheb’s History of India.” 
 
B: “Where your compass points, does something exist?” 
 
G: “Indeed it does!” cried Gora, indignantly. “I may lose my way, or even drown, but 
my treasured port remains. It is my Bharatvarsha in all its glory, replete with wealth, 
knowledge, spiritual faith. To say that this Bharatvarsha does not exist! That only 
falsehood around us is real! ... There is a real Bharatvarsha—a complete India. Unless 
we establish ourselves there, we can’t absorb its true living essence into our minds 
and hearts. Therefore I say, forgetting all else, discarding book-learning, the lure of 
prestige, and the temptation of odd profits, we must set sail for that very port, 
whether we drown or perish. No wonder I can never forget the true, complete image 
of Bharatvarsha!”10 
 
This exchange signals Binoy’s growing alienation from Gora and his extreme beliefs. At 
stake are the fundamental questions such as those posed by John Strachey: “What is India?” 
																																																								
8 Ibid., 2. 
9 Ibid., 8, 81. 
10 Ibid., 21-22. 
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“What does this name really signify?” Echoing Bankim’s views in Anandamath, Gora argues 
that the true, real Bharatvarsha will manifest when all Hindus come together in devout 
adherence to Hinduism. Yet Binoy is wary of such abstractions and desires something more 
concrete to warrant such blind devotion: “Either show me that image, or let me remain all at 
sea, like everyone else.”11 Evoking the ardent devotion and sacrifice to the nation required by 
Bankim’s ascetics, Gora’s vision of Bharat requires intensive labor and sacrifice and is, 
accordingly, impossible for many to attain: “Strive for it. If you are a believer, you will find 
happiness in sincere effort.”12 Binoy’s lingering doubts after this tense exchange are 
revealing: “Today his heart rose in rebellion. He began to feel that Bharatvarsha was only a 
figure of negation.”13 
Binoy and Gora’s ties to one another—and to the largely nebulous ideas of the 
nation that they struggle to maintain—are challenged through their exposure to the liberal 
and progressive Poreshbabu Bhattacharya and his family, who are adherents of Brahmoism. 
In line with this creed's rejection of many aspects of traditional Hindu practice held to be 
retrograde, Poreshbabu’s daughters do not observe purdah, and are highly educated, 
independent, and outspoken in their opinions and beliefs. It is in the inviting space of 
Poreshbabu’s home that Binoy and Gora’s conservative Hindu beliefs clash with the more 
progressive, liberal views of the Brahmo faith. The early conversations between Poreshbabu, 
Binoy, Gora, and Poreshbabu’s daughters Sucharita and Lalita largely center on Hinduism 
and contentious practices such as idol worship and caste.14 While Binoy tries to adopt an 
agreeable tact in his arguments, Gora assumes an offensive and even combative posture that 
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is off-putting to everyone. The narrator observes that “[Gora] was the living image of 
rebellion against the modern age” as he flagrantly showcases his Hindu identity through his 
“tilak of sacred Ganga soil,” “coarse dhoti,” and “Cuttack shoes with pointed curling toes.”15 
Gora also ostentatiously observes purity rituals even in Poreshbabu’s home (i.e., by not 
eating proffered food), which is highly offensive to his hosts, particularly Sucharita and 
Lalita, as well as to Binoy.16  
Tagore critiques not only the religious orthodoxy in the Hindu tradition but also that 
of the Brahmo faith. The designated suitor to Sucharita, Haranchandra Nag is the zealous 
Brahmo counterpart to Gora’s staunch Hindu orthodoxy.17 Soon after they meet the two 
start bickering over Haranchandra’s aping of British views about the inferiority of the 
Bengali Hindus: “However successful they may be at passing examinations, Bengalis are 
incapable of doing any work.”18 In his angry reply, Gora cites the hollow nature of the 
Haranchandra’s beliefs and charges him with being an unthinking mimic of the British: 
“Your account of social evils is merely learned by rote from English books…You yourself 
know nothing of such practices. You should voice your opinions on this subject only when 
you are capable of expressing a similar contempt for all English practices.”19   
The novel further censures the orthodoxies of Haranbabu and Gora when the two 
discuss the controversial topic of Hindu reform. To Haranbabu’s suggestions that a 
widespread Indian nationalism could only occur after Hindus first rid themselves of certain 
ostensibly backward practices, Gora retorts: 
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“I believe in the ideas you denounce as superstition. Until you can love your country 
and join your own countrymen on an equal footing, I shan’t tolerate the slightest 
criticism of the nation from your lips…Reform must come much later. Love and 
respect are more important by far. We must unite first; then reform will follow 
automatically, from within. Remaining separate, you all want to fragment the nation; 
alleging that the nation is full of social evils, you wish to keep aloof as a band of do-
gooders. I tell you, it’s my greatest desire not to separate myself from anyone else on 
the pretext of superiority. Afterwards, when we are one, the nation, and the Maker of 
its destiny, will decide which customs to retain, and which ones to discard.”  
 
“There are customs and beliefs that prevent the unity of the nation,” countered 
Haranbabu. 
 
“Expecting to uproot those customs and beliefs one by one before uniting the 
country, is like dredging the ocean before attempting to cross it,” Gora declared. 
“With humility and love, banishing contempt and arrogance, surrender yourself 
wholeheartedly to all, and such love will easily overcome a thousand faults and 
shortcomings. Every country, every society, has its faults and shortcomings, but as 
long as the people of a nation are bound together by love for their countrymen, they 
can deal with the poison. The germs of decay exist in the air. As long as we stay alive, 
we manage to survive them, but once dead, we succumb to decay. I tell you, we 
shan’t brook any attempts at reform, whether from you or from missionaries!”20  
 
While for Haranbabu, the reform of Hindu traditions must precede nationalism and nation, 
for Gora, reform is a profound betrayal to the cultural integrity of Bharat. Gora’s view is 
evocative of many Bengali bhadralok in the late nineteenth century; owing to its ostensibly 
Anglophilic and Christian orientation, the Brahmo Samaj was perceived to be an elitist and 
exclusionary organization.21 This exchange is also heavily ironized in that Gora, born to an 
Irishman (though he does not yet know it), suggests that Haranbabu is not an authentic 
Hindu, Bengali, or Indian. For Gora, Haranbabu’s flaws include not only his shameless 
parroting of British views, but also his adherence to a doctrine, Brahmoism, that was 
founded on the wrongful internalization of British critiques of Hinduism.  
																																																								
20 Ibid., 63-64. 
21 As Metcalf and Metcalf observe, “For the most part, these men were unwilling to follow Ram Mohan Roy in 
repudiating so ruthlessly so much of contemporary Hindu devotional practice” (88). 
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The irony of the passage further manifests in Gora’s declaration that he will “not 
separate [himself] from anyone else on the pretext of superiority” because he ultimately 
becomes estranged from Binoy on precisely such grounds. As a result of his ongoing 
interactions with Poreshbabu and his daughters, Binoy gradually shifts his allegiance from 
Gora to the Brahmo family. Much like Sucharita and Lalita, Binoy is drawn to Poreshbabu’s 
open-mindedness and humility, and eventually falls in love with the bold and charismatic 
Lalita. When the two decide to get married, Gora disapproves of the union because Binoy is 
an orthodox Hindu and Lalita is a Brahmo. Even though his condemnation of the marriage 
means that Binoy and Gora’s friendship will effectively end, Gora is adamant that such a 
drastic course of action is necessary: “When our own dear ones become alien to us we have 
no choice but to abandon them completely.”22 Gora’s reaction stands in stark contrast to 
that of Poreshbabu, who, after careful thought and consideration, agrees with both Binoy 
and Lalita that narrow-minded and arbitrary dictates of one’s society ought not to trump the 
will of the individual, especially when the latter is honorable: “I have realized that there is no 
religious cause to oppose your union…in such a situation you are not obliged to accept any 
objections raised by society. I just have a small thing to say: if you wish to exceed the limits 
of society then you must rise above society, be greater than it.”23 For Tagore, Poreshbabu’s 
equanimity and humility, which favors unity over separation, is precisely what India needs. 
The turning point of the novel occurs when Gora, like his literary precursor Kim, 
takes a walking tour on the Grand Trunk Road in order to expose himself to unfamiliar 
																																																								
22 Ibid., 411. 
23 Ibid., 409. 
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elements and discover his nation in its fullness.24 Yet, as the narrator reports, what Gora 
discovers is deeply disappointing: 
For the first time, Gora saw what our country is like, outside the social worlds of the 
respectable bhadralok, the educated, and the Kolkata-dwellers. How fragmented, 
narrow-minded and feeble was this vast, concealed realm of rural Bharatvarsha—
how utterly unaware of its own power, how completely ignorant and indifferent 
about its own interests! How extreme were the social differences between places 
only…ten to fifteen miles apart—how many self-created and imaginary obstacles 
constrained the land from advancing in the world’s giant workplace—how much 
importance it attached to trivialities, how moribund it had grown, clinging to every 
prejudice and superstition—how somnolent was its mind, how faint its heart, how 
feeble its efforts! Had he dwelt among the villages in his way, Gora could never have imagined 
this.25 
 
While Binoy’s realization about the limitations of Bharat had been prompted by the nation’s 
exclusion of women, Gora is roused from his naiveté when he views the devastation 
wrought by caste, communalism, and ignorance. Upon seeing the discouraging realities of 
the rural populations, Gora begins to understand that his staunch brand of Hindu orthodoxy 
is profoundly shortsighted and far too exacting. His later observations of Muslim villagers 
reinforce his growing realization that Hinduism is intrinsically flawed in its prescription and 
sanction of social antagonism and violence within the fold: “It pained [Gora’s] entire being 
to acknowledge that Muslims were united by their dharma, not merely by their practices. Just 
as the bonds of tradition had not needlessly restrained all their activities, so also were their 
bonds of religion extremely close.”26 
In the novel women emerge as critical interlocutors with the men in numerous 
substantive discussions about religious belonging and the Indian nation. In sharp contrast to 
the flat and one-sided Hindu heroines observed in the works of Bankim, Ghosh, and Mitra, 
the majority of Gora’s female characters are dynamic figures who, for the most part, do as 																																																								
24 Ibid., 149. 
25 Ibid., 180. Emphasis added. 
26 Ibid., 463. 
 247 
they please and affect real change in their environments. For example, through Lalita’s 
encouragement, Binoy comes out of Gora’s shadow and realizes the limitations of his 
friend’s orthodoxy and conservatism. On top of refusing to participate in a demeaning, 
obsequious play put on for the amusement of British officials, Lalita flees the humiliating 
scene with Binoy, causing great scandal in the Brahmo community. She again defies Brahmo 
custom when, with her father’s blessing, she marries Binoy according to Hindu rites.27 
Similarly, Sucharita refuses Haranbabu’s relentless proposals of marriage, and after much 
careful thought and consideration, realizes that her exchanges with Gora have actually led 
her to identify with the Hindu faith (albeit a reflective, moderate brand analogous to 
Poreshbabu’s Brahmoism). As she tells her father, “All these days I felt no connection with 
my nation’s past or future, but so powerfully has my heart now recognized the great reality 
of that connection, I simply cannot drive it from my mind…But now my heart vehemently 
and unabashedly proclaims: ‘I am a Hindu.’ That brings me great joy.”28 
The most significant female character in Gora is Anandamoyi, who is at once the 
mother of all and the mother of no one. The female counterpart to the liberal Poreshbabu, 
she evinces precisely the kind of broadminded and egalitarian notions towards self and other 
that Tagore considers necessary for the nation-in-the-making. Much like the younger women 
Sucharita and Lalita, Anandamoyi readily challenges unthinking adherence to immoral or 
unjust behavior. For example, when her husband Krishnadayal hesitated to give shelter to 
Gora’s birth mother during the chaos of the 1857 rebellion, Anandamoyi found a way for 
the woman to stay with them (she died just after giving birth to Gora).29 While Krishnadayal 
wanted to send the infant to an orphanage, Anandamoyi insisted that the child be raised in 																																																								
27 Ibid., 402. 
28 Ibid., 447. 
29 Ibid., 31. 
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their home. The following exchange reveals the stark differences between Anandamoyi and 
Krishnadayal when it comes to arbitrary religious and social dictates:  
A: “So what if I’m a Brahman’s daughter? I have given up Brahman practices, 
haven’t I? Just recently, at Mahim’s wedding, the bride’s family had threatened to 
create trouble about my Khristani ways. So I had deliberately remained aloof, not 
said a word. The entire world calls me a Christian, and many other things besides, 
but I accept everything, saying: Aren’t Christians human beings after all! If you are of 
such high caste and so dear to the Almighty, why does He let you suffer defeat at the 
hands of Pathans, Mughals and Christians, in turn?” 
  
K: “That’s a long story. You’re a woman. Such things are beyond your 
comprehension. But you do understand don’t you, that there is something called a 
community, which you should respect?” 
A: “I have no need to understand such things. I only understand that having reared 
Gora as my son, if I now pretend to be orthodox, my faith will certainly be lost, 
whether the community remains or not. It is out of respect for religion that I have 
never concealed anything. I let everyone know that I don’t follow any restrictions, 
and suffer everyone’s contempt in silence…”30  
 
In this exchange, Tagore pits religious orthodoxy (as represented by the unsympathetic and 
dislikable Krishnadayal) against an open, inclusive humanism (as embodied by Anandamoyi). 
Although she was raised in a Brahman household, Anandamoyi has since abandoned its 
many restrictions and pays no attention to other Hindus decrying her “Khristani” [Christian] 
ways. Anandamoyi would rather remain true to what she believes is moral and just—
including taking in the orphaned infant Gora—than cater to orthodox Hindu opinion, which 
would have disapproved of this act.   
Much like Poreshbabu, Anandamoyi evaluates all prescriptions of thought and 
action, especially those that do violence to others, through her own brand of personal ethics 
and morality. In sharp contrast to Krishnadayal whose newfound religious turn results in a 
withdrawal from the world—and particularly Gora whom he regards as polluting—
Anandamoyi challenges any action that irrationally divides people rather than fosters 																																																								
30 Ibid., 32-33. 
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connections between them. No matter the difficulties or disgrace that may befall her, she 
consistently acts in ways that she holds to be honorable and right. Similar to Poreshbabu, 
Anandamoyi’s warmth and openness draw many “children” to her, among them Binoy, 
Sucharita, and Lalita. For example, when Binoy desires to marry Lalita and is faced with the 
prospect of no family attending his wedding, Anandamoyi enthusiastically does her part to 
represent Binoy’s family and welcomes Lalita as a daughter-in-law. As she tells Poreshbabu, 
“Please have no worries about Lalita…She will never suffer any pain at the hands of the one 
to whose care who have surrendered her. And after all this time, the Almighty has filled a 
gap in my life. I had no daughter, but now I have acquired one.”31 
Anandamoyi’s authenticity additionally stands in stark contrast to the vanity of 
Borodasundari, Poreshbabu’s selfish and callous wife, and Harimohini, Sucharita’s shrewish 
widowed aunt. Both women are depicted as extremely conservative in their respective 
religious beliefs and are offensive in their interactions with others, particularly their own 
family. Despite being a Brahmo, and having ostensibly progressive views, Borodasundari 
constantly compares Sucharita with her three daughters by birth (Lalita, Leela, and Labanya) 
and marginalizes the former within the family. She also does not attend Lalita’s wedding to 
Binoy. In a similar manner, Harimohini, a highly conservative Hindu woman, designs to 
marry off Sucharita to a Hindu family of her (Harimohini’s) choosing. Considering that 
Poreshbabu gave her shelter when she was in need, and that she remains dependent upon 
Sucharita for her livelihood, Harimohini’s desire to marry off Sucharita into a Hindu family 
is highly offensive, demonstrating the systemic nature of the abuse that conservative Hindu 
women frequently inflict upon one another and across generations. In contrast to these 
women who are staid and unthinking figures, Anandamoyi, Lalita, and Sucharita function as 																																																								
31 Ibid., 460. 
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positive role models for Hindu women as they consistently embrace righteous action over 
senseless and unjust customs and beliefs. 
Tagore completes his critique of unreflective adherence to religion at the conclusion 
of the novel when Gora (finally) discovers that he is in fact not Hindu by birth. This 
revelation is nothing less than profoundly liberating for Gora given his growing awareness of 
the many deficiencies of orthodox Hinduism and in particular its tendency to keep its 
adherents alienated from one another. Rather than decrying or lamenting this knowledge as 
might be expected, Gora is elated and goes to Poreshbabu’s house right away. Blurting out 
that he “has no ties,” Gora is elated to tell Poreshbabu that 
Today I have become an Indian—Bharatvarshia. In me there is no hostility towards 
any community, Hindu, Muslim or Christian. Today I belong to every community of 
this Bharatvarsha. I accept everyone’s food as mine…You are the one with the 
mantra for this freedom. That is why, in our present times, you could not find a 
place within any community. Make me your disciple. Initiate me today into the 
mantra of that deity who belongs to everyone, Hindu, Muslim, Christian, or Brahmo, 
whose temple doors are never closed to any community, or any individual, who is 
not merely a deity for Hindus but the deity of Bharatvarsha!32  
 
In this ironic denouement, Gora reaches a newfound awareness about himself and the world 
through his discovery that he never was, nor need be, bound to Hinduism. Gora finds 
himself liberated from its many restrictions and is now able to embrace his newfound beliefs 
and desires, including his love of Sucharita. Unencumbered by demeaning and exacting caste 
restrictions, Gora can now rekindle his friendship with Binoy and is free to request water 
from Anandamoyi’s low-caste maid, an act that would have unthinkable before.33 He can 
also now admit his admiration for Poreshbabu and approach him as his guru, for he is the 
only one “with the mantra for this freedom.” Much like Anandamoyi, it is Poreshbabu who 
embodies the egalitarianism and equity that is consonant with what Bharatvarsha really 																																																								
32 Ibid., 506-507. 
33 Ibid., 508. 
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needs. Likewise, Gora’s embrace of Anandamoyi in the concluding scene of the novel, “Ma, 
you are my real mother! …You have no caste, no discrimination, no contempt for anyone. 
You are the very image of goodness! It is you who are my Bharatvarsha!...”34 emphasizes the 
openness and love that will bring Indians together. Eschewing Bankim’s violent deification 
of the motherland as a Hindu goddess, Tagore upholds a vision of Bharat in which all 
Indians—Hindus and Muslims, men and women, those of high and low castes—may come 
together rather than remaining aloof and hostile to one another on the basis of religious 
orthodoxy and dogmatism.  
In Gora, Rabindranath Tagore offered a powerful critique of Hindu nationalism at 
the turn of the twentieth century, which Tanika Sarkar has called a “significantly new 
political imaginary.”35 As opposed to the romanticized portrayals of Bharat offered by 
Bankim, Ghosh, and Mitra, Tagore called attention to the inherent dangers of this idea that 
was being shrilly advocated by an intellectual elite disengaged and disaffected from more 
peaceable ways of rallying the masses. His admonitions about nationalism were prescient in 
their emphasis that the ideology of India as Bharat was informed by discriminatory views of 
not just religion, but also class, caste, and gender. Given that this dissertation has only 
examined male writers, Tagore’s powerful words, uttered through Binoy, deserve reflection: 
“We see Bharatvarsha only as a land of men; we don’t notice women at all.”36  
In considering the longer cultural history behind Hindu nationalism, “Imagining 
Bharat” intervenes in scholarly discussions about the inherent instability of group and 
national belonging and the powerful ways in which nostalgia can activate nationalist desire. 
Rather than continuing to look to proximate causes for India’s ongoing communal strife, this 																																																								
34 Ibid. 
35 Tanika Sarkar, “Rabindranath’s ‘Gora’ and the Intractable Problem of Indian Patriotism,” 37. 
36 Ibid., 110. 
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dissertation has endeavored to illuminate the ways in which the seeds of such discord were 
sown in literature published well over a century ago. Events such as the 1947 Partition and 
the ongoing instances of communal violence in India are thus thrown into sharper relief, as 
outcomes of an ideology that has long privileged India’s Hindus to the detriment of religious 
minorities, women, and those of low caste. By examining how India became imagined as 
Bharat, the dissertation has attempted to highlight literature’s critical role in shaping our 
ingrained ideas about who we are and where we belong, and how such beliefs may, perhaps, 
change.   
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